Moving Back From the Precipice Toward Soviet State Based on Rule of Law

The widespread Western skepticism about the prospects for a Soviet state that relies on the rule of law is based on many factors.

The first, naturally, reflects the objective characteristics of the prolonged reality of the past--the grim decades of Stalinism. But the end of the big terror in the mid-1950s marked the clear turn to a situation of another character, removed as it was from the ideal of the “rule of law instead of the dominance of men.” For 30 years since, we have been witnesses to a fundamental, although not spectacular, process: the crumbling of the pyramid of violence and terror, of the hierarchy of fiat--political, economic and cultural. A generation of Soviet people oblivious of the fear of nocturnal knocks at the door has emerged on the social arena.

The other objective reality feeding Western skepticism is that the nation has no experience to speak of in building a democratic, law-based state. Yet one can well be reminded of the experience of the Russian social-democratic and other political movements, the multiparty system the country had between 1905 and 1920, and the state duma (a prototype of the modern parliament), limited as its authority was.

Another reality is the one-party system in the Soviet Union, viewed by many as being incompatible with a law-based state. But it is an indisputable fact that it was the leader of the Soviet Communist Party who launched the drive for more democracy. Any realistically minded Soviet politician understands that this drive within the party is the most promising road to democracy, established peacefully in a constitutional way.

There are also subjective reasons for the apprehension: the biases and prejudices that for the longest time have dominated the individual and social mentality of the West. It is clear today, though, that the “Brave New World” was, happily, not realized in full. The underlying image of the 100% totalitarian system, self-perpetuating and immune to change, has proved unrealistic despite the substantive features of Stalinism reflected in it. Another unfeasible myth is the idea of the potentially complete indoctrination of individuals in the spirit of the “capitalist, bourgeois enemy,” as perestroika convincingly proves.

Focusing on yet another factor, the complete literacy of the population, I believe the task of building a Soviet state based on the rule of law is fully realistic within a historically short period of time. Work is under way in three directions: Reform in the political system, cardinal changes in economic relations and radical revision of the judicial system.

The election campaign with the free nomination of candidates was the first, yet crucial, step toward a law-based state. The struggle for the genuine supreme legislative power of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the reformed Supreme Soviet is still ahead. The bureaucracy, those who used to pull the strings behind the scenes, fiercely resists the transfer of full authority to the freely elected soviets, or local governments. This resistance should not be underestimated. The loss of the monopoly on power is exasperating indeed.

Our economic reforms are prompted by life itself. Everybody understands that the old methods of running the economy by decree are fraught with the danger of our country’s losing its status of a developed power. What we need is a socialist market to regulate our economic processes. An agrarian reform--that the land should be given forever and ever to those who till it--is on the agenda. This is countered by those who think it is their destiny to “manage” the farmer. By the same token, those who are used to “managing” the worker resist the cooperatives operating on market principles.

Nevertheless, I believe the course toward the demolition of the old administrative managerial machinery will be pursued to the end. Along with that, the new soviets will help make individual and collective operators economically independent, and will defend their interests against bureaucratic attacks.

About the judicial reform: The task here is to build strong, independent courts--a “third power” after the legislature and the executive. The courts used to be subjugated to the strong influence of the party and the authorities. This should be radically transformed. Society wants the new courts to be sovereign arbiters with inalienable rights.

The West has noted our progress in the field of human rights. The process will continue until the situation fully conforms with international criteria. Perestroika has produced a new term--the “unofficials,” i.e. popular associations, fronts, alliances, clubs and the like. We see a pluralism of opinions, ideas and platforms across the board, from environmental protection to the country’s political system. Rallies and demonstrations are now an integral part of Soviet political life. They are the first lessons of political activities, demonstrated so convincingly during the recent election campaign.

The new formula for the union--a strong center and strong republics--moved to the fore by perestroika is the road to equal contractual relations and broader sovereignty of the republics.

I believe there is no stopping the process. What matters is the rate of change and social spinoffs. The events last month in Tbilisi, Georgia, where the army and other security forces were used against a peaceful popular rally, are a regrettable sign that the authorities still have the knack for using old methods. But the result of the Georgian developments was something new: The republic’s leaders who made the decision to use the troops had to resign. The events have posed a new task that the new Supreme Soviet will have to face without delay: to put the actions of the armed forces, especially of the security forces, under public and constitutional control.

The road to a law-based state is no bed of roses. To succeed, we need time and favorable external conditions.