Warsaw and Moscow Walk Onto Shaky Soil : For Both, Solidarity in Power is a Huge Risk

In a moment of both keen insight and black humor during World War II, Josef Stalin remarked that the idea of creating socialism in Poland was akin to putting a saddle on a cow.

Had he fully appreciated the wisdom of his joke, both Poland and the Soviet Union would, no doubt, be better off today. Poland has been the most unstable country in Moscow’s Eastern European empire and, due to Poland’s key strategic location, this has been acutely felt.

Yet last week, Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski approved the formation of a coalition government led by the Solidarity movement. With the participation of two small parties formerly subservient to the Polish Communists--the Democrats and the United Peasants--this government will control both the lower and upper houses of the Polish Parliament. The cabinet will include at least two Communist ministers, who will hold the crucial portfolios of interior and foreign affairs.

This is yet another link in a chain of remarkable and unexpected developments in Poland. But it is probably too soon to be euphoric. The cow has not been completely unsaddled.

When the Communists sat down with Solidarity representatives for their round-table discussions last March, expectations for a political breakthrough were low.

Solidarity was relegalized and allowed to contest a significant number of seats in parliamentary elections. Its trouncing of the Communists in head-to-head competition made it possible for an Eastern European government--the first one in 40 years--to be led by a non-Communist politician. Yet as late as last week, this result was seen as outside the realm of possibility.

During the competitive scrambling to put together a ruling coalition, Jaruzelski had stated that Moscow would not look favorably upon a Solidarity-led government. Then the Soviet Foreign Ministry contradicted him by reiterating a statement that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev made to the Council of Europe earlier this year: “Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states--friends, allies or any other--are inadmissible.”

So it is Gorbachev who has radically altered the rules of politics in Eastern Europe. If the Soviets abide by their statements, Poland will regain its internal sovereignty within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. If the Soviets can permit this in Poland, it is possible in every other country in the region.

The Poles have prudently chosen not to test the limit of their autonomy in external affairs. Lech Walesa made a point of stressing that Poland would not leave the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev seems to have come to the conclusion that, from the point of view of Soviet security needs, a Warsaw Pact composed of internally autonomous, politically stable allies is preferable to one made up of politically volatile, economically deteriorating, ideologically orthodox vassal states.

Yet in both Moscow and Warsaw, the foundations on which this rapidly changing relationship hinges are shaky. In the Soviet Union, the continued deterioration in conditions on the consumer market are undermining popular support for Gorbachev and his program of perestroika . If grumbling turns into labor unrest on a scale beyond the recently settled strikes in coal-mining regions of Siberia and the Ukraine, if the Soviet nationality problems grow worse, or if change in Eastern Europe takes on a violent or explicitly anti-Soviet character, the hand of hard-liners opposed to Gorbachev may grow stronger. Thus Gorbachev needs peaceful and orderly political change in Eastern Europe. If he is removed or is forced to curtail his policies, the tolerance for political experimentation in Poland may disappear.

In Warsaw, the most pressing task for the Solidarity government will be to reform the moribund Polish economy. For this reason, taking power is a huge political risk. Any economic reform and austerity program that Solidarity pursues will, in the short run, hurt Polish society and the working class. It is unclear as to whether the union’s popular support is extensive enough to prevent more radical opposition groups from threatening potentially beneficial reforms.

Should Solidarity’s future economic reforms fail outright, the union will face threats from many corners. Its popular support will certainly begin to wane. Internally, it will be beset by recrimination and centrifugal pressures. If such a scenario comes to pass, Solidarity will have to worry about the dissolution of the governing coalition, the splitting of the union, defeat at the polls during the next scheduled elections in 1993, the growth in strength of the more radical opposition groups, or even a coup d’etat by hard-line elements in the Communist Party, army and police. Such a failure by Solidarity would not be of much help to Gorbachev’s political career, either.

Further complicating the situation is the question of whether the decisions that the new government makes will be quickly and wholeheartedly implemented. Nobody knows if the state bureaucracy, whose interests are closely intertwined with the Communist Party, will listen to Solidarity ministers. In the past, the most crucial positions have been filled only by those who have had the overt approval of the party. This nomenklatura system has been one of the key bulwarks of party rule. Solidarity will want and will have to replace such people. Finding enough suitably trained replacements from among Solidarity’s supporters and the time it will take to make such a transition pose additional problems.

At this time the Bush Administration, in concert with our Western European allies, must move decisively to help Poland stabilize itself economically. The $100 million that the President promised on his trip to Poland earlier this summer is much too little. The Polish debt must be restructured so that it does not doom Solidarity from the outset. Economic assistance, particularly to revive Polish agriculture and create modern consumer and light industry, is indispensable to assure social peace. Finally, programs should be established as quickly as possible to help train Solidarity cadres to run the state bureaucracies.