El Salvador: Sleepwalking Into Disaster

By any political-military calculation, domestic and international events now favor the communist guerrillas in El Salvador. Many indicators point to a coming major offensive by the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). The final days of 1988 were highlighted by guerrilla successes including car bombings in the capital, a daring daylight attack on the armed forces headquarters, and the forcing of about 40 rural mayors to resign after the assassination of eight of their colleagues and, just last week, a governor.

Meanwhile, the Socialist/Communist left has entered the political arena with the introduction of the Democratic Convergence party. While the party leadership remains largely that of the FMLN’s old political ally, it has candidates legally running for president and vice president in the March election. This “legitimization” is in part responsible for an increase in right-wing activity. A case in point is the birth of ARDE (the Anti-Communist Revolutionary Exterminating Action). This unwanted addition from the far right will further divide the Salvadoran people and fragment a fragile consensus of support in Washington.

Although the U.S. Embassy is optimistic about recent high-level changes in the Salvadoran military, they are unlikely to make much difference in the way the military influences events. Although their forces are better equipped than in 1981, senior army commanders still do not fully understand all the requirements for fighting guerrillas and advancing the cause of the common people. Nothing is being done to deny the guerrillas their main “safe areas” and operational bases. The army should be moving to establish a battalion-size force near the guerrilla headquarters around the town of Perquin, 105 miles from San Salvador, thus displacing the guerrillas from the entire Northern Department. Instead, the army has opted for a conservative defense of the safer and more pleasant urban areas.

Some U.S. advisers note that the majority of the Salvadoran people do not support the government, the military or the guerrillas. The people have designed their lives around the conflict. Each person seeks to avoid real participation or commitment. Despite evidence of heavy voting in five prior elections, perhaps 70% of the people are indifferent to the struggle.

In stark contrast, the communist leadership remains successful despite sharp internal differences over operational philosophies. The FMLN has educated the people to a steady theme of rampant social injustice under corrupt civilian and military officials. At the same time, the guerrillas have prevented the government from providing long-promised social and economic changes in the lives of the people who continue to suffer in a sad, sometimes tragic environment. In the rural areas the guerrillas and their “local peoples governments” have effectively blocked the seeds of democracy from taking hold while expanding the areas they control. More recently, a unified FMLN has succeeded in driving the beginning of a wedge between the Christian Democratic government and the increasingly restive military.

The major success of the Salvadoran left results from a remarkable ability to establish an international support mechanism. It has been particularly successful in the United States, following the Vietnamese Communist concept of exploiting the domestic political vulnerabilities of foreign powers.

Diplomatic efforts to settle differences with the guerrillas have gone nowhere. Nearly 11 years of intermittent efforts culminated in the much celebrated Esquipulas II plan, but, as President Jose Napoleon Duarte said to his Cabinet last month, “Esquipulas has only succeeded in killing off the Contras (in Nicaragua).” In recent weeks, the flawed “peace plan” has also been working to increase the flow of equipment and materiel to communist forces in El Salvador.

Despite all the bad news, there is reasonable cause for hope--if long-recommended U.S. initiatives are adopted and fully implemented.

--The United States should insist that El Salvador legislate a realistic anti-terrorist law (suspected guerrillas are now freed within 72 hours) and establish an effective protection program for judges and key witnesses. When the military judge presiding over the case of the 1985 killing of four U.S. Marines was assassinated last May, a clear message went out to his colleagues on the bench.

--The U.S. Embassy needs to maintain greater personnel continuity in key positions. Since 1981, Washington has sent four ambassadors and six military group commanders to El Salvador. Only one of the latter had the required training and experience in both counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare.

--As the highest priority, El Salvador should establish a nationwide civil defense program. This is the one solution that could turn the reconstruction program around and save the country. Community defense in coordination with Agency for International Development projects is the sure way to roll back guerrilla gains and prevent an otherwise inevitable communist victory. Unless the commanders of the armed forces agree to civil defense, any dream of democracy, peace and stability will be lost--along with almost 70,000 Salvadoran lives, more than a dozen Americans and $4 billion in U.S. aid.

If a predicted offensive occurs, the security of American advisers and trainers will be at serious risk. Some intelligence indicators point to 1989 as the year in which U.S. military personnel will be targeted. This would be a marked change from the FMLN’s policy of avoiding confrontation with U.S. personnel.

Currently, the most dangerous area for U.S. military advisers is in the city of San Salvador. The time has come for the U.S. military group to accept recommendations to lower their number in the capital, which has become a war zone, and send home vulnerable dependents. There should be fewer U.S. military theorists and more Special Forces-qualified personnel in contested rural areas. There has long been a serious need for such specialists in low-intensity conflict, which requires multidimensional skills ranging from psychology to economics in addition to military expertise. Changing the balance of advisers, from desks in the capital to the “safer” field, is the best way to have a decisive impact on those Salvadoran commanders reluctant to challenge recent communist gains.

Finally, the United States would be well advised to stay out of the March election--something that we did not do very well in 1984. If we really support the democratic process, we ought to let the Salvadorans choose the leadership for their own future.