East Bloc Data on Conventional Forces May Ease Talks

The Warsaw Pact’s recently released estimates of the balance of East Bloc and Western forces in Europe offer the potential for early resolution of some of the thorny issues that have impeded an agreement to reduce non-nuclear forces, U.S. officials say.

Although the Warsaw Pact numbers differ significantly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization figures, particularly in their estimate of NATO’s strength, they are, in the words of one U.S. official, “in the right ballpark.” They hold the potential for early agreement at the East-West Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, which will open in Vienna on March 9, officials said this month.

Among other things, a senior State Department official said, publication Jan. 30 of the Warsaw Pact’s data on military forces could open the way to an accord on overflights by aircraft of each side of the other’s territory and the stationing of monitors at key rail and road intersections. Such accords are necessary to assure that each side can verify that the other is abiding by any arms reduction formula.

Implementation of such small steps as they are settled, rather than waiting for all matters to be resolved and promulgated in one large package, would maintain a momentum toward a full-blown agreement, which the Soviet Union appears to want within the next three to four years, the State Department official said.

In broad outline, the NATO proposal to be laid before the Vienna meeting calls for reductions in tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers to 95% of current NATO levels. The Warsaw Pact has numerical superiority in these areas, according to its own statements as well as those of NATO.

Approach Not Disclosed

The Warsaw Pact has yet to disclose its approach to the Vienna talks, but U.S. officials believe that Moscow will seek cuts in tactical aircraft and naval forces as well as in land equipment. The Soviets believe that NATO has the advantage in these areas, particularly in ground-support aircraft that have superior range, electronics and payload capacities.

“The Soviets have accepted the West’s conceptual approach to the CFE talks--that there are asymmetries between the two sides that should be eliminated,” a senior official said.

“The difference is that we approach equipment as the basic guide. It is easier to verify, and it is the weaponry that captures and holds ground,” he added. “The Soviets may want to throw . . . personnel as well as aircraft and naval vessels into the pot.”

While a negotiated outcome in Vienna is far from certain, U.S. officials do not expect the talks to dribble on endlessly, like the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks that lasted 15 years before expiring last year without any result.

Two general pathways are seen: a comprehensive agreement in three to four years, or piecemeal steps that are implemented along the way to the comprehensive settlement. Several key senators, including Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, have told State Department officials that they favor the piecemeal approach.

First Details Ever

U.S. officials welcomed the Warsaw Pact figures--the first detailed data on military strength ever published by that alliance--because with them the East Bloc admitted to a huge numerical advantage in all three categories of land equipment. The result is that the ratio of Warsaw to NATO forces to be reduced, under the NATO proposal, is not as disparate as the numbers suggest and therefore seems less irreconcilable.

On the subject of tanks, for example, NATO contends that it is outnumbered 51,500 to 16,424. The Warsaw Pact claims an advantage of 59,470 to 30,690. Based on NATO figures, the Warsaw Pact would have to withdraw 44 tanks for every one taken out by NATO to reach the proposed 95% of NATO levels. Based on the Warsaw Pact figures, the reduction would be 20 to 1.

Different “counting rules” in all categories explain some of the numerical discrepancies and indicate why these negotiations will be more complex and difficult than the nuclear arms talks.

NATO counts artillery pieces (and mortars and rocket launchers) down to 100 millimeters, but the Warsaw Pact figures include such pieces down to the 75-millimeter size. Warsaw Pact figures for armored personnel carriers include smaller vehicles, which NATO ignores, and light as well as heavy tanks. NATO counts only the heavy tanks.

One of the first orders of business at the new conventional forces talks--they were initially named Conventional Armed Forces in Europe talks before officials became concerned that the acronym, CAFE, suggested frivolity--will be to establish common counting rules in these categories.

While land, sea and air forces will be discussed in the talks, the basic “trade” that the Soviets appear to seek is Warsaw Pact tanks in exchange for NATO tactical aircraft. The East argues that NATO has a slight advantage in both fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters, 16,475 to 13,444, while NATO insists that the Warsaw Pact has a major advantage, 11,950 to 6,396.

NATO Objection

NATO objects in principle to negotiating reductions in aircraft, arguing that air support is not vital in an invasion (although obviously preferable). Many invasions have succeeded without air cover, the official said, and ground cannot be captured with aircraft.

If NATO fails to bar consideration of aircraft, it will insist that the Warsaw Pact adopt more realistic counting rules. Now, the Warsaw Pact figures count only those aircraft whose primary mission is support for ground forces, excluding fighter-interceptors whose mission is air defense.

NATO contends that most interceptor aircraft can be used for ground-support missions, that Soviet fighters are equipped to carry bombs if necessary and that Soviet pilots train 5% to 10% of the time for ground attack.