Arafat Trumps Shultz on Principle : Terrorism Objection Is Correct; It’s Also a Diplomatic Error

Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, has received a boost from an unexpected source --the U.S. secretary of state, George P. Shultz. That wasn’t Shultz’s intention, but it is the result of his decision to bar Arafat from addressing the U.N. General Assembly this week.

Last month, the Palestine National Council--what passes for the legislative arm of the PLO--met in Algiers. It declared an independent Palestinian state, sidled up to accepting two key U.N. resolutions on Arab-Israeli peacemaking, adopted a convoluted formula that some PLO spokesmen (but not Arafat) said was implicit recognition of Israel, and renounced terrorism--but not “its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence,” or “the right of peoples to resist foreign occupation,” meaning military action in Israel and the occupied territories.

The diplomatic ball supposedly was hit into the American court. But, while citing the actions in Algiers as being steps in the right direction, the Reagan Administration correctly argued that they fell short of meeting tests that the last three American Administrations have demanded that the PLO pass before the United States would “recognize or negotiate” with it. And, also correctly, Washington urged the PLO to address itself to Jerusalem and prove that it is ready to make peace with Israel.

Arafat’s counter was to schedule an appearance before the U.N. General Assembly in order to drum up further international support for his newly declared state. That would have been a story of a few days’ duration, and the field would then have been left clear for the incoming Bush Administration to consider its peacemaking role.

There was a snag, however: Shultz had to approve a visa for Arafat to visit the U.N. headquarters in New York--something that the State Department had done once before, in 1974. To many Americans, that is offensive: Arafat has more than his share of blood on his hands, and the thought of his being admitted to this country is repugnant.

But this morally valid reaction misses two points, one legalistic and one practical: As the host country for the United Nations, we are committed to let individuals attend meetings when their business is on the agenda, as is clearly the case here. Arafat would not be the first foreign leader of dubious repute whose presence on U.S. soil most Americans find obnoxious. But, in the process of barring Arafat, the United States looks as if it is not taking its obligations seriously, precisely at a time when President Reagan has mercifully called a haltto U.N.-bashing.

More important, Shultz has managed to turn what could have been a one-day wonder for Arafat into a public-relations and political bonanza. The U.S. action has been denounced not only by Arab and Third World states but also by several U.S. allies. Arafat and his supporters will now try to convene a special session of the General Assembly in Geneva, thus guaranteeing continued media play during the December doldrums. And Arab leaders, many of whom would prefer that Arafat disappear, have been forced to defend him lest they appear to be knuckling under to U.S. fiat.

The U.S. action also helps Arafat to solidify his political control over the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, one of the PLO chairman’s key objectives in convening last month’s meeting in Algiers was to reassert his role as champion of the Palestinian people and to gain charge of an uprising that had begun without him.

Nor has Shultz necessarily done Israel a favor. It surely does not benefit from any enhancement of Arafat’s stature, or from seeing the United States isolated on an Arab-Israeli question that does not go to the heart of Israel’s political or security requirements. The point is underscored when Egypt, the one Arab country that has made peace with Israel, must join the chorus of opposition to the American decision.

In contemplating his task in the Middle East, George Bush must not be pleased by this brouhaha. Over an issue that could have been minimized, he now faces an unnecessary erosion of U.S. credibility in the Arab world and added pressures to be active in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. While no permanent injury has been done to U.S. interests, the President-elect’s flexibility has been reduced. In contrast to Reagan, who has been careful not to make anything more difficult for his successor, Shultz is showing no such sensitivity. (Indeed, while supporting his secretary of state, the President made clear that denying Arafat a visa was Shultz’s decision.)

This is nothing new. For the past several years Shultz has at critical moments displayed a curious emotionalism about Middle East matters--an area in which sober judgment is at a premium. He apparently was seared by the tragic U.S. military experience in Lebanon, by terrorism against Americans and by the (predictable) collapse of his only substantive achievement in the region--the May, 1983, agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Ironically, his assertive attitude toward the use of force--not just in the Middle East but elsewhere--has contrasted with the greater circumspection of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger.

Deep emotions can be admirable in policy--for example, when they underpin basic U.S. commitments, like the commitment to Israel’s security. And the rebuke to Arafat will leave most Americans feeling good. But indulgence in a feel-good approach to policy is not a desirable quality in a secretary of state. As manifested in Shultz’s decision, the failure of judgment to overrule passion has helped neither Israel nor the United States. Only Yasser Arafat looks like a winner.