U.S. Aid to Perestroika Could Make Soviet Economy Lean--and Military Mean

President Reagan has a new friend: the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Being a generous man, the President wants to help his friend solve some of the more intractable problems that beset him. Thus it is that the President has become a cheerleader for perestroika , Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s plan to restructure Soviet society in general and the economy in particular.

The Soviets, however, need more than cheerleaders. They need management skills, technology and money in order to reform their ossified system. Without the practical wherewithal that is only available in the West, Gorbachev’s battles against the economic bureaucracy are doomed.

Can the United States provide Gorbachev with the support he requires? Of course we can. Whether we should do so is an entirely different matter.

The issue is not one that directly relates to the longevity of Gorbachev; even if he disappears from the scene relatively quickly, the social and political Pandora’s Box he has opened will be difficult to close. Rather, the question is one of U.S. interest in perestroika creating a leaner Soviet economy that could breed a meaner Soviet military.

The Soviet military is in the throes of a doctrinal debate over its posture, it has been demoralized by the defeat in Afghanistan, it is rapidly becoming populated by less well-educated and non-Russian-speaking Soviet Asians, and it finds itself succumbing to the American disease of longer development cycles as it produces ever more sophisticated equipment. In short, the armed forces, despite their domination of Soviet high technology and their 15% slice of the gross national product (more than twice the equivalent available to the Pentagon), are at an institutional crossroads. Reportedly the Soviet navy has already been forced to cut back on operations because of economic difficulties. It must be clear to all of the services that they will benefit only with a perestroika of their own.

Such a restructuring could best be accelerated through the availability of hard currency for the purchase of foreign materials, the acquisition of foreign technology to shortcut domestic Soviet development efforts and the application of Western management methods to ensure that increasingly complex weapon systems are high in both quality and reliability.

Yet it is precisely this acceleration that the Reagan Administration in general, and the Department of Defense in particular, fought against for the past seven years. The Defense Department wrested control of strategic-export policy from the Commerce Department so that it could take the lead in organizing reluctant allies to tighten the control of technology exports to the East. After battling for several years, the Defense Department was able to resuscitate the Consultative Committee on Export Control, which previously consisted of a threadbare office, an ancient typewriter and the ghost of a staff. The committee updated the critical technology lists and ensured that allied representation included officials from defense ministries, not only (as had often been the case) from trade ministries whose goal was to sell products --not to restrict their sale.

Many technologies fall into the gray “dual use” area: They have both commercial and military applications. This is especially true with respect to computer-related technologies. The Soviets are constantly emphasizing the importance of the computer to perestroika. The computer is also the linchpin of modern military weapon systems. An atmosphere that encourages support for the sale of civilian technologies in the name of perestroika will accommodate dual-use technologies as well.

Similarly, throughout the Reagan years the Department of Defense has sought support for legislative initiatives to control, or at least to monitor, the nature and level of “no-strings” loans to Eastern Europe. After repeatedly failing to carry the Administration with it, Defense finally won the support of major government agencies, at least to the degree that the United States is asking its allies to use financial aid as a lever to encourage democracy in Eastern Europe.

The enthusiasm for helping to finance Soviet economic rationalization in the name of perestroika will render it extremely difficult for the Administration to block loans to the Soviets. That the funds generated by these loans could be used to purchase military components from the West, or from other arms manufacturers ranging from Brazil to the Far East, would quickly and unfortunately be overlooked.

One of the most visible means by which U.S. support for perestroika could be demonstrated is in the area of joint ventures. Since restructuring cannot take place without a honing of management skills, joint ventures appear an ideal mechanism for embodying the spirit in which the President blessed perestroika at the Moscow summit meeting. On the other hand, managerial skills, particularly quality control and inventory management, are readily transferable to the military sector, where they would be most welcome. It was precisely for this reason that Defense officials counseled caution to their counterparts in agencies that are inclined to rush headlong into support for the Soviet initiative. In this regard nothing has changed since before the Moscow summit other than the atmospherics, which are making resistance to joint ventures more difficult.

It is clear that perestroika’s benefit to the military could be damaging to Western interests. The indirect provision of technology, financing and managerial skills to the Soviet defense effort would dovetail neatly with the plans that Gen. N. V. Ogarkov, the former chief of general staff, and his followers have postulated to build a more responsive, more efficient, sophisticated fighting force.

Yet if the United States were to decline to participate in ventures that might turn deleterious to the security of the West, would America stand accused of undermining the very perestroika that its President had so publicly praised and supported? Most likely it would. Indeed, as the “era of good feelings” spans our election season, the pressure will grow to avoid the inevitable calumny that would accompany an American refusal to ease its current tough stand on technological relations with the East.

It will therefore take courage, foresight and fortitude for this Administration and its successor to avoid paying more than lip service to friend Gorbachev’s commendable concern about his economy. But to support words with action would be to risk a further deterioration in the military balance between the superpowers, with serious consequences for Western security for many years to come.