Afghanistan: More Bloodletting

Afghanistan was supposedly the Soviet Union’s Vietnam, its introduction to the humbling realities of fighting a guerrilla war that it could not win. But the parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan can be overdrawn--a lesson brought home by Moscow’s announcement last week that it was suspending the withdrawal of its troops because of an offensive mounted by the moujahedeen rebels. When the United States left Vietnam, it practically washed its hands of Indochina; the Soviet Union, by comparison, wants to salvage what it can from its nine-year occupation of Afghanistan and to influence the shape of its future government.

The United States has reacted quietly to the Soviet announcement, with assurances from official spokesmen that the Administration expects the Soviet withdrawal to be concluded by Feb. 15, right on schedule. By expressing confidence that the Soviets will do what they promised to do, the United States is in essence letting them know that Washington will not be panicked into further concessions. The United States wisely recognizes that Moscow is almost certainly not going to reverse itself and seek a military solution in Afghanistan; the Soviets have too much at stake. Remaining in Afghanistan would shatter the growing trust between Moscow and Washington, derail any detente with China and expose the Soviets both to international criticism and to a popular backlash at home, where the war is regarded as a major blunder.

Moscow’s real objective is to buy more time for Afghan President Najibullah’s beleaguered Marxist regime, which has come under such relentless pressure from the well-armed moujahedeen that some experts thought that it might fall even before the last Soviet troops pulled out. While the Soviets complain that stepped-up deliveries of U.S. arms have escalated the violence, the United States blames Moscow for introducing new weapons to the conflict, including Soviet-based Backfire bombers and Scud-B missiles targeted on the moujahedeen and their arms depots in Pakistan.

The superpowers have long wrangled over which should be the first to halt weapons deliveries to Afghanistan. On that point the Geneva peace agreement was little more than an agreement to disagree; neither promised to relent. What is significant about the Soviets’ newest weapons is that they seem aimed at punishing the moujahedeen so that they will bargain with Najibullah; the none-too-subtle threat is that, even if the moujahedeen take Kabul, an unfriendly regime in Afghanistan will always be within easy reach of long-range Soviet firepower. Self-determination is not in the Soviets’ lexicon.

Neither the Soviets’ new bombing raids nor the suspended Soviet withdrawal has intimidated the moujahedeen. If anything, the rebels’ attitudes appear to have hardened. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the Afghan resistance, told Times staff writer Norman Kempster this week that his organization would never negotiate with Najibullah. “You don’t give the murderers of a nation the right to participate in a future government,” Rabbani said.

The most likely prospect for Afghanistan, both before and after Feb. 15, is more bloodletting. The Soviets, who stand to be humiliated if Kabul falls early to the rebels, promote new international talks on Afghanistan’s future but simultaneously keep pouring on the firepower. The United States routinely cautions the rebels to show restraint but promises to maintain the arms pipeline through Pakistan. Once the resistance vanquishes Najibullah, the fierce rivalries among the rebel factions will become more pronounced. The United Nations talks about a cooling-off period and formation of a caretaker regime to repatriate Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to set the stage for a permanent government. But none of the antagonists want peace enough to accept those terms.