Lebanon’s Peace Depends on Friends and Foes Outside

For more than a decade, the conflict in Lebanon has seemed like a quagmire from which there is no exit. Only when the hostage crisis flares up does the West’s attention turn seriously, if momentarily, toward Lebanon. Now, as the civil war enters its 14th year, the convergence of several trends has created a favorable opportunity for peace. To succeed, it will need assistance from Lebanon’s friends, particularly the United States.

The difficulty of the Lebanese problem is that it is no longer a domestic conflict. What began as a civil war among the four major factions of the Lebanese population has been also a battlefield for conflicting forces and alliances in the region and beyond.

The tension among the major factions of the Lebanese population--the Christian Maronites, the Muslim Sunnis and Shiites, and the Druze--erupted in an open struggle for power in the early 1970s. For decades, government power had been shared by the Maronites, who held the presidential office, and the Sunnis, who had the premiership.

Demographic changes, some of them hastened by political conflicts outside Lebanon, have rendered the old system obsolete. The Shiites want to increase their political lot to match their rapidly growing share of the population. The Druze have made similar claims on the system. At stake is not only whether the shares of political power will be realigned, but also the character of the new system.

Lebanon used to be considered the free land of the East, and Beirut its Paris, where (almost) everything goes. Each community now in contention for power is afraid that its competitors will bring about a Lebanon that is different and unacceptable. That is why some Lebanese leaders are calling for the establishment of a neutral Lebanon--a Switzerland of the East. It is an idea worth consideration.

The domestic strife could not have lasted this long or reached the present level of violence except for the continuous interventions by conflicting forces in the region, each deriving its justification for being on Lebanese soil from the presence of the others. Thus, the presence of Syria, which was initially called upon by the Arab League to help establish stability, was used by other Arab and non-Arab forces as justification to mingle also in Lebanon’s conflict.

It was the intervention of two other states that complicated the problem and made it beyond the reach of the Arab League alone. First came Iran, after the Khomeini revolution, to support the Shiites in Lebanon. Today, both the largest Shiite organization, Amal, and the small splinter Shiite groups look to Iran and Syria for orientation.

Then came the further complication of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its continuing occupation of the southern part of the country. The ongoing confrontation between Israeli occupying forces and the Shiite resistance has taken a heavy toll. It has also been a factor in the tragic situation of the hostages in Lebanon.

In May, the Arab League initiated a mediating committee composed of the heads of state of Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Moscow showed a high interest in that effort; meanwhile, a Soviet emissary’s visits to Beirut and other regional capitals were helpful in persuading the leftist forces in the region to lean toward reconciliation. Iran, with a new president taking a more pragmatic approach, can be expected to be open toward reconciliation. And so, with all of the Shiite factions, the Druze and the Sunnis willing to reconcile, there is a good opportunity to find a meeting ground between them and the Maronites. The Arab League’s initiative called for an informal meeting of the Lebanese Parliament, to be held in Saudi Arabia, to explore new arrangements for power-sharing. All of the parties have expressed willingness to attend, including the Maronites. This is a possibility that should not be missed.

What remains to be seen is the Israeli position toward Lebanon. Israel’s occupation will continue to be a strain on both the Shiite residents of the south and the Israeli military. Eight years of carnage have left deep scars on the Israeli-Lebanese relationship. The need to stop the Israeli expansion is often given as a major reason for other forces to remain in Lebanon. If the United States makes it clear that it will work for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, that will add a major impetus for the reconciliation process.

Guaranteeing Lebanese sovereignty over its own territory is the first step toward establishing a Lebanese authority that is respected by all its citizens and its neighbors. If the United States will lend its weight to such a process at this important juncture where all other forces seem to be leaning toward peace, the window of opportunity will be wider and the possibility of success more compelling.

An entire generation of Lebanese has been tormented in this war marked by extremes of both intervention and neglect from the outside world. Now seems a propitious time for the international community to lend constructive assistance in bringing the Lebanese to reconciliation.