Libyan Deal, Latin Aid Stir U.S. Doubt on Soviet Policy

Bush Administration officials, reacting to Soviet foreign policy moves from Libya to Nicaragua, complained Wednesday that the “new thinking” proclaimed by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev appears to have produced little real change in Moscow’s actions in the Third World.

Administration officials said they are deeply concerned by the Soviet Union’s decision to supply advanced jet bombers to Libya and disappointed by Gorbachev’s unwillingness to end military aid to Nicaragua, as President Bush has asked.

But perhaps more important than these issues, the recent Soviet actions have heightened the skepticism that many Bush aides feel toward Gorbachev’s declared vision of a new foreign policy.

“There is still a lot of doubt that they are on a new course,” a senior White House official said.

Administration officials said Bush and his aides regard Soviet behavior in such areas as Central America and the Middle East as a key test of what Gorbachev’s doctrine of “new thinking” in foreign policy will mean in practice.

“We have long said that regional relations are one of the best gauges to political attitudes and activities in the Soviet Union,” White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said Wednesday.

So far, one official complained, the only real changes in Soviet behavior have come “in places where they were incurring heavy costs”--Afghanistan, where the Red Army has withdrawn after almost a decade of futile war, and Angola, where Moscow has supported a U.S.-mediated peace process after spending billions of scarce dollars to support a Marxist regime.

Officials said the Soviet sale of 12 to 15 Sukhoi 24-D jet bombers to Libya--first revealed Wednesday--was worrisome for two reasons: because it could give the radical Arab country a new ability to attack long-range targets in Israel and elsewhere, and because it appears to deepen Moscow’s relationship with Libya’s erratic leader, Moammar Kadafi.

The Soviet action also flies in the face of one of Bush’s major foreign policy goals: controlling the spread of sophisticated weaponry among Third World countries.

“The United States certainly is concerned about the proliferation of these kinds of weapons and having them provided by the Soviet Union to other countries,” Fitzwater said. “We would be very concerned about any aircraft sales to Libya and what it might do for stability in the Middle East. So the general issue is a very serious one.”

In Central America, officials said they have seen no signs that Gorbachev is preparing to respond to Bush’s appeal for an end to Soviet military aid to leftist-ruled Nicaragua. Some officials had suggested that Gorbachev might announce at least a token reduction in Soviet aid to Nicaragua and Cuba during his visit to Cuba, which ended Wednesday. But Gorbachev made no such gesture in his major speech to Cuba’s National Assembly on Tuesday.

“I think it’s certainly fair to say that we’re disappointed,” Fitzwater said. “ . . . The speech did not provide any new thinking--mostly old thinking--and no real leadership in terms of new directions in Central America on the part of the Soviet Union.”

The Soviet action in Libya--and inaction in Central America--have come at a sensitive time: the Bush Administration is completing work on a long-range review of Soviet intentions, and the exercise has touched off a muted debate over how the United States should respond to Gorbachev’s declarations of more peaceful intentions.

“Some of us believe we should be taking a few more risks to test Gorbachev,” a senior official said. “Others are more skeptical, more traditional-minded.”

Chief among the skeptics, reportedly, is Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security adviser, who has frequently warned of the danger of moving too fast in U.S.-Soviet relations. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, on the other hand, has emphasized the need to take Gorbachev up on some of his foreign policy challenges.

Several scholars of Soviet behavior said there are signs that Gorbachev is becoming more cautious after an early wave of daring foreign policy initiatives, culminating in his announcement last December of a unilateral withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe.

“There may be a certain amount of backsliding going on,” said Francis Fukuyama of the RAND Corp. in Santa Monica. “There is clearly a fight between Gorbachev and the conservatives, (Politburo member Yegor K.) Ligachev and others, on foreign policy.”

A State Department official said the rationale behind the sale of the jets was “a bit of a mystery” but said the Soviet government may have sold the planes largely for the amount of hard currency the transaction would produce.

“Our understanding is that a significant amount of cash is involved,” the official said.

The delivery of the sophisticated aircraft gives Libya a “major power projection capability,” said one Defense Department official. U.S. officials fear that if Libyan pilots become skilled in flying the jets, Kadafi would possess potent options to retaliate against attacks, as well as to launch preemptive strikes at targets as far away as 800 miles.

The SU-24D’s extended range would bring not only Israel, but parts of Southern Europe and much of Africa within the reach of Kadafi’s air force, Pentagon officials said.

The SU-24D, designed as a ground attack bomber equal to the American FB-111 and known by NATO as the “Fencer,” was introduced to the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Times staff writer Robin Wright contributed to this report.