U.S., Iran Should Act to Break Deadlock

Iran’s Islamic revolution has completed a decade, surviving a brutal war, economic chaos and virtual isolation from the world community. The regime is not on the verge of collapse, and no obvious and more palatable alternative has emerged. The Islamic government has endured numerous attempts--many with assistance from abroad--to bring it down, yet it has both endured and matured. Now Tehran appears ready to enter a new phase, and its gestures, especially toward the West, should be grasped as an opportunity to end a decade of hostility.

Initially, Islamic Iran’s ability to resist foreign aggression and opposition from both within and without enhanced the confidence of many Iranians that they could meet their national needs without relying unduly on foreign powers. The revolution also brought into the mainstream of social and political life people from parts of Iranian society that had been alienated from the regime of the shah. The Islamic regime’s independent international posture and its defiance of the superpowers also inspired many Third World peoples, if not their governments.

In the course of establishing itself, however, the regime made costly mistakesthat have largely dissipated Iranian self-confidence and disillusioned foreign admirers. Most damaging was its unwillingness to accept a negotiated peace on favorable terms when it had the upper hand over Iraq, thus incurring close to $400 billion in economic damage and nearly 1 million dead and wounded.

The war kept Iran from investing adequately in the development needed to fulfill the regime’s promises of economic prosperity and social justice. And its initial plans have been complicated by a birthrate boom that will increase demands on the country’s now-limited resources. The regime’s excesses both at home and abroad, especially its involvement in terrorism, have eroded its image even among many of its admirers. This has contributed to itsisolation, with devastating consequences for Iran’s national interests.

Even more serious has been the revolutionary regime’s inability to resolve its own internal divisions, which range from religious disagreements to differences on public policy. As it enters its second decade, it faces both the daunting task of postwar reconstruction and the demands of an ever-growing and youthful population, yet its vision for shaping the country’s future is far less certain than it was 10 years ago.

The differences were brought into sharp focus over the last several months during debate on issues like the role of the private sector, the acceptable level of foreign investment and external borrowing, and the potential role of foreign experts in the country’s postwar reconstruction. The regime is also divided concerning its approach toward the several hundred thousand Iranians who left the country during the revolution. It recognizes Iran’s need for the capital and the technical and scientific expertise of these expatriates, many of whom would like to return home under the proper circumstances. But it has not yet reached a consensus on the concessions to lure them back.

Nor has the regime yet defined an international role for itself that could both gain broad support within the disparate ranks of the Islamic revolution and be acceptable to its potential partners in the region and beyond. Some factions seem to have learned from the past: They realize that Iran must abandon its self-destructive behavior and accommodate itself to the international system. But the regime still cannot decide which nations to favor as economic and political partners. Especially controversial is the latitude to be permitted Iran’s so-called opening to the West.

At heart, Iran’s national debate derives from the regime’s inability so far to develop its vague Islamic ideology into concrete political, social and economic guidelines. To appeal to most Iranians, these must simultaneously address the demands of modernizing, economic efficiency, social justice, political freedom and Islamic spirituality. Yet, despite its internal contradictions and its uncertain future, Iran remains a strategically important country with a growing population, natural resources and a vibrant if sometimes confusing political culture. It will continue to be an important factor in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In view of the regime’s staying power and growing signs of moderation, the anniversary of the revolution is a good time to put U.S.-Iranian relations on a new footing. Iran’s reintegration in the international community will not be complete until it normalizes ties with the United States, while a working relationship with Iran would help safeguard U.S. interests from Lebanon to Afghanistan.

Beneath their defiant rhetoric, both sides recognize these facts. The problem lies in breaking the deadlock without either party’s appearing to be making concessions or being seen as more eager than the other.

One way would be for Iran and the United States to make simultaneous gestures, as signs of good will, without making one contingent on the other. The United States could indicate that it does not want to see Iraq use its military advantage to press Iran into a discriminatory treaty. Washington also could encourage the Arab-Iranian reconciliation in the Persian Gulf that is already under way. For Iran’s part, the single most important gesture would be to use its influence to gain the release of as many American hostages as possible.

President Bush has set the right tone for the start of a U.S.-Iranian dialogue. Tehran would be wise to respond positively to his call for a cycle of good will to begin healing the mutual wounds of the past decade.