Latin America Wonders Which Bush Won : He’s Well Suited to Tackle Debt Morass--if He Resists Ideologues

There are as many ways of viewing the U.S. presidential election from abroad as there are nations in the world that have both ties and differences with the United States. The Mexican perspective, and more broadly the Latin American outlook, on George Bush’s victory can perhaps best be characterized as ambivalent and somewhat confused, with healthy doses of both wishful thinking and stereotypical mistrust.

The ambivalence stems from the difficulty of deciding what is really preferable for Latin America’s interests: a strong U.S. President with a mandate, a congressional majority and a clear agenda, or the opposite, which seems to be the case for Bush. The negative campaign that he waged, whatever its merits or drawbacks, will make it nearly impossible for Bush to claim unmistaken popular support for his policies, at least in the beginning of his term. The Democratic strengthening in the House and Senate means that he will not be able to carry Congress with him on many of the issues that are important in the hemisphere: the Contras, trade, debt, immigration, drugs.

For Latin America there are, as always, advantages and disadvantages to a less-than-all-powerful U.S. President. On matters like aid to the Contras and hard-line anti-communism, the moderating influence of the Democratic Congress will be welcomed. There seems to be only a faint chance that the Bush Administration will seriously try to revive the Contras; it appears even less likely that it would succeed in persuading the House and Senate to go along. Not that the status quo is an acceptable solution; the misery of the Nicaraguan people is a reality that should not be swept under the carpet out of sheer Realpolitik , and the war should come to a complete end soon.

On other important U.S.-Latin American issues the outlook is less clear. Indeed, for Mexico the recent past shows that a strong statesmanlike stance in the White House is frequently necessary in order to compensate for congressional irresponsibility on matters like trade and drugs. Representatives and senators, by definition, aim to please their constituencies. Their ability to damage U.S.-Mexican relations with outrageous politicking is ever-present and growing, given the number of U.S. issues that have a Mexican angle. Only a strong President can limit the damage and ensure that statements or attitudes do not turn into policies.

Perhaps the most important issue for Latin America is its monstrous and unpayable foreign debt. Most experts and officials have concluded that without U.S. presidential leadership there will be no significant relief in the mid-term future. Too many bureaucratic and legal obstacles, actors and interests stand in the way. The only participant in the debt drama who can knock heads and provide an incentive to move forward is the U.S. President. The U.S. Congress and most European governments, as well as Japan, will probably go along with any intelligent U.S. proposal but will not take the lead. Most banks would not like drastic solutions like those that are called for, yet would accept being leaned on. Only the President of the United States can do both the leading and the leaning.

The reaction to Bush’s designation of James A. Baker III as secretary of state was typical of Latin American wishful thinking with regard to the new Administration. While no one doubts Baker’s qualifications for the job or his great political abilities, it is doubtful that he will be able to fulfill the unreasonably high expectations that he has aroused south of the Rio Grande. In Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America, he is viewed as a sort of “super secretary” who will manage debt and trade and even drug policy along with the traditional areas of foreign affairs. It is doubtful that this would be as advantageous to Latin America as many believe; in any event it doesn’t take account of reality. Bureaucratic inertia and the rigidities of the U.S. interagency process will not easily allow the secretary of state, even one with executive experience in the White House and at the Treasury, to pursue issues that belong on other departments’ turf. Influence, yes; command, no: Jim Baker will not be the solution to Latin America’s problems in Washington.

Baker may help, though, to calm the fears that many in Latin America have about a President who once ran the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA hasn’t done nearly as much in Latin America as many on the left of the hemisphere’s political spectrum believe, but it has done much more than most people in the United States are willing to accept. The kinds of regional bonds, friendships, complicities and debts that the head of the CIA necessarily acquires are a good reason for adopting an attitude of wariness and skepticism toward the new occupant of the White House. In a sense Bush carries the burden of proof; he will have to show Latin America that the company he kept during his CIA days is no longer with him. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of this aspect in Latin American public opinion, regardless of the apparent “maturity” that some of the region’s officials may try to show by dismissing Bush’s past associations.

The clearest signal of Bush’s and Baker’s intentions in U.S.-Latin America policy will be seen in their choice of an assistant secretary for inter-American affairs. Proof that they respect the critical nature of problems confronting the hemisphere would be in filling that key post with a moderate, experienced Foreign Service professional. A political appointment of a hard-line extremist would be most discouraging.