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Making Peace Is Political : Rejecting War, Nicaragua Now Relies on Democratic Support

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<i> Arturo J. Cruz, a 1984 candidate for the Nicaraguan presidency, is senior research associate of the Institute of Inter-American Studies at the University of Miami. </i>

As the Central American presidents move their itinerant summit from one meeting place to another, they seem to get closer to their goal of peace in the region. At the Honduran port of Tela on Aug. 7, they finally established a timetable and means to implement their peace plan.

Significantly, the presidents not only continue to make strides in conflict resolution in Nicaragua, but also have started to place more emphasis on the other focus of civil war--El Salvador.

This progress is the result of a combination of changes in the terms of the original equation in the quest for peace. The first was the replacement of the Contadora Group as peace broker by the Central American governments themselves. The second, and by far the most determinant, was a bipartisan consensus in the United States to sever ties with the Contras. The third has been the entente cordiale of Washington and Moscow, incipient that it may be. In addition, there are a number of other factors that constitute stimuli to compromise, such as the lack of clear winners in the protracted guerrilla war, the insurmountable economic disaster of Nicaragua and its refugee problem, which is seriously affecting Honduras, Costa Rica and the United States.

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However, there is not a uniform opinion. Persons who regard the Arias peace plan as a panacea for a beleaguered Central America assert that we are witnessing the gradual unfolding of a peacemaking process activated by the natural impulse in man to use reason when force has failed. Others rebuff this proposition as naive. Drawing conclusions from the duplicity evidenced by the Central American radical left during an entire decade, they dismiss both the ruling Sandinistas of Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas as miscreants who will never accept democracy.

There is a third, more pragmatic, school of thought. Its adherents, including Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, are as distrustful of the professed sincerity of the Sandinistas and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front as any pro-war hard-liner. However, they rely on the diplomatic summit accords to halt a futile and devastating conflict. Aware that we all need a respite, they have attempted a truce as a stepping stone to effective peace.

Still, some indignant anti-Sandinistas decry the Tela accords, labeling the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance forces as a “sellout.” These critics fail to realize that this action was necessary in order to deprive the Sandinistas of excuses. Furthermore, it is an explicit request made by the opposition political parties in a public agreement with the Sandinista government signed at Managua on Aug. 4. The Nicaraguan Resistance now lacks a legal reason to continue waging war. Similarly, the United States government cannot ignore the wishes of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition. In fact, the latter’s leadership has asked “the foreign governments with interests in the Central American region to abstain from carrying out any concealed activities in the Nicaraguan electoral process.” Interested in peace, the Bush Administration supports the Central American initiative. But in order to appease its most conservative constituency, it still speaks to the Sandinistas with a harsh rhetoric.

The United States, though, has a legitimate concern to see the Sandinistas fulfill their pledge guaranteeing the safe return of the rebels and their families to Nicaragua from Honduras. Many of them are small farmers and other campesinos who raised arms against Sandinista injustice. President Bush could go a long way toward restoring peace in Nicaragua, and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, if he proposed to use his influence and support--together with other heads of state, the World Bank and various other international agencies--to help launch a resettlement program, in Nicaragua, of both the Contras and other refugees. With a multilateral guarantee for the pursuit of life with work, social services and the enjoyment of freedoms, those Nicaraguans who have sought asylum abroad would be enticed to return home. However, such a project to restore our dignity as Nicaraguans can be possible only if the Sandinista regime takes a sincere decision to adopt democracy.

Unfortunately, the way things stand today in Nicaragua, everything hinges on the forthcoming elections. In spite of their bravado, the Sandinistas must fear the elections since they are fully aware of the tremendous erosion of their popular support base. They also know that there will be so many international observers that it would be rather difficult for them to conceal fraud. In typical fashion, some of their spokesmen have declared that if they lose the elections, they are disposed to surrender the government but not power. More recently, they have gone further, hinting that they might consider giving up power, as well. That is senseless talk. In either scenario, the Sandinistas, once deprived of the national budget, would see their capacity to reward and punish (the foundation to authoritarian power) greatly diminished. It is hard to imagine the Ortega brothers, Tomas Borge and the rest of the comandantes stepping down from power to watch passively as the Sandinistas become an insignificant political party.

It is more realistic for the international community to foster pluralism and common goals in Nicaragua. By the same token, the Central American presidents must demand that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega immediately meet his obligations under the Tela accords and display genuine efforts to persuade the Salvadoran guerrillas to make peace with President Alfredo Cristiani.

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The United Nations will soon be sending a peacekeeping force to Nicaragua. That is a positive step. God willing, the Central American presidents will meet again some time later in the year at Managua. One important step that should come out of that meeting would be a request for a U.N. peacekeeping force in El Salvador, too.

Meanwhile, the United States should contemplate a policy of continuing and vigorous support to the Central American presidents’ peace initiatives. When the presidents succeed in their task, the nightmare of civil wars and refugees will fade away.

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