In Afghan Act II, Let U.S. Be Wary of Friends’ Aims

With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the curtain fell on Act I of Afghanistan’s latest drama. Act II, the competition of outsiders for influence over the new government, is now under way. How Afghanistan’s future is resolved--Act III--will depend on whether influence becomes domination.

The outcome may be even more important for the region’s politics than was the superpower struggle over Afghanistan itself. Overreaching by some of the regional contenders for influence could prove destructive in terms of their broader security and other interests. The United States could lose much if the ambitions of its regional allies lead to developments that, instead of stabilizing Afghanistan, help to destabilize the entire region.

There is precedent for this prediction. During the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and Iran tried to transform Afghanistan’s politics and its foreign-policy orientation, in particular to bring about greater distance between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. But this attempt only contributed to events that finally produced the Soviet invasion of 1979.

Now there is risk that efforts by outsiders to impose a government of their liking in Kabul could have other unforeseen and potentially damaging consequences. At the very least, such efforts would delay national reconciliation in Afghanistan, and they could even lead to endemic civil war along the lines of Lebanon.

It is no secret that the interim government, formed by seven rebel groups, does not enjoy the support of the majority of the Afghans. For example, Shiite Muslims, who make up 15% to 25% of the population, are not represented in this government. Even the relatively moderate Afghan groups in Peshawar are not totally behind it, nor are many of the local rebel commanders.

This lack of cohesion is caused in part by traditional Afghan rivalries. But the interim government is also widely viewed as the handmaiden of a collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and therein lies its cardinal weakness.

Both countries are pursuing major goals. Pakistan aspires to gain dominant influence over a future government in Kabul, in part to avoid difficulties like the persistent Afghan efforts to create an independent “Pushtunistan” out of Pakistani territory. The Saudis chiefly want to block any increase of Iranian influence. In addition to supporting the interim government, the Saudis have been promoting fundamentalist Wahabbi missionary activity in Afghanistan as part of broader religious proselytizing in south and central Asia.

Such aggressively pursued ambitions are bound to generate responses by other states in the region. India is unlikely to sit still in the face of Pakistani efforts to turn Afghanistan into a satellite. Nor would Iran acquiesce to the disfranchisement of Shiite Muslims by the Sunni Muslim majority in a Saudi-Pakistan dominion over Afghanistan.

It is conceivable that India and Iran would cooperate in blocking Saudi-Pakistan ambitions. Such cooperation would be facilitated if the current trend in Soviet-Iranian rapprochement continues, especially if their reported arms deal materializes. Backed by the Soviet Union, an Indo-Iranian alliance would shift the balance of regional power against Pakistan and would put it in a difficult strategic position by flanking it with two hostile neighbors. India and Iran could also manipulate Pakistan’s Pathan and Baluchi minorities, thus increasing the chances for internal instability.

Rather than risking these consequences, Pakistan should develop an Afghan policy that serves its legitimate interests. It does have a right to demand that a future Afghan government unequivocally recognize the current border and abandon any ambitions to create an independent Pushtunistan. But if Pakistan goes further, or if it aids and abets broader Saudi objectives, it will be asking for trouble--for itself and for others, including the United States.

Creating stability in Afghanistan and keeping its problems from spilling over onto the rest of the region require respect for two basic rules. First, a future Afghan government must be as representative of the country’s diverse ethnic and religious makeup as possible, and it must not be dominated by a single group or political or religious tendency. Second, that government must be nonaligned, not only in regard to ties with the superpowers, but also in its relations with countries in the region.

For its part, the United States is legitimately entitled to an adequate presence in a nonaligned Afghanistan. Beyond this goal, however, U.S. interests and the ambitions of its regional allies do not necessarily coincide. Certainly, the United States has no interest in seeing religious extremism spread in Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether Shiite or Wahabbi. Nor does it have an interest in seeing Pakistan’s relations deteriorate with two important neighbors, India and Iran. And an Indo-Iranian cooperation blessed by the Soviets would not serve U.S. interests in South Asia.

The United States is thus in the difficult position of relying on others to determine whether its interests in Afghanistan will be protected. While it attempts to sort out just what it wants there, it must be clear about what it does not want: to be misled by the parochial interests and ambitions of regional allies.