Senate Report Cites U.S. Intelligence Gaps on Colombian Drug Cartels

U.S. anti-drug agencies suffer from “large gaps” in their knowledge of how the Colombian cocaine cartels operate, and even when important information is obtained, it is not used effectively, a Senate report obtained Monday concludes.

The report of the Republican staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs permanent investigations subcommittee, which began its inquiry a year ago, charged that U.S. efforts resemble the “body count” approach during the Vietnam War--emphasizing drugs seized and arrests made rather than strategic intelligence about the cartel organizations.

“We can’t win the war on drugs if we don’t know the enemy,” said Sen. William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.), the subcommittee’s ranking minority member.

Hearings Start Today

The report, a copy of which was obtained by The Times, is to be released at the opening of hearings today at which officials of the Drug Enforcement Administration and FBI are scheduled to be questioned.

Meanwhile, a veteran FBI official warned in a hearing Monday that the United States would not be able to prevent counterattacks by Colombian cartels if they chose to carry the battle to this country.

“We do not have the resources to even attack the drug-trafficking activities of these organizations, much less assure (that) they will not engage in acts of violence and retribution,” said Oliver B. Revell, associate deputy director of investigations for the FBI.

“If there was intent on the part of these cartels to have blood running on the streets of America, I don’t think we would be in the position to preempt it,” Revell told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.

The warning of intelligence failures by the permanent investigations subcommittee takes on special significance because of U.S. attempts to bolster the fight against the cartels being waged by Colombian President Virgilio Barco Vargas.

Noting that Colombia’s government is battling “for its very life in full-scale war against the entrenched armies of the drug cartels,” Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the subcommittee chairman, said: “Unfortunately, we are still a long way from having the type of detailed intelligence we need to successfully combat their operations.”

Subcommittee investigators said they found within U.S. agencies “very widely divergent views on the organizational structure and operations of the international cocaine cartel.” In a regional office of one agency, which the report did not name, three agents, each with extensive South American experience, “offered three widely disparate views” on how the cartels are organized and operated.

The report blamed the lack of consensus on two primary factors--insufficient effort to collect and analyze information that is available and the reluctance of agencies to share information, particularly that which is obtained from confidential informants.

“Some of the available knowledge about drug-trafficking organizations is never reported or recorded in any official channel,” the report said. “It is stored in the heads and desks of hundreds of U.S. agents and officials both in the United States and abroad.”

Subcommittee investigators also blamed the intelligence gap on the absence of any single entity charged with collecting and analyzing drug-related strategic intelligence. They cited the Administration’s consideration of establishing such a center “a good first step.”

The report noted that the two major cartels in Colombia are the Medellin and the Cali, with the smaller Cali organization appearing to function in a more businesslike and less violent fashion than the Medellin.

Secondary trafficking groups--such as the North Coast organization--provide such services as storage facilities, landing strips and safe staging and departure areas to the larger organizations, according to the report.

The report identified transportation as one of the traffickers’ most vulnerable areas, with many of the pilots being U.S. citizens who are often brought to Colombia to meet the cartel bosses.

“This reliance on non-Colombians as pilots seems anomalous in organizations which otherwise rely on family members or trusted associates from their region of Colombia,” the investigators noted. “But (it) is necessary because American pilots have better technical know-how and skill and they are more familiar with U.S. terrain.”

The investigators pointed to Mexico as a popular transshipment point for U.S.-destined cocaine and said there are “thousands of landing strips in the desert areas around Los Angeles” that are used to bring the cocaine across the border.

A customs official offered this profile of a typical ground crew that is paid to handle a cocaine shipment: “One person sitting in a lawn chair in the middle of the desert near an empty riverbed. Attached to the lawn chair is a sock, which indicates wind direction. Parked nearby is a Winnebago or some other large transportation vehicle.”