E. Europe’s Drift From Moscow Must Not Be Forced

“We are heading toward the erosion of the Soviet empire in every direction,” a French diplomat remarked not long ago. “Now our problem is to make sure the whole mess doesn’t explode.”

His point is well taken--especially with regard to Eastern Europe--in the aftermath of the remarkable Soviet elections.

Those defeated included a non-voting member of the Politburo, the mayors of Moscow and Kiev, several military and naval commanders, many senior Communist Party and government officials in the restive Baltic republics, and the Estonian chief of the KGB secret police.

The results amounted to a strong vote of support for perestroika , the reform program of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. But, as a senior Soviet journalist noted, it also revealed “real anger” at the Communist Party.

Foreign policy didn’t figure much in pre-election campaigning; the emphasis was on bread-and-butter concerns of the average citizen. However, the potential impact on Soviet relations with the outside world is enormous.

It is conceivable that frightened conservatives will now try to put the brakes on “democratization” or even to oust Gorbachev. But that seems unlikely.

First, Gorbachev’s position is probably too strong. And even the conservatives must see a need to deflect public anger by accelerating efforts to make more food and other consumer goods available. If that meant a greater diversion of resources from the military, the result should be even more emphasis on arms control as assurance against a Western tilt in the military balance.

All this is happening against a background of exhilarating change in Eastern Europe, where Gorbachev has encouraged both political and economic reforms.

Gorbachev has no intention of giving up the Soviet power of veto over what happens in the area. But he knows that another upheaval requiring military intervention would sidetrack perestroika --and destroy his reputation in the West as leader of a new, non-threatening Soviet Union. He apparently feels that a looser rein will help keep the lid on and make the East Europeans more valuable economic partners in the process.

The ossified leaders of East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia reject reforms. But the Polish regime has agreed to recognize Solidarity--something it vowed it would never do only a few months ago--and to allow opposition groups a share of power in Parliament. Although details are still hazy, “alternative groups” in Hungary will be allowed to participate as political parties in 1990 elections.

The Communists intend to control the power-sharing process and use it to force opposition forces to share the blame for unpopular belt-tightening measures. But even Gorbachev must be uneasy over some of the things being said in Eastern Europe--and their possible spillover into the Soviet Union.

Milovan Djilas, the disillusioned old Titoist in Yugoslavia, says that “communism isn’t changing, it’s disintegrating.” The thesis that communism is not reformable--and must give way to something else--is widespread among opposition forces throughout the region.

Communist leaders don’t agree. But Hungary’s prime minister has publicly suggested that the party, if outvoted, would have to surrender power. Reflecting the hunger of East Europeans to participate in Western Europe’s economic integration, the Hungarian trade minister has broached the idea of joining the European Free Trade Assn.

Yuri Afanasev, a prominent Soviet champion of reforms, told an Italian newspaper that members of the Soviet-led military alliance should have the possibility of leaving Comecon, the Soviet-led economic bloc, or “abandoning socialism” if they wished--and was sharply reprimanded by Pravda for his pains.

Oleg Bogomolov, Soviet economist and sometime adviser to Gorbachev, told an interviewer that a politically neutral Hungary, like Austria or Sweden, would “present no security threat” to the Soviet Union. A high Soviet official quickly labeled his statement “absurd.”

The ferment in Eastern Europe plainly creates opportunities for the West to encourage the drift away from Moscow. Indeed, from the humanitarian and self- determination viewpoint, we have a duty to help it along. The Bush Administration is studying proposals to do just that. The situation is ticklish, however.

It is just possible that the Kremlin would settle for a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, in place of outright dominance, if the process were gradual. But any overt U.S. campaign to detach the region from Soviet control could be dangerous.

We cannot afford to forget that instability in Eastern Europe helped set off World War I--and that a violent, anti-Soviet upheaval there is the most likely trigger for World War III.

For the present it would be wiser to let events take their natural course--an approach that up to now has served both our interests and those of the Eastern Europeans.