Deng’s Actions Discredit Legitimacy of His Rule : Disarming, Humiliation of Army in Streets Probably Made Murderous Force Inevitable

The events in Tian An Men Square during the early morning hours of Sunday seem certain to rank among the most momentous and infamous episodes in four decades of communist rule in China. Three weeks after the first student sit-ins that disrupted the summit meeting with visiting Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and two weeks after the initial declaration of martial law, a besieged, desperate leadership finally decided to act. Having failed to persuade or intimidate the students and their supporters, having refused to negotiate with them, and finally having been unable to out wait or outwit them, the authorities turned to the use of force, without regard to the loss of life.

The final decision bore all the hallmarks of Deng Xiaoping, China’s aged but still supreme leader. Although little seen in public in recent weeks, Deng has proved to be the decisive figure throughout the course of events. His decision to reject Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s pleas to negotiate with the demonstrators and to throw his support to Premier Li Peng led to the decision to impose martial law. Deng had decided to draw the line: There would be no compromise whatsoever with the protesters in the square, who were depicted as insurrectionists determined to topple the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

But these decisions were followed by a prolonged stalemate at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership. Numerous other ranking officials were labeling Zhao Ziyang a “counterrevolutionary anti-party element”; at the same time many senior military commanders voiced extreme reluctance to use force again the demonstrators. The initial deployment of troops in the early morning hours of May 20 (principally from the Beijing Military Region) was neither forceful nor determined, and the citizens of Beijing gloried in their ability to turn back the soldiers.

It was not until several days before the final violent assault on the square that indications grew more ominous. When lightly armed soldiers were rebuffed during the early morning hours of June 3, many in the streets believed another singular victory had been achieved. But the abject humiliation of the People’s Liberation Army--the soldiers having been disarmed and embarrassed by the citizens--probably made the final assault inevitable, with military units showing few compunctions about the loss of life.

The horrific events in Tian An Men Square early Sunday morning were further compounded by the employment of main-force units totally unprepared for quelling urban protests. These units, drawn disproportionately from military regions other than Beijing, demonstrated unflinching loyalty to Deng and his allies in the military, but also their unsuitability to deal with the situation in the square. The use of substantial firepower guaranteed exceedingly high casualty figures, which were probably much in excess of numbers reported by area hospitals.

But Deng’s concern was not about the loss of life, but about his loss of face. Confronting the biggest challenge to the authority of the party since the Cultural Revolution, he chose--tragically and mistakenly--to view the recent protests in the context of his remembrance of those earlier traumatic events. The result is a final, shameful discrediting of the legitimacy of his rule, and a sad dismembering of the nation’s progress during a decade of economic reform initiated under his aegis.

What happens next? Deng and his allies have probably succeeded in imposing their will on a defiant citizenry, at least in the near term, but at a grievous cost. Deng’s historical reputation is a shambles within his own populace, and internationally as well: He is likely to be remembered most for his insistence on a brutal suppression of mass protest regardless of the consequences.

Actions do have consequences. The repercussions and aftershocks of this weekend’s events will long persist. Deng may face renewed challenges to his determination to remain atop the Chinese system, possibly from within the circle of elders on whom he now depends so critically for support. China’s urban and politically attentive citizens, though in most instances without a full and accurate understanding of the gruesome outcome in the square, will remain profoundly alienated from the leaders who either urged or acquiesced to the use of force. A firestorm of protest has also been unleashed internationally, and it seems very likely that major adjustments in U.S. policy toward China are in the offing.

Thus Deng’s decision has assured little, except that China’s leader for a full decade seems a disgraced and vastly diminished figure. It is in this context that all Chinese and indeed the world as a whole await the next momentous turn in China’s extraordinary political drama.