Algiers Statement: No Reason for U.S. to Ease Off on PLO

Four months ago in Algiers, Yasser Arafat’s spokesman, Bassam abu Sharif, circulated to the Western press a unique document. It spoke eloquently of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, expressing sensitivity for Israel’s security concerns and arguing that “the Palestinians would be deluding themselves if they thought that their problems with the Israelis could be solved in negotiations with non-Israelis.” The document, however, was not authorized by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Four months later, again in Algiers, the Palestine National Council--the PLO’s policy-making body--issued an authorized “political document.” But, disappointingly, it contained none of the conciliatory language of the Abu Sharif article. Sensitivity was replaced by vitriol. Its only explicit reference to Israel was to call it “a fascist, racist, colonialist state based on the usurpation of Palestinian land and on the annihilation of the Palestinian people.” Far from extending the olive branch to Israel, this bitter document was carefully designed to appeal to everybody except Israel.

A conditonal acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242 and a renunciation of terrorism (as defined by the PLO) was carefully crafted to appear as if the PLO has accepted American conditions for recognition. Invoking other, anti-Israel, U.N. resolutions, however, allowed George Habash, leader of the hard-line Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to argue that the PNC had not recognized Israel. And Arafat’s interpretation was as ambiguous as ever.

For American diplomacy, this is the heart of the problem. What the United States needs to promote negotiations is a positive Palestinian political program that clearly communicates an abiding commitment to Israeli-Palestinian coexistence. What has been delivered instead is a political program that will be read in Israel, by dove and hawk alike, as an artful effort to sugar-coat the PLO’s basic objective of the destruction of Israel by stages.

How else are we to explain to Israelis the PLO’s renunciation of terrorism except against targets in Israel , justified by reference to U.N. resolutions that “affirm the right of people to resist foreign occupation”? How else are they to interpret the PLO’s acceptance of 242 “in accordance with other U.N. resolutions” that deny Israel’s legitimacy? How else are they to understand the declaration of an independent Palestinian state without defined borders, a declaration that in the same breath defines the creation of the Jewish state asa “historic injustice.”

Those who argue that it is now America’s task to persuade Israel to go to an international conference and negotiate with the PLO should understand that this document has given American diplomats nothing to work with.

How then should the United States respond? We could ignore the prevarications, qualifications, contradictions and competing interpretations and instead reward the PLO for its qualified acceptance of 242 and its supposed renunciation of terrorism by relaxing our conditions for dialogue. Proponents of this approach argue that the PLO needs to be encouraged.

This approach, however, relaxes the pressure on the PLO just when that pressure is beginning to produce results. It rewards ambiguity when clarity is the minimum requirement for progress in the peace process. It will actually enable the PLO to claim victory and argue that no further moderation is necessary.

More fundamentally, what this approach misunderstands is that the debate is no longer between PLO “moderates” and “hard-liners” in which the United States supposedly should be encouraging the moderates. It is rather between the PLO leadership, Habash and Arafat alike, and the Palestinians of the occupied territories who have been resisting Israel’s control for almost a year.

Previously their concerns were given short shrift in PLO deliberations--the role of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians was to stay put while the PLO leadership played a macabre, make-believe game of liberating them. But, after 21 years of waiting, these Palestinians have grown tired. They have been shaking the ground under the feet of the PLO leadership, publicly calling on them to translate their uprising into a political initiative that will relieve the Israeli occupation. And behind the demand is an implicit threat--if the PLO leadership fails to deliver, perhaps the leadership of the intifada will have to do so.

These Palestinians are no longer content to contemplate continued Israeli military occupation, their abandonment by Jordan and increasing economic hardship. They have gained legitimacy in the Palestinian community by resisting Israel. But they also have a stake in coexisting with Israel, and they know well how to communicate this to Israelis.

In these circumstances the most effective form of American encouragement comes not from relaxing our conditions but rather in standing by them. By upholding the standard of what is necessary to persuade Israel that the Palestinians are genuinely prepared to make peace, and by refusing to reward the PLO for only partial fulfillment of our conditions, we can increase the pressure on the PLO from the territories. And, by encouraging Israel to undertake a serious political initiative toward the Palestinians in the territories, we can pursue a more productive route to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

The Abu Sharif document demonstrates that Arafat knows full well what he has to do. The PNC document, by contrast, shows how difficult it is for him--structurally, ideologically and psychologically--to actually do it. By PLO standards the PNC may indicate that the PLO has come a long way. But by American standards, the only standards that can make a negotiated settlement possible, the PLO still has a long, long way to go.