The Sanctions Message

Congress’ indignation and concern about the deteriorating situation in South Africa make its drive to adopt more assertive sanctions understandable. But they are not likely to survive the near-certain veto of President Reagan, and, in the long run, that may very well be for the best.

One good reason for postponing implementation of new sanctions is that the old sanctions have not had a fair test. The evidence suggests that part of the problem has been foot-dragging by the Reagan Administration. Given the fact that the sanctions were imposed over the President’s veto, his lack of enthusiastic application would not be surprising.

Another cause for reflection is the extreme nature of the sanctions approved Thursday by the House of Representatives. They would cut off virtually all economic relations between the United States and South Africa and were intended, according to Rep. Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.), to be a declaration “of economic warfare.” Unless there were full compliance by other major investors and traders like Japan, West Germany and Britain, any moderating influence that the next American Administration might have would be lost. Sanctions are more likely to be effective than draconian measures that terminate relations, especially if they are applied on a carefully graduated scale to reinforce realistic demands.

It is certainly true that sanctions thus far have encouraged the South Africans to dig in more stubbornly than ever and to harden racial repression with a state of emergency. Some loyalists say that sanctions boost their confidence in South Africa and make them more determined to go on alone. But the response masks not only the deep effect that even relatively mild sanctions have had in undermining economic confidence, but also the terrible fear of broader sanctions. Sanctions do hurt, and they hurt everyone.

It is the fact that they hurt everyone, including the black majority, that raises another sort of question. Given those risks, and given the failed Reagan policy of constructive engagement that encouraged intransigence in Pretoria, we think that a better case can be made for delay to allow a new President a new opportunity to test, for example, South Africa’s intentions in Namibia, where progress now seems just possible. To rush ahead now could limit the potential for progress available to the White House six months from now.

But a vote in the Senate for tough sanctions is almost certain, following the House action. And Pretoria must understand the significance of that vote. Next year there will not be a President as committed as Reagan to resist sanctions. Michael S. Dukakis has spoken for firm action. George Bush is also a strong opponent of apartheid, and learned in serving at the United Nations the potential for good in multilateral action.

The reality may be that the whites who control South Africa will be unable to enact reforms that are acceptable to the world community and will throw away the opportunity that is theirs to end at last the racism and injustice of their system. In that event, global sanctions would only accelerate South Africa’s own process of self-destruction.