Back Door Opens in the Iron Curtain : As East Germans Get Out, a Host of Problems Rush In

Think twice before you celebrate this week’s dramatic exodus of 12,000 young and highly skilled East German workers.

The courageous yet almost inevitable decision of the Hungarian government to allow the single largest flow of refugees from the East Bloc since 1961 has been sympathetically welcomed by the West, tolerated by the Soviet Union and either praised, condemned or officially ignored by the other East European states. As the cloud of confusion lifts, we can begin to better understand the far-reaching and potentially destabilizing implications of this event.

The last exodus of East German workers--47,000 strong in 1961--led to a landmark decision to construct the Berlin Wall. The events in Hungary have become another landmark in East-West relations.

East German authorities have denounced the Hungarian decision as “organized slave trading,” “illegal smuggling” and “an overt attempt” by the West Germans to destabilize their country. The emotions on all sides are high because the stakes are big and the issues are among the most sensitive and potentially destabilizing in Europe. These include the relationship of the two German states to each other; the internal cohesion and viability of the Warsaw Pact; the status of bilateral treaties between socialist countries, and the future course of Soviet policy toward quarreling East European allies. The Hungarian decision to open a back door in the Iron Curtain will directly affect the coming elections in Hungary and West Germany and could well have a strong effect on Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s position in the Kremlin.

The unilateral suspension by Hungary of “certain paragraphs” of the 1969 Hungarian-East German treaty on tourism has much more to do with the future evolution of Eastern Europe than the obligation to prevent citizens of an allied country from exiting to the West without the approval of their own government. Hungarian authorities have rightfully invoked their international obligations as a signatory of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, which bans the practice of forcibly sending refugees back to countries of origin if they are likely to face persecution.

The Hungarian decision was a carefully thought-out response to serious domestic pressures that could spell the fate of the leadership of the Communist Party in the forthcoming elections. The party leadership has committed itself to hold parliamentary elections, most likely in the spring, under conditions much freer than those that led to the humiliating setback suffered by the Polish Communist Party in June. Hungarian party officials estimate that at best they might capture 30% of the vote, with the remainder being divided among 10 opposition parties. One party official recently told a group of Western experts that if the government sent back the East German refugees against their will, “we would be lucky to get 5% of the vote.”

Another important consideration for Hungarian authorities was the need to highlight the real limitation of sovereignty on East European states--the restrictive bilateral treaties that were signed by members of the Warsaw Pact in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion in 1968. The Hungarian actions were in part intended to publicly raise awareness that the real danger is this “iceberg below the water line” and not the Brezhnev doctrine itself.

For the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian decision could not have come at a worse time. The Oct. 7 celebration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the East German state may take place without the presence of Erich Honecker, the seriously ill leader. Two decades of careful building of relations with West Germany could be jeopardized as the collective leadership decides what action to take.

There are two major courses that can be followed. First, the close links built with West Germany can be preserved while a slow hemorrhaging continues--e.g., the most skilled young workers continue to leave the country via the Hungarian back door. More likely, a hardened status quo approach will be taken, with the East Germans becoming increasingly isolated. Yegor K. Ligachev, the Soviet Politburo hard-liner who is now visiting Berlin, has publicly enunciated Kremlin support for its “reliable ally.” Other Soviet hard-liners and members of the military are expected to demand increased Kremlin support for the East German leadership and are likely to get it. The German Democratic Republic is absolutely vital to Soviet security interests. Its loss would be devastating to the Soviet Union and would not be tolerated-- perestroika or not.

Among the big losers may be the West Germans. Already East German and Soviet media are portraying the exodus of refugees as being manipulated by Bonn.

The Warsaw Pact will face a tremendously difficult task in maintaining civility, let alone consensus. This comes at a difficult time for reformers and arms-control advocates in the Kremlin who want and need a significant conventional arms reduction agreement in Vienna. President Bush has called for an agreement within the year. The opening in the Iron Curtain’s back door may well have set back the hopes of meeting such a timetable. It will certainly have an impact on other dynamics under way in Europe.

The situation in central Europe today is too fluid to allow accurate predictions. As a Soviet official told a group of us this week: “You wanted change and you’re getting it.”

The question is, what do we do with it?