Shultz’s Decisive Act Closes Some Doors, Opens Others

The meaning of diplomacy, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder. Thus Secretary of State George P. Shultz has decided to accept at face value a series of declarations made by Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In so doing, Shultz has caused a political earthquake, fundamentally altering the terms of Arab-Israeli peacemaking and acknowledging the effect of the intifada , the year-old Arab uprising in the West Bank and Gaza.

Little changed in the PLO’s position between Arafat’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly in Geneva and his clarifying press conference the next day. Arafat’s statements on the three tests imposed by the U.S. government remained ambiguous. He accepts Israel’s right to exist, but it is not clear that this means more than the truncated state proposed by the United Nations in 1947. He renounces terrorism, but perhaps not acts of violence to counter the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. He accepts the two key U.N. Security Council resolutions (242 and 338), but under a novel interpretation that presumes the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

These points were reduced to quibbles when Shultz took the command decision on Wednesday to authorize a “diplomatic dialogue” with the PLO. No doubt he acted from a variety of motives. These included the shock of the almost universal opposition abroad to his decision two weeks ago to deny Arafat a visa to address the General Assembly in New York. And after a year’s experience in failing to gain any movement on Arab-Israeli peacemaking, Shultz may have concluded that a decisive ingredient was required, especially in the face of political impasse in Israel. He also elected to make this controversial decision in the dying days of the Reagan Administration so that President-elect George Bush can start off fresh, with new opportunities to make peace.

With this one small step Shultz closed several lines of advance even as he opened new ones. For years the Camp David accords held out the possibility of negotiating limited autonomy in the occupied territories, thereby putting off decisions about their final disposition. That idea is now dead. So, too, is the U.S. and Israeli search for a party other than the PLO, like Jordan’s King Hussein, to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people.

Equally dead, in practice, is the debate in Israel about whether it can escape the logic of trading “territory for peace.” Nor can it avoid confronting the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. In his announcement, Shultz was careful to argue that a U.S.-PLO dialogue would not imply recognition of the state declared in Algiers last month by the Palestine National Council. Shultz’s words preserved the diplomatic niceties. But U.S. agreement at this time to talk to the PLO is seen virtually everywhere as tantamount to accepting that an independent state is inevitable.

By his statement, Shultz also altered the terms of U.S.-Soviet relations in the Middle East. Perhaps without intending to do so, the Reagan Administration has won the race with the Soviets to be able to deal with all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the world of diplomacy lately, it is a rare occurrence for the United States to seize the initiative from Mikhail Gorbachev. This point was made clear by Moscow’s prompt announcement that steps toward an international peace conference would justify its restoring diplomatic relations with Israel.

Overnight the United States also regained its credibility in the Arab world as a peacemaker. At the same time, it reduced both the need to involve the Soviets and the risk that Gorbachev would outmaneuver the United States for this role. Yet there is now less risk in permitting the Soviets to be involved in an international conference. The United States is no longer likely to find itself isolated with Israel while the Soviets alone deal with the PLO.

Israel, already mired in the difficulties of trying to form a new government, has been put under intense pressure by the political earthquake that Shultz set in motion. In recognition of Israel’s deep and legitimate anxieties, he reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to its security, the bedrock of any search for peace.

But in terms of achieving practical results, Israel is under less pressure than is the PLO. By ending the chess game of semantics, the secretary of state is giving Arafat the chance to turn words into deeds--for the first time, indeed, to exercise responsibility. Even though the PLO’s role as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” can no longer be challenged, Arafat must begin earning the trust of both the United States and--more important--of Israel, or the result of this week’s diplomacy will simply be another period of hopeless stalemate.

Immediately Arafat must show that he can deliver on the PLO pledge to renounce terrorism, in the face of the commitment of radical Palestinian groups to prevent any compromise. The risk of a dramatic terrorist incident has risen sharply, and if Arafat cannot prevent such an outrage he must be able to prove that it happened against his wishes. There is also a major problem of definition: Does a continuation of the intifada represent “terrorism” or legitimate Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation?

Considerable time must pass before all implications of a U.S.-PLO dialogue become clear, and arduous efforts lie between here and peace. But one conclusion is already evident. Until this week President-elect Bush could look forward to some breathing space before deciding how deeply to become involved in Arab-Israeli peacekeeping. That luxury is now gone. If only to secure the U.S. relationship with Israel and to preserve America’s renewed standing in the Arab world, Bush has no choice but to be an active peacemaker.