The Message to America Is That the Soviets Can Go It Alone

Many American commentators have wanted to believe that Mikhail S. Gorbachev is very weak--in the Politburo, in his ability to control the military, in societal support for his policy, in his ability to reform his economy, in his ability to deal with America’s allies without America’s consent.

These Americans have seen Gorbachev driven to an American-centered policy. They have seen him coming to the United Nations to obtain a photo opportunity to divert the attention of his people from their domestic troubles and/or to promise better Soviet behavior in regional conflicts and emigration as part of his plea for an end to American trade restrictions.

In fact, Gorbachev came to New York to make precisely the opposite point. He wanted to demonstrate that he controlled the agenda, that he was concerned with troops opposite Europe and China rather than nuclear-arms negotiations with the United States (which he mentioned in one sentence during his speech to the United Nations on Wednesday), and that he was strong enough vis-a-vis the military to retire his chief of staff and impose a unilateral reduction of forces.

It was, however, on the issue of Afghanistan that Gorbachev indicated his clearest disdain for American concerns. He strongly emphasized “freedom of choice”--code words for the “right” of the Nicaraguan, Angolan and Afghan people to have radical governments free from American interference. He said that treaties must be served--a way of saying that American aid to the rebels is a violation of the Geneva accords that the United States signed.

But it was Gorbachev’s concrete proposals on Afghanistan that were so chilling. He called for a complete cease-fire, including an end to rebel shelling, by Jan. 1. This would be a cease-fire “with the opposing Afghan groups retaining, for the duration of the negotiations, all territories under their control.”

In plain language, this would mean that the communist central government of Afghanistan would retain control of the cities, with no rebel attacks on them permitted. To cement such control, Kabul could then drag out the negotiations indefinitely. Gorbachev was asking the West to recognize a communist victory. The response is extraordinarily easy to predict.

Gorbachev didn’t say what he will do if the cease-fire proposal is rejected, as Afghan rebels have indicated they will do. He has suspended his troop withdrawal, and the question now is whether he will go through with the total withdrawal by Feb. 15, as promised. It seems unlikely. By emphasizing “freedom of choice,” American treaty violations and a “reasonable” cease-fire, he has created a situation in which his domestic audience would find him weak if he were to cave in and lose Afghanistan. He would have played it differently if he were going to leave.

The Afghan situation makes Gorbachev’s troop reductions and adoption of a defensive posture in Europe particularly well timed. American conservatives will be demanding that George Bush respond harshly on Afghanistan. But Gorbachev’s peace offensive will make it impossible for us to demand that our European allies slap sanctions on the Soviets. All that America can do is retain its restraints on trade policy, and Gorbachev didn’t even mention Soviet-American trade at the United Nations.

We should not be that unhappy with the way things are going. Unlike President Reagan, President-elect Bush has been emphasizing conventional-arms negotiations instead of nuclear-arms control. He needs such negotiations to solve the deficits without raising taxes. For the first time the Soviet and American leaders are on the same wavelength. Even if Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan, there are benefits. If the Soviet threat does recede in Europe, we can use the Afghan argument to justify the North Atlantic alliance.

But what is crucial is that America now has a clear sense of reality. We began the decade thinking that a stagnant Soviet Union with a semi-moribund leader was driving for military superiority and world domination. Now we are ending the decade thinking that a Soviet Union with a vigorous and powerful reform-minded leader is impotent and totally dependent on our good will.

Gorbachev’s performance at the United Nations demonstrated once more that we are facing an extremely able adversary, but one who has abandoned many old ideological dogmas and now has an economic need to reduce military spending.

The United States can continue to supply the Afghan rebels and damn Gorbachev’s policy there. But Washington must not let secondary issues distract it from the main business at hand: a building of America’s economic strength in the competition with Japan and Western Europe.