Will Colombia Stand Up to Paramilitary?

The assassination of Sen. Luis Carlos Galan hit a nerve in Colombian society, and the courageous response of the people and the government deserves applause. For it is political will, not military might, that ultimately will determine whether Colombia will rid itself of the cocaine cartel.

Since the murder of Galan, one of the country’s most outspoken anti-drug politicians, the government has made thousands of arrests and expropriated millions in drug-financed property. But the Colombian security forces have yet to confront the military arm of the traffickers, the paramilitary structure that sustains the political and drug-related violence in the country.

According to the government, there are more than 140 paramilitary organizations, most of which are organized and financed by traffickers. Operating like death squads but with the weaponry of mini-armies, they defend the drug lords’ interests. These extend beyond narcotics to politics.

Rabid anti-communists, the traffickers have united with landowners and other traditional elites to protect their common economic interests against guerrilla groups and the growing demands for political and economic reforms by poorer sectors of the population. Supporting the alliance are members of the Colombian security forces who resort to paramilitary activity for profit or out of frustration with the inability to win the 30-year battle against guerrilla insurgencies. The net result is a “marriage of convenience” in certain areas of the country between the traffickers and other landowners and members of the military and police forces, all of whom are bent on eliminating “subversive elements.”

The paramilitary activity stemming from this “marriage” has displaced guerrillas from areas where they have enjoyed substantial popular support, such as the middle Magdalena agricultural region. However, more often than not, the targets of violence are Colombia’s growing non-violent progressive forces, such as civic movements, peasant and labor unions and a newly formed political party, the Patriotic Union. Last year there were 2,738 political assassinations, including 82 massacres (killings in groups of four or more civilians), the vast majority of which were carried out by death squads or “hit men” trained by them. The murder of Sen. Galan was just one of more than 1,000 political killings this year.

Colombian government investigators and human-rights activists have compiled significant evidence implicating members of the military and police in paramilitary activity. One of the most highly publicized cases occurred in March, 1988, when gunmen raided two banana farms in the Uraba region, killing 22 union leaders. The investigation by the Colombian equivalent of the FBI led to the indictment last September of two well-known drug traffickers, three military officials, a police lieutenant, a mayor and others. After presenting her report on the massacre, the judge presiding over the case fled the country because of death threats. Her father was recently killed, apparently in retribution for her brave actions.

Perhaps evidence such as this provides a clue as to why the Colombian security forces have yet to raid the paramilitary organizations’ geographical base, Puerto Boyaca in the middle Magdalena region. Since Galan’s death, there has not been one direct confrontation between the military and a paramilitary group anywhere in the country, nor have there been any attempts to raid the highly publicized paramilitary training schools. In fact, within the range of measures being implemented, the paramilitary issue is conspicuously absent. Until the paramilitary groups are confronted directly, drug traffickers will continue to wage their “total war” on the Colombian government and society.

While the Colombian government’s recent efforts to curb drug trafficking must be taken in good faith, the Colombian military has yet to show the political will to engage in battle with the traffickers’ paramilitary arm. The U.S. government, having declared a “war on drugs,” has steadily militarized its anti-narcotics programs overseas and is already providing Colombia with significant levels of military assistance under the anti-narcotics rubric. Now it is sending $65 million more, along with U.S. military advisers to provide “technical assistance.” Yet until the Colombian military proves its willingness to clean up its own house and to rid the nation of paramilitary violence, such aid will only serve to exacerbate domestic political conflict. Ironically, in the end it may aid the very forces we are trying to combat.