Disappointing Tete-a-Tete

Close observers of the Communist world are just starting to argue over who came out ahead in last week’s Cuban summit between Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Fidel Castro. But for now, it appears that the long-anticipated meeting between the two Marxist leaders resolved little, particularly with respect to Cuba’s involvement in Central America.

The first summit meeting between Gorbachev and Castro (they had met before, but this was their first get-together as heads of state) was viewed with so much interest in this country, because they have staked out dramatically different views of Marxism-Leninism and how the Communist bloc should deal with the United States. Gorbachev is trying to reform and open up the Communist system while Castro insists on Stalinist orthodoxy; Gorbachev says he wants to lessen tension with the West, while Castro viscerally mistrusts the United States.

In his meetings with U.S. leaders, Gorbachev has mentioned regional conflicts, like those in Central America, as arenas where tensions between the superpowers could easily be reduced. So top officials in the Bush Administration had hoped Gorbachev would use his government’s influence in Cuba (the Soviets provide Castro with more than $5 billion a year in foreign aid) to persuade Castro to reduce his support for the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. But Gorbachev’s conciliatory stance is contrary to the view often expressed by Castro: As the first successful Marxist revolutionaries in the Third World, Cubans have an obligation to encourage and support other “liberation movements” wherever they occur. That stance has led them to foment or aid leftist rebellions in Latin America and to act as Soviet surrogates in Africa.

Which view prevailed in the discussions between Gorbachev and Castro is not known. Neither the Cuban nor the Soviet governments provided many details about the talks. And each side could point to public statements that seemed to support its own man’s position.

The two leaders signed a Cuban-Soviet friendship treaty that included a favorite theme of Gorbachev’s, condemning the use of force in foreign relations. And in his speech before the Cuban National Assembly, Gorbachev called for an end to all outside military aid in Latin America. But Gorbachev took no action to back up those fine sentiments. And, in public at least, Castro was the same old Fidel, his speeches laced with attacks on U.S. “imperialism.”

The most disappointing result of the summit was that nothing immediate was done to reduce Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias insists that Soviet arms in Nicaragua are every bit as destabilizing as U.S. arms for the Contras, and he’s right. While no one expected Castro to listen to Arias’ opinion--the Cuban is notoriously arrogant in dealing with other Latin American leaders--many had hoped Gorbachev might.

Of course, there is always a chance that Castro’s bluff and bluster is just so much show, and that once public attention shifts away, he will become as reasonable as his chief sponsor and ally claims to be. But given the Cuban dictator’s reputation for unpredictability and ornery independence, nobody in Washington or Moscow should hold his breath waiting for the change.