Papers Support View That Johnson Tried to Mold Vietnam War Opinion

Secret documents recently declassified and opened to public view confirm behind-the-scenes efforts by the late President Lyndon B. Johnson and top military commanders to manipulate American public opinion of the Vietnam War and reverse growing opposition.

In one memo, Vietnam commanders were told to “make it clear to all concerned that expressing criticism to news media representatives and others will serve only to aggravate the issues surrounding our problems in Southeast Asia.” It was signed by Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific.

Johnson himself was described in some messages as wanting to play down military operations in 1968 so as not to upset efforts to get the North Vietnamese to enter peace talks.

The 12 million pages at the National Archives are one-sixth of the 72 million pages of Army documents that will be released in installments. The next batch will be released in April, 1990.

Wide Ranging Material

The papers’ topics range from battlefield reports to a division commander’s concern that his troops were taking radios and comic books to the front lines, making them less vigilant against Viet Cong attack.

But the most significant papers are the exchanges between Saigon and Washington. While Johnson’s sensitivity to criticism and his Administration’s efforts to put the most favorable light on an unpopular war were widely reported at the time, the papers provide an inside view of official thinking.

One particular message, signed by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, illustrates the Administration’s thrust. It was sent Jan. 31, 1968, at the start of North Vietnam’s Tet offensive, which began turning Americans against their involvement in the distant war.

In the memo, Gen. William C. Westmoreland was told that President Johnson wanted him to make a brief personal comment to the press at least once each day “to convey to the American people your confidence in our capability to blunt these enemy moves and to reassure the public here that you have the situation under control.”

Chaotic Situation

But even as Westmoreland received the memo, the situation was chaotic, with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops attacking more than 100 cities and towns on the second day of their 3-day Lunar New Year, called Tet.

They suffered heavy casualties but showed the vulnerability of South Vietnam’s cities, sending a message to Americans that no end to the war was near. In the two weeks of the offensive, more than 1,000 Americans were killed, increasing frustration and dismay back home.

The papers also reveal that Johnson’s decision two months later to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in hope of coaxing the enemy to the peace table was instead taken by military officers as an opportunity to lie low in bad weather and sway public opinion at the same time.

The President appeared on national television on March 31, 1968, to announce the cessation of bombing above the 20th Parallel. He then stunned listeners when he added that he would not run for another term as President.

Timing of Decision

In a memo dated the same day and apparently reflecting prior knowledge of Johnson’s announcement, Sharp, the Pacific commander, pointed out to Westmoreland that the bombing halt was timed just right.

“Since the Tet offensive, support in the U.S. for the war in Southeast Asia has decreased at an accelerating rate,” Sharp wrote. “Many of the strongest proponents of forceful action in Vietnam have reversed their positions, have moved to neutral ground or are wavering. If this trend continues unchecked, public support of our objectives in Southeast Asia will be too frail to sustain the effort.

“Weather over the northern portion of North Vietnam will continue unsuitable for air operations during the next 30 days. Therefore, if a cessation of air operations is to be undertaken, now is the best time from the military viewpoint.

“It is hoped that this unilateral initiative to seek peace will reverse the growing dissent and opposition within our country to the war. The initiative will aid in countering foreign criticism.”

Public Opinion Sensitivity

In another March 31 message, Wheeler advised Westmoreland that at a White House meeting that night, Johnson “cited the fact that we have been accused in the past of always accompanying peace initiatives with increased military activity.”

Wheeler said the President was aware of ongoing operations to open Route 9 and lift the North Vietnamese siege of the American base at Khe Sanh, one of the most widely reported campaigns of the war.

“The purpose of this message is not to have you stand down those operations,” Wheeler told Westmoreland. “However, it is desired that you, your subordinate commanders and your PA (public affairs) people play them low key. . . . You and your people should take care to describe these operations as being merely in the usual run of offensive operations.”

The battle to free Khe Sanh, however, was hardly usual. More than 200 Marines were killed and 1,600 wounded in the 77-day siege, which was lifted April 5, 1968.

Johnson Furious

In the meantime, air strikes continued in the less populous southern panhandle of North Vietnam, and the Administration failed to manipulate the press to its liking. When it was reported in mid-April that U.S. bombers had launched the heaviest air strikes of the war in the panhandle, Johnson was furious. That prompted a cable on April 16 from Wheeler to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and others, including Sharp and Westmoreland:

“Apparently, the President was considerably chafed by TV and radio newscasts . . . to effect that Johnson unleashed yesterday heaviest air attacks of war against panhandle of NVN (North Vietnam),” Wheeler said. “The President thinks we are handing a case to those who profess that our actions are contrary to his 31 March speech by providing so much detail . . . to the news media.”

Sharp and Westmoreland suggested to Wheeler that if bombing was to be renewed beyond the panhandle, their commands should decline comment to the press. Responding on May 23, Wheeler said:

“As I advised you previously, the highest authority (Johnson) desires the noise level to be kept low in such eventuality--i.e, no announcements to the press giving details of weight or effort, targets struck, etc.

“I must say, Westy, that your proposal and the rationale behind it make good sense; specifically, that you make no announcements but be permitted to confirm that a particular target has been struck if such question is asked.”

The North Vietnamese did agree to peace talks, which opened in Paris on May 13, 1968. But it was almost five more years, on Jan. 27, 1973, before an agreement was reached ending U.S. intervention in the war.