Dry Run for a New Era

A debacle averted in Namibia holds promise for the future of South Africa.

In many ways, what is happening there is a “dry run” for a South African peace. But its lessons must be learned.

If violence early this month in northern Namibia had not been contained, this would have vastly strengthened the right-wing in South Africa--thus seriously impeding the more enlightened elements of the South African government who seek to reform society. The lull in the fighting between infiltrating guerrillas of the South-West Africa People’s Organization and South African-led security forces, with the United Nations offering guerrillas the safety of makeshift bases, is a modest triumph for dovish diplomacy.

Though the southern African caveat has to be added--that anything could happen to smash the peace--the progress achieved is important for future South African actions in the subcontinent.

At the height of “wind-up” week, in which nearly 300 fighters--mostly SWAPO guerrillas--died, South African newspapers were publishing war headlines. The territory, due for independence elections on Nov. 1 under U.N. monitoring and South African administration, was shaken to find Day One of the process, April 1, marked by savage fighting.

There was loose talk of Cuban tanks heading south through Angola to help the embattled SWAPO fighters being severely dealt with by the security forces in Ovamboland. But the South African government, heavily influenced by its experienced foreign minister, Roelof F. (Pik) Botha, refused to be stampeded into over-hasty responses. He quickly calmed things down by, in effect, accepting Cuban assurances that their forces had no hostile intent.

At the same time he was meeting with Angolans, Cubans and even prominent Soviets as part of the peace plan; and it must be appreciated that to be seen dealing in good faith with such quarters is a hazardous business for a white South African politician. Right-wing politicians challenging the ruling National Party for power are poised to exploit any perceived sellout to communism, or the world for that matter.

The upshot of the intensive diplomacy was heavy pressure on SWAPO’s leader, Sam Nujoma, to withdraw his fighters back to Angola via the U.N. emergency bases. It was a remarkable diplomatic push, involving the strangest of bedfellows--Americans, Soviets, Angolans, Cubans and South Africans. It showed what can be achieved if different nations can be locked into a peace process. It points a way forward for South Africa itself.

The South Africans are feeling good at being recognized, by and large, in the international community as the “good guys,” having stuck to the letter of the peace deal--though showing their steel against those who apparently did not.

The importance of “good guy” status is that those in the government who want to reform society away from apartheid and forge better relations with the world will be encouraged to pursue their course. With President P.W. Botha on the way out and younger and more pragmatic politicians coming to the fore, the possibility is strengthened that--at least after general elections expected within months--the government will try to break out of its international isolation.

This, of course, will not be easy while racial discrimination lingers in any form. But if Namibia goes well, there will be an improvement in the political atmosphere, favoring negotiations with the South African guerrilla organization, the African National Congress. Already the Soviet Union, which has had discussions with many influential South Africans including Foreign Minister Botha, has shown a preference for negotiation rather than guerrilla war.

The United Nations has been criticized for being slow to deploy its peace force, and the Security Council’s haggling over the cost and size of the U.N. operation could have caused delays that opened the way for greater bloodshed. There also appears to have been unspecific drafting of some aspects of the agreement--for example, what, exactly, would happen to any SWAPO forces already in Namibia on April 1.

The lesson to be learned is obvious: Securing the peace is no leisurely, casual matter. The international forces should not see their job as simply monitoring some obscure elections while enjoying the African sun and local beer. Nor can the job be done on a shoestring budget. These points should be taken by the big powers.

Sometime in the future, South Africa itself will be on the agenda for a peace settlement, with or without U.N. involvement. It has nearly 30 times the population of Namibia, no “international” status, a more complex history of political division and black grievance, a sophisticated economy and massive urbanization. It is the only home of ruling, tough-to-crack Afrikaners, who respond badly under pressure. That will be a blockbuster event compared with Namibia. The lessons are best learned in advance.