Syria’s Assad, Moscow’s Stalking Horse in Mideast, Won’t Easily Turn Toward Peace

Syria is in the process of moving from pre-eminent Soviet asset in the Middle East to primary liability. This is not because of what Syria is now doing in the region, but because of what Moscow is now doing in the world.

Syrian President Hafez Assad, arguably the most brilliant political tactician in the Middle East in a generation, has for years been the Soviets’ single best investment in the region. He has pursued a bold vision of Syria’s interests that leaves no place for peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This de facto rejectionist policy has brought him the leadership of the Arab world for nearly two decades.

By his insistence on maintaining the Arab struggle against Israel, Assad has served his own interests exceedingly well. His policy has justified a claim to major supplies of advanced Soviet weaponry. To pursue the “Arab confrontation,” he has successfully demanded large sums of oil money from the Persian Gulf states that fear Syria’s power and feel guilty and politically exposed if they do not pay something more concrete than lip service to “the cause.” He has arrogated to Syria the right, as the leading confrontation state, to direct the politics of the Palestinian movement against Israel. He has intimidated most Arab states into lending Syria support in a variety of ways simply because they have been afraid to cross him; Syria has not shrunk from occasional “reminders”--unattributed acts of violence or even assassination of officials--against hostile or unresponsive regimes. He has for years been able to block broader Arab moves toward moderation at Arab summits where consensus has ruled. And Assad has seen his praetorian role in Lebanon as an extension of his need to control the politics of all states that border on Israel. Jordan has not been exempt from such pressures; King Hussein has always understood his own limits in directly opposing Syrian interests.

In short, continuous confrontation has bought Assad a great deal of influence, authority, money, arms, power and even grudging respect in the Arab world. Above all, he has been able to legitimize his minority regime of Alawites who constitute less than 15% of the Syrian population in a largely Sunni Muslim country. Despite serious economic problems and periodic setbacks and many conflicts with Israel, Assad has been able to command virtually unquestioned domestic leadership since 1970.

Why should Assad want to change all this? What does peace hold out for him? For nearly two decades the answer has been: very little. True peace would require Assad to give up most of the advantages that he derives from confrontation. Above all, he would slip from the leadership of the Arab nationalist struggle down to a modest second place in a peace camp dominated by rival Egypt. But only a genuine peace, as distinct from mere non-belligerence, offers the prospect of Israel’s returning the Golan Heights.

Alliance with a state like Syria has been ideal for the Soviet Union since the early ‘70s. For several decades Moscow has found its interests best served through the maintenance of a state of controlled tension in the region: While not wanting war, Moscow has found that such tension played to its own strong suit as arms purveyor to radical states, and also keptthe United States at a disadvantage in the Arab world, where Washington was perceived as single-mindedly and exclusively concerned with Israel’s security. Assad could therefore be counted on to masterfully accomplish what the Soviets also wanted in the region: the weakening of moderates and the blocking of U.S. initiatives toward a Pax Americana. All that Moscow needed to do was supply the military wherewithal to enable Assad to do his thing. This alliance was not, of course, free of friction. But on the whole it was a valuable investment.

Today Moscow’s agenda has changed. Mikhail Gorbachev’s sweeping revolution at home, involving a total redefinition of the character of Russian national power, has established domestic and international priorities that leave little room for regional conflicts of dubious value and considerable risk. The “zero-sum quality” of Soviet calculations toward competition with the United States in the Third World is sharply diminishing. I believe that Gorbachev has turned a sharp strategic corner in which, for the first time, he now views Soviet interests as being fulfilled by a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. He does see this settlement as involving some kind of eventual Palestinian state--but then so does most of the world, including our European allies.

If the Soviet strategic priority has shifted dramatically, then Assad’s long-brilliant blocking game no longer serves the Soviet purpose; indeed, it becomes Moscow’s No. 1 headache.

Assad is his own man--shrewd, pragmatic, careful and clear in his own priorities. He does not want a peaceful settlement on any terms remotely acceptable to Israel. He does not want an independent Palestinian state, which would lie under the shadow of Israel and Jordan. He wants a PLO subservient to his interests. He wants to maintain Syria as a formidable military force on terms of rough parity with Israel that can never be ignored in Israeli calculations.

These goals do not seem to complement Gorbachev’s priorities today as he moves toward normalization with Israel and places heavy pressure on the PLO to moderate and seek accommodation with Israel. He will find Assad’s erstwhile brilliance now working against broader Soviet interests.

If Syria could ever be compelled to join a peaceful settlement--always questionable--the time may now be arriving. Syrian isolation, its desperate economic situation, the reemergence of its bitter rival Iraq after the gulf war, the return of Egypt to the Arab fold after more than a decade of Camp David disgrace--all these elements pose major new problems to traditional Syrian policies. But the shift in Soviet policy is likely to be the straw that breaks the Syrian camel’s back.

Assad, as shrewd as he is, cannot fail to observe these signs in the firmament of Middle East politics. We see him displaying more moderation, improving ties with key moderates like Egypt and Morocco. But Assad will not easily abandon his vision for Syria. No longer able to explicitly block peace from the outside, he may well now be playing a subtler game, seeking to move within the framework of negotiations where he will set conditions for a comprehensive settlement that cannot be met.

Whatever the case, Moscow has its work cut out for itself. If Gorbachev can ever actually “deliver” Assad, he will have more than earned his way to a central position at the peace table.