Fear of Soviet Changes Sells America Short

The American reaction, both official and unofficial, since Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s historic speech at the United Nations makes it clear that the Cold War will not end just because it is over.

It is over because the conditions that produced it have radically changed. The Soviet Union is softening its ideology of global struggle into a global vision of pragmatic humanism. It has replaced Stalin’s paranoia with a spectacular call for mutual trust backed by a series of largely unilateral concessions, including withdrawal from Afghanistan and the promise to demobilize half a million troops. Gorbachev says that he wants to reduce the role of force in international relations, and he called for cooperative assault by East and West alike on the environmental threats that hang over all humanity. Most interestingly, he is saying that these welcome moves are not concessions, because they will make the Soviet Union more secure.

After almost 70 years of U.S.-Soviet hostility, the suspicion of the Reagan Administration is understandable. But suspicion is not a policy. Much less understandable is the curious detachment and ambivalence that Gorbachev’s efforts at reform have produced in Washington. Three years of White House “spin control” has minimized the importance of what Gorbachev says and does, counseled caution and delay, raised questions about whether the United States should “help” him, and emphasized the shakiness of his hold on power.

There’s a fundamental question raised by this extraordinary Soviet leader that the Reagan Administration never answered: Is it in the United States’ interest that he succeeds? To me the answer is self-evident. If Gorbachev is deposed, his successor is sure to be more of a throwback, especially since Gorbachev will be accused inside the Soviet Union of selling out communism at home and making foreign-policy concessions without getting anything in return. The sooner agreements can be reached and the broader they can be, the better chance there is that the positive developments from the Soviet Union will be irreversible.

But there are powerful and influential voices in this country crying “Trojan Horse!” They understand precisely why Gorbachev is seeking to moderate and modernize the Soviet economy. It is not possible to run one-sixth of the Earth’s surface as an autarky. Nor in the computer age is it possible to compete in an integrated world economy under a system in which all the important economic decisions are taken in government offices and production is expected on command. The legacy of the Brezhnev era was the isolation of the Soviet Union because of its belligerent posture and reputation, a loss of the Communist Party’s legitimacy because of its failure to deliver on its promises to the Soviet people, and an economy that cannot meet the basic needs of a modern industrial society. All of Gorbachev’s reforms are directed to the solution of these problems.

A Soviet Union that can generate greater economic power and provide more economic security and opportunity for its people would indeed be a formidable model and a serious competitor in world affairs. A Soviet Union able to play the role that Gorbachev wants it to play challenges the United States to carry out a perestroika of our own. Ending the arms race requires restructuring the many institutions--the defense industry, university research--that now depend on it. The conditions in our two countries are very different, but both are burdened by military expenditures that keep society from investing in its future and by a loss of confidence in government that seems unable to meet the needs of the people. (A democratic system in which less than half of the people bother to vote is in need of revitalization.)

To fear Gorbachev’s success is a vote of no confidence in America. It is to succumb to the old fear that American leaders cannot protect American interests at the bargaining table. But if agreements are specific, clear, verifiable where appropriate and in the mutual interest of both sides, they can help release money and energy to deal with our two most urgent security threats: an economy out of control and a physical environment demanding payment for generations of rape and neglect. To believe that the United States is less capable than the Soviet Union of reorienting its economy and its foreign policy to the demands of the 21st Century is surely to sell America short. But to respond to Gorbachev’s invitation for a new political relationship requires rethinking the American national interest for the first time in almost 50 years.