Talking Peace and Trading Goods: A Formula for U.S. Mideast Policy

Despite the understandable desire to move cautiously in formulating foreign policy, the Bush Administration’s early priority will almost certainly be the Arab-Israeli conflict.

With escalating tension between Israelis and Palestinians, pressure for a U.S. peace initiative is growing. The U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization has already set in motion political forces that will test bipartisanship between the President and Congress. Israeli and Arab leaders both seek early meetings with the Bush Administration; the European allies push their own peace initiatives. Meanwhile, the grisly resurgence of Middle East terrorism, aimed at disrupting the peace process, has begun.

To contain these pressures and move the peace process forward, the United States must ensure its two fundamental interests in the Middle East: the deterrence of war and peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel. No peace initiative can hope to succeed without these cornerstones of U.S. policy.

The Bush Administration must assume that Arab radicals will do all they can to sabotage the process--for peace in the Middle East always seems tentative.

Syria remains the Arab state most capable of preventing peace--whether by overt military means or its support of international terrorism. Although Damascus has softened its rhetoric--perhaps reflecting new signals from Moscow--deterrence can never be taken for granted. Washington should have no doubts about Syria’s ability to undermine any peace process it does not support. Though President Hafez Assad has always been careful to preserve a peace option, he has never been ambiguous about resisting any initiative he did not approve. It is worth recalling the U.S. experience in Lebanon to ensure mistakes are not repeated.

Assad was consistent and determined to defeat U.S. policy in Lebanon in 1983-1984. During Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s shuttle diplomacy after the April, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Embassy, the Lebanese foreign minister reported, with grim foreboding, having failed to convince Assad that the agreement between Lebanon and Israel would benefit Syrian interests. On the contrary, Assad warned, “there was nothing good in the agreement, and that the Lebanese government should just remember what happened to (Anwar) Sadat.”

In fall, 1983, Syrian-backed military and terrorist pressure against Beirut culminated with the bombings of the U.S. and French barracks. Caught up in a political struggle in Washington, the United States talked tough but failed to act. So Syria grew bolder--firing surface-to-air missiles at U.S. reconnaissance aircraft while increasing the level of combat in Beirut and its environs.

By February, 1984, the multinational force had left Beirut. Damascus resumed its pre-eminent position.

It had taken less than one year for Assad to defeat U.S. policy in Lebanon and fulfill his earlier warning. Syria fought and won a limited war with the United States. Now as then, the United States cannot afford to overlook Syrian interests and Assad’s capabilities.

Today, though seemingly bogged down in Lebanon, the Syrians have, in fact, improved their military capabilities qualitatively and quantitatively. Advanced MIG-29 aircraft, a modernized and expanded surface-to-air missile network, expanding inventories of accurate SS-21 ballistic missiles and thousands of T-72 tanks contribute to Assad’s declared goal of “strategic parity”--Syria would be able fight Israel without any Arab partners.

Syria’s relationship with its principal patron, the Soviet Union, has changed. Most significant, Michael S. Gorbachev recently advised Assad that strategic parity between Syria and Israel is not obtainable for political and economic reasons. Damascus now grumbles that Moscow no longer fulfills all its equipment requests--and acts as it sees fit.

For example, when the Soviet Union refused Syria’s request for equipment to manufacture chemical weapons, the Syrians turned to West Germany. Yet Syria remains Moscow’s most important ally in the region.

As in Lebanon, Syria will not hesitate to use force to advance its political objectives against Yasser Arafat or other Arabs, Israelis or whomever. President George Bush, together with Congress, must determine how to persuade Syria to desist from its spoiler role. Washington should not assume that the Soviets alone can discourage Assad from using violence.

Several steps should be taken to advance U.S. interests. First, the United States should resume a high-level dialogue with Syria. While making the U.S. interest in cooperation with Syria clear, there can be no ambiguity regarding Washington’s readiness to use whatever measures are needed to deter violence. Second, U.S.-Soviet Middle East talks should be narrowly focused, both to ensure that every effort is made to avoid an Israeli-Syrian war and to determine an acceptable format for an international peace conference. Third, the United States must maintain arms sales and economic support for Israel, while reinforcing bilateral strategic cooperation. Similarly, U.S. arms sales to Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia should proceed, enhancing these states’ confidence in U.S. steadfastness and their own ability to defend against radical threats.

The second cornerstone, peace between Egypt and Israel, is a vital U.S. interest. The restoration of Egypt’s historic leadership role in the Arab world, when combined with peace with Israel, provides Washington with important political advantage in efforts to broaden the peace process. Indeed, Arafat’s recognition of Israel vindicates Egypt’s 10-year peace policy, creating new opportunities for U.S. and Egyptian diplomacy in the Arab world and Israel.

One of the most important postwar achievements, peace between Egypt and Israel, excited hopes that stability and prosperity would encourage other Arabs to join the peace process. Unfortunately, Egyptian and Israeli expectations of how the other should act--politically and economically--have gone unfulfilled, and relations continue to deteriorate. This situation weakens the ability of Americans, Europeans and others to convince Israelis that compromises for peace are worth the risks.

From the Israeli perspective, occasional acts of violence by Egyptians against Israelis, the Egyptian media’s generally harsh treatment of Israel and the minimal scale of Egyptian-Israeli trade and commerce have reinforced Israeli skepticism about the value of political agreements with Arab states.

From the Egyptian perspective, however, Israel has no cause for complaint. Israel was never promised a special relationship and, to Cairo’s way of thinking, does not deserve it. In the years since the signing of the peace treaty, Israeli policy in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and other places has not endeared Israel to the Egyptian government or people.

Many Americans and Israelis hoped that the economic area, in particular, would blossom with the normalization of relations. It has not--though the potential for business cooperation is huge.

The Administration must try to break down Israel-Egypt economic barriers to halt further erosion of relations. Trade can help cultivate trust and offer greater economic achievement to each country.

The lack of trade is only partially a result of politics. The two economies are in very different stages of development, further exacerbating prospects for cooperation even where there are complementarities--such as in tourism, agriculture, energy and some technical service and product manufacturing areas. Neither the Egyptian nor the Israel national economies have been restructured with a view toward doing business with the other, but certain problems could be overcome with sustained effort.

In the financial area, it is difficult for both Egyptians and Israelis to arrange credit facilities to finance trade and other projects. But financial problems are subject to government intervention. The United States could encourage steps in both countries to enhance availability and terms of credit for conducting business. For example, more Egyptian banks could be authorized to finance Israeli imports. There is only one bank in all Egypt now authorized to do this.

In the political arena, Egypt could relax visa requirements for Egyptian businessmen traveling to Israel, while expediting import licenses for Israeli products into Egypt. For their part, Israelis could offer incentives to Egyptian manufactureres who work with Israelis, taking advantage of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement and Israel’s membership in the European Economic Community.

Although the international community has grown used to peace between Egypt and Israel, neither country’s citizens have grown used to each other. The low-key steps outlined here could change this situation while encouraging others in the Middle East to realize that peace makes economic sense.

The deterrence of violence against the proponents of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the improvement of Egyptian-Israeli relations require a sustained U.S. effort for the next few years. The ability to bring Palestinians, Israelis and others to the negotiating table is tied to the achievement of these two objectives. For not only will the foundation of the U.S. position in the Middle East be reinforced, Washington’s ability to deal effectively with the challenges of the peace process will be much improved.