Move Toward Peace

This week’s summit meeting of the five Central American presidents moved that war-ravaged region farther along the road to peace. But one of their decisions--to demobilize the Contra army that has been trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua--will compel the U.S. government, which helped create and sustain the Contras, to make some difficult choices.

The reason the presidents gathered in El Salvador was to revive their long-delayed effort to end fighting in their part of the world. They had deliberately delayed their summit meeting until former President Reagan was out of office, knowing that the most powerful supporter of the Contras might pressure El Salvador and Honduras, the main U.S. allies in the region, to delay peace talks and thus give the Nicaraguan rebels more time to put military pressure on Managua. But most of the region’s political leaders knew full well that Reagan and his aides were wrong to think that the Contras were a serious threat to the Sandinistas. That is why the Nicaraguan rebels were so quickly and easily bargained away at the summit.

In return for agreement from Honduras that it would begin closing down Contra bases on its side of the border, the Sandinista government said that it would hold open elections as early as possible next year, and free most of the political prisoners held in Nicaragua jails. All three steps are key elements of a peace plan drawn up in 1987 by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez--a plan designed to end a decade of fighting in all five countries. Arias said that he is satisfied with the progress now being made in the talks. But that does not mean that the ensuing steps will be easily or quickly achieved.

For example, moving up the date of Nicaragua’s 1990 elections by nine months, as Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega agreed to do, is far less important than the conditions under which those elections are held. The Sandinistas must still guarantee opposition parties the right to campaign without intimidation by the government or by Sandinista mobs.

Of more immediate concern for U.S. policy-makers is what precisely to do with the Contras, who have been waiting in their Honduran enclaves ever since Congress cut off their military aid last year. The Central American presidents agreed only to devise a plan for disarming and relocating them within 90 days; they offered no specifics on carrying out the plan. They did send a clear message to the United States, however, when they called on outside governments to stop aiding guerrilla groups “except for humanitarian aid” that contributes to the peace process. Congress is still sending food, clothes and other necessities to the Contras. Now is the time for it to join with the Bush Administration to use that aid in other ways. U.S. policy-makers must accept the fact that the nation’s surrogate army in Nicaragua no longer serves any purpose, and must devise plans to withdrawn them from the battlefield--and, if necessary, grant refuge in the United States to those who seek it.