Salvador Guerrillas’ Offer Is Worth a Test

On paper the Salvadoran guerrillas’ peace initiative seems to be exactly what the United States has been urging for years: to settle the conflict with ballots, not bullets. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front says that it will support the presidential election this year, urge votes for its allies in the leftist Democratic Convergence and accept the results. In return it wants security guarantees, fair electoral procedures and a six-month postponement of the election, to September. This would give the Convergence time to organize a countrywide campaign if popular and political organizations are allowed to operate without repression.

Washington officially welcomed the offer as a positive sign, but it remained wary--and rightly so. The guerrillas have violently disrupted past elections, demanding negotiations and a part in a provisional government before any further balloting. Now, just when they are showing new strength militarily, they seem to be making an about-face. Unpredictable as this new twist is, the United States cannot afford to ignore the possible opening.

For eight years U.S. strategy has had two parts: military aid to defeat the Marxist guerrillas, and political and economic assistance to promote a reform Christian Democratic government and ameliorate the repression and poverty that ignited the revolution.

The guerrillas have neutralized U.S. efforts. They appear able to sabotage the economy indefinitely, mount damaging strikes against government forces and prevent the army from imposing a military solution. In fact, the army has been on the defensive in recent months.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-backed Christian Democratic government proved corrupt, inefficient and unable to cope with the urgent problems that plague the country. The economy is deteriorating. Real wages continue to drop; under- and unemployment are more than 50%. Land reform has been severely limited, and the intended beneficiaries are being driven under by lack of credit, technical assistance and marketing support. The armed forces continue to repress labor and peasant leaders. Arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, torture and disappearance go unpunished, and death-squad activity has increased.

Widespread disillusionment with the government has set in. The far-right ARENA party, long associated with death squads and the oligarchic Establishment, won control of the legislative assembly last March and began to dismantle the Christian Democrats’ tentative reforms. Now ARENA is favored to win the presidency, which would polarize the situation still further, threatening the bipartisan support for continued aid in Washington.

Although this deteriorating situation makes it rational for the White House to take the guerrilla offer seriously, the key actors in El Salvador have little interest. Jose Napoleon Duarte and ARENA cite insurmountable constitutional problems as preventing postponement of the election, an uncharacteristic adherence to legal strictures that belies their real objections. The right is confident that it can win next month. Giving the left the time and freedom to organize would certainly block ARENA from winning a majority on the first ballot, and would threaten its position in a run-off. ARENA is probably mistaken in thinking that it can create political and economic stability and win the war, but it wants to take office and try.

The Christian Democrats know that they are doing badly against ARENA, and a six-month postponement of the election would allow a unified left to attract many Christian Democratic supporters disillusioned with the party’s failure to deliver on promises of reform, recovery and peace. There is a reasonable chance that by September the Democratic Convergence could beat the Christian Democrats on the first round, forcing a run-off with ARENA.

The military’s prime interest is in destroying the guerrillas and keeping the left out of power. A leftist civilian government that would stop the institutionalized corruption and punish human-rights abuses gives many military commanders a chill. They were hoping that the March election would provide enough legitimacy to keep counterinsurgency aid flowing from Congress. The FMLN demand that the assassinations, jailings and repression be ended to facilitate a democratic vote would give the non-guerrilla opposition space in which to challenge military dominance.

Does the initial rejection of the FMLN offer doom it? Not necessarily. All of the actors in the capital know that without the $1 million a day in U.S. aid the economy and the war effort would collapse. If Vice President Dan Quayle makes clear, when he visits San Salvador this week, that the FMLN’s offer is worth negotiating, there is a good chance of progress.

There are points in the proposal that need to be clarified and negotiated; it’s not clear, for example, what the guerrillas mean when they say that they are willing to “accept the legitimacy of the electoral result,” nor is it clear whether they will cease urban terrorism like car bombings.

Wisely, the initial State Department response was to call the FMLN proposal “worthy of serious and substantive consideration.” There is good reason for the United States to urge its reluctant allies in El Salvador to test the FMLN’s intentions. Eight years of U.S. efforts to win the war and create a centrist alternative have failed. If the election were postponed, the worst that could happen is that the situation would be back to where it is today. But there is the possibility that it might be better--that the FMLN offer might be the start of national reconciliation and peace.