Gorbachev’s Success Is in U.S. Interest

The reaction of the Bush Administration to the Gorbachev revolution has vacillated between stunned disbelief and grudging approval. The most repeated expression is “prudent caution.” This is astounding, because Mikhail S. Gorbachev has already fulfilled the Cold War goals of the United States and gives promise of moving to levels of freedom and democracy beyond our wildest expectations. It is contrary to U.S. interests that Gorbachev should fail or be replaced, yet President George Bush has not made the decision to assist him actively.

The Grand Tetons subsummit meeting may have ended the foot-dragging on disarmament, because the agreement to hold the first Bush-Gorbachev summit in mid-1990 will provide incentive for action in both conventional and strategic force negotiations. Yet a strange reluctance persists--to acknowledge that mutual verified disarmament is as much in U.S. interests as the Soviets’.

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger’s recent speech (Opinion, Sept. 24)--crafted with White House approval--reflects the confusion within the Administration. Eagleburger said we should stick to the policies of the past 40 years until the Gorbachev reforms become irreversible. He said U.S. policies should be devised to serve our interests, whether Gorbachev succeeds or fails. This boggling conclusion demonstrates that the Bush Administration has not made up its collective mind--unlike Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, who are both enthusiastic supporters of Gorbachev.

Such timidity in lending support represents the counsel of disaster. Gorbachev is leader of democratic reform in the East and if he is toppled the chances for those reforms probably will be lost.

Now it may be that some of the Bush Administration’s caution is inspired by the right wing of the Republican Party. There are politicians and pundits who hope Gorbachev will be overthrown and the Soviet system replaced by capitalism. Some would like to see a civil war between the various nationalities because that might hasten the collapse of the Soviet government. Others believe the Soviet economy is so weak that the United States should pursue a policy of unrelenting pressure for ever more concessions.

Fortunately, the Bush Administration recognizes that these positions are naive, because the alternative to Gorbachev--rather than democracy and capitalism--is likely to be totalitarians of the right or left. The Bush Administration has been careful not to undermine Gorbachev. In fact, during Boris N. Yeltsin’s recent visit, the White House decided not to grant photo opportunities for fear of offending Gorbachev. Bush says he wants to end the Cold War and move beyond containment. He says he wishes Gorbachev well and hopes his perestroika will succeed. But he goes on to say that there is little the United States can do to help. Either the President is badly briefed or he is less than candid. For the United States can help Gorbachev enormously while also helping itself.

Gorbachev wants to disarm rapidly. He wants to cut his defense budget 50% by 1995, and another 50% by the end of the decade. He wants to demilitarize competition with the West to eliminate the possibility of war, and he also needs the resources that would become available for consumer production. Since he is already in the process of a 14% cut in defense, why doesn’t he make the full 50% reduction by unilateral action? The answer to that is key to understanding the process of the Gorbachev revolution.

Gorbachev has been performing an amazing political balancing act. His goal has been to restructure Soviet society while eliminating the totalitarian forces of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. Given the entrenched bureaucracy, the odds against Gorbachev were immense. But after only 4 1/2 years we see almost unbelievable progress. All the neo-Stalinists and most of the orthodox Marxist-Leninists have been eliminated from the Politburo and the Communist Party secretariat. The remaining hard-liners in the Central Committee are expected to be removed at next year’s party congress. In February or March of 1990, elections for local soviets--bodies to run day-to-day affairs--will be held with multiple candidates and secret ballots. Observers anticipate that most of the rascals--meaning the party hacks--will be thrown out.

The new Congress of Peoples Deputies and its operating arm, the new Supreme Soviet, includes among its elected members the greatest dissident, Andrei D. Sakharov, and Yeltsin, who was fired from the Politburo by Gorbachev. Both Sakharov and Yeltsin, though supporters of Gorbachev, have made private trips to the United States where they criticized Gorbachev for holding too much power and moving too slowly with reforms. This summer, five deputies from the Supreme Soviet spent a month with members of the U.S. Congress and their staffs, learning about legislative procedures--especially voting processes, the Ways and Means Committee, the Intelligence Oversight Committees and the General Accounting Office. A minority block of the Soviet Peoples Deputies is supporting pluralism in the Soviet Union.

The removal of Stalinist repression on non-Russian nationalities has uncovered smoldering ethnic hostility and demands for national autonomy. In the Baltic states, the demands are for national independence. The nationalities problem is certain to join production of consumer goods as Gorbachev’s greatest challenge. He will very likely move to a federal system, granting wide autonomy to the national republics.

In foreign policy, Gorbachev has withdrawn from Afghanistan, rejecting further expansionism plus renouncing the theories of class struggle and military support for liberation movements. He has removed Marxist-Leninist ideology from Soviet foreign policy--tolerating the formation of a non-communist government in Poland and the emergence of political pluralism in Hungary. He has been critical of neo-Stalinism in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Cuba.

All this has been accomplished while facing the risk of losing his balance. Some say Gorbachev has moved too fast, others too slow. Some say Gorbachev is the greatest politician-statesman since World War II. Certainly what has happened so far is clearly in the interest of the United States. But Gorbachev cannot go much further with unilateral disarmament and remain in power. Even his supporters in the military and KGB would oppose such action. No Western power would disarm unilaterally. There has to be reciprocity; disarmament that can be reliably verified is just as much in the interest of the United States as the Soviet Union. The savings will do wonders for the U.S. deficit, and our security will be enhanced.

A major benefit will accrue to both the United States and the Soviet Union from disarmament: the freeing of scientific and technological brainpower. The Pentagon and the Department of Energy have employed many of the best U.S. scientists for military research and development. From 1981 to 1988, the Pentagon more than doubled its spending in universities and research laboratories. An important reason the Japanese have acquired such an advantage in certain consumer areas has been the diversion of so much U.S. technology to defense programs.

Gorbachev has suggested joint talks between leaders of the military-industrial complexes of both nations about the details of converting military plants to civilian production. This is an important area where the United States can provide advice. The process of conversion will be more difficult for the Soviets because their military plants don’t have experience with civilian production, compared with large U.S. military producers such as General Electric and Boeing.

The major assistance the United States can provide for Gorbachev will result from increasing the pace of disarmament, but the Soviet Union also needs U.S. technical assistance and technology in everything from agricultural to tourism. Further, the United States should liberalize its export-licensing policy, limiting controls only to goods and technology with clear military application. Restrictions on immigration from the Soviet Union have been removed, so the President should use his authority to grant most favored nations tariff status. Bush should act now to help Gorbachev survive and succeed.