CRISIS IN NATO: The Brussels Summit : Doctrine Followed Massive Retaliation Policy : NATO Flexible Response--the Strategy

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s nuclear strategy of flexible response lies at the core of the quarrel within the alliance over short-range nuclear forces . Here are questions and answers about the controversial doctrine.

Question: What is flexible response?

Answer: It means that Western Europe is defended by nuclear missiles ranging from artillery shells on the battlefield, with a range of a few miles, to intercontinental missiles based in the United States. If Soviet forces were to invade and overwhelm conventional armies, the attack could be countered by a graduated, or flexible, range of nuclear weapons.

Q: Has this always been NATO’s nuclear doctrine?

A: No. Though Secretary of State James A. Baker III recently said flexible response has kept the peace in Europe for 40 years, the doctrine has been in effect only for the last two decades.

Q: What preceded flexible response?

A: Massive retaliation. In the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the strategy provided for retaliation for a Soviet attack on Western Europe by destroying Soviet cities with U.S. intercontinental missiles or bombers.

Q: What changed this strategy?

A: The Soviets developed the bomb and long-range missiles. If we hit Moscow, they could hit New York or Washington. This was not considered a realistic deterrent. So the doctrine was shifted in the late 1960s to flexible response, under which a Soviet attack might be countered by a “small” nuclear shell, leading to a “limited” nuclear war, thus sparing Soviet and American urban populations.

Q: Wouldn’t the use of short-range nuclear weapons destroy much of East Germany and West Germany, the region most likely to suffer the most devastation during a Soviet attack?

A: That’s what the Germans say. That’s why they are unhappy about having short-range nuclear weapons on their territory designed for use only against targets in the two Germanys. In the view of some Germans, flexible response represents a paraphrase of the officer’s remark in Vietnam: “We had to destroy the country in order to save it.”

Q: Why have German objections surfaced only in recent months?

A: Actually, the West Germans have been calling for reductions in short-range nuclear weapons at NATO meetings for the past two years--ever since the treaty banning ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) was endorsed.

Q: What is the significance of the INF treaty to the Germans?

A: It meant that an enormous deterrent against a Soviet attack was lost because the Soviet heartland would no longer be threatened by these weapons. This left only short-range nuclear forces--the low end of flexible response--whose targets would be limited to those only in the two Germanys.

Q: Are the short-range nuclear weapons, with about 4,600 atomic warheads, really necessary for NATO’s defense?

A: Gen. John R. Galvin, NATO’s supreme commander, thinks so, as do the governments in Washington and London. But many other strategists feel the short-range weapons are irrelevant.

Q: Why?

A: Because they might be overrun by Soviet forces before authorization would be given for their use. And if fired, a nuclear strike would quickly escalate into exchanges of longer-range weapons. So in all likelihood, battlefield nuclear weapons would never be used. Further, their role as a deterrent could be covered by longer-range air- or sea-launched nuclear missiles, well to the rear of the battlefront.

Q: Doesn’t that suggest that flexible response may be outmoded as a doctrine?

A: The Germans think so. Bonn Editor Thomas Kielinger calls this “NATO’s dirty little secret.” Strategist Theo Sommer in Hamburg declares: “Flexible response is a bluff at best.” Opposition Social Democrat Horst Ehmke argues: “NATO would destroy Germany four days into the war. What’s flexible about four days?” And West German President Richard von Weizsaecker says a “limited” nuclear war is simply not a feasible strategy.

Q: Has this perception created tensions in the alliance?

A: Definitely. In many European eyes, flexible response could mean that a nuclear war would be fought on the Continent--without involving any losses to American territory. The Americans say a short-range nuclear strike would give the Soviets a chance to think twice. But the Europeans prefer a doctrine that would quickly trigger U.S. longer-range nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union--thus serving as the maximum deterrent.

Q: Will the argument over flexible response be sorted out at the Brussels summit?

A: Most likely not. The alliance has come to live with such ambiguities. But many strategists believe that flexible response will ultimately be replaced as NATO’s key defensive doctrine.