A Risky Role for U.N. in Cambodia : If Peacekeepers Go In, It Must Be With a Consensus

The international community is about to ask the United Nations to be both midwife and guarantor of Cambodia’s future. There really is no alternative. Having survived the horrors of the Khmer Rouge killing fields and the Vietnamese occupation, the people of Cambodia could face protracted civil war after the Vietnamese withdraw in late September. After all, it has been the Vietnamese enemy that has bound together a most unlikely coalition of resistance forces, each with its own major power patron. Since there are no neutrals at the Paris peace conference, only the United Nations has any hope of brokering a compromise minimally acceptable to each of the competing factions and interests.

But caution should be the guiding principle. At this point, neither the political, nor military, nor material conditions exist for a successful U.N. intervention. And no one should have any illusions about the United Nations’ ability to perform overnight miracles, no matter how many Nobel Peace Prizes it garners.

The decision in Paris to request the dispatch of U.N. fact-finders makes good sense as a first step. Yet there is no agreement or clear understanding on what steps should follow.

One reason is that Cambodia typifies a new generation of conflict: wars between domestic opponents sometimes acting as proxies for outside powers. U.N. peacekeeping has worked best against old-fashioned wars when there are only two parties--preferably nation states--to the conflict, boundaries are well-defined and the military situation is at a stalemate.

For the two kinds of conflict the task of the intervener could not be more different. In one, peacekeeping is passive; it buffers combatants as diplomats convert cease-fires into peace treaties--often by exchanging some territory.

In a civil war the job is far messier. If a country is to avoid partition, territorial settlements won’t suffice. Instead, a governable national fabric has to be rewoven from a tangle of political, ideological, ethnic, tribal, religious and other threads. The peacemaker becomes a surrogate state-builder, monitoring elections, resettling refugees and rebuilding the economy, bureaucracy and infrastructure.

As the United Nations’ own record attests, the transition from peacekeeping to state-building can be a dangerous and uncertain one. In the Congo, the United Nations was sucked into full-scale combat, splitting the Security Council and sacrificing the life of its secretary general. In Lebanon, the U.N. peacekeeping force is as much a victim caught in a cross-fire as a buffer. In Namibia, both the rebels and South Africa have repeatedly challenged the United Nations’ mandate. And in Afghanistan, it has proven easier to get the Soviets out than to get the killing stopped.

With such experience, the United Nations could be forgiven for politely refusing the entreaties to save Cambodia, to reserve its peacekeeping energies for more clear-cut conflicts. But there are few of those left. A whole generation of Third World conflicts is winding down without clear winners. Increasingly, member states are too eager to dump their unsolved problems in the United Nations’ lap. What is less clear is whether they are willing to equip the organization with the political and financial tools necessary to execute so many demanding missions.

With proper support, the United Nations can, and should, respond to this new set of challenges. But it should resist adding Cambodia to its already full plate until minimal conditions for success are met.

The Vietnamese, who have complained of U.N. bias against them, and all domestic factions must be willing to cooperate with the organization and to live up to all of the terms of the agreement now being negotiated. U.N. peacekeepers on their own should not be expected to tame the Khmer Rouge or resist another Vietnamese intervention. It is up to China and the Soviet Union to cut off arms and assistance to their clients if they are uncooperative. If the peace process breaks down anyway, then it is up to the major powers to give the United Nations the military and political wherewithal to enforce its mandate.

Similarly, the five permanent members of the Security Council should be prepared to live with the decisions of the Cambodian people, even if the factions that they favor do not fare well. Since each of the five has a veto over further U.N. action, their unity and support are essential.

The mandate and timetable for U.N. involvement should be very carefully and clearly spelled out. The United Nations cannot afford another Namibian experience, where squabbling over the size and cost of the force and last-minute logistical snafus prevented the U.N. peacekeepers from being in place in time to prevent violations of the accord.

The major donor countries should be prepared to sustain long-term, substantial financial support for the operation, whether or not it initially shows signs of suc- ceeding. Japan may be prepared to carry an extra burden, but the whole enterprise could be crippled if the U.S. Congress again tries to nit-pick it to death with unilateral conditions and withholdings.

Finally, any peacekeeping commitments should be undertaken only as part of a much larger humanitarian and development program designed to rebuild Cambodia and to give peace a chance. This should be a natural for the United Nations, which is usually better at carrots than sticks.

The risks will still be great and the outcome unpredictable. But with proper preparation, the United Nations, itself a radical experiment in international cooperation, should take the plunge.