Marcos’ Real Skills Veiled by His Ignominy

Ferdinand E. Marcos, who dominated Philippine politics for more than 20 years, continues to influence his nation even in death. President Corazon Aquino, citing a threat to national security, has refused to allow Marcos to be buried in the land of his birth.

It is as hard to write about Marcos fairly as it is to write about him kindly. So much that is damaging has come to light--the influence he and his cronies exerted throughout the Philippine economy, their vast accumulation of wealth, the involvement of his chief of staff in the assassination of Benigno Aquino and Marcos’ repeated attempts to overturn the new government.

Yet Marcos stood out among postwar Filipino politicians in cunning, political skill, ability to mobilize government, vision for the country--and, unfortunately, greed. His worst sins were squandering the opportunity given him by Philippine history and the 15 years lost to the country as a result of martial law and its outcome.

Most Filipinos recognized the declaration of martial law in 1972 for what it was--a ploy to allow Marcos to maintain his hold on power beyond the constitutionally imposed limit. Yet martial law in its early years was widely popular. The confiscation of thousands of firearms and the disbandment of private armies brought an end to a period of widespread violence and kidnapings. Beyond this was the promise that martial law would overcome the divisive, obstructionist and self-absorbed character of Philippine politics and allow the government to promote rapid economic growth, along with other countries in the region.

The government’s ambitious program of reform and investment attracted many idealistic Filipinos, as well as substantial external financial support. But it failed for a number of reasons: Policy reforms were never carried out, and despite the rhetoric of martial law, economic policy continued to shelter domestic industry from competition and to tax the agricultural sector. The investment program was more successful, at least in its early years, and added greatly to the infrastructure in agriculture and energy.

But it was the rake-off that increasingly dominated martial-law policy, as aid and investment-project funds, profits from monopolizing industries and income from corporate takeovers lined the pockets of Marcos, his family, his cronies and supporters. By the 1980s, it was the staggering weight of that corruption that, as much as anything, brought the economy--and Marcos--down.

The Aquino government has been far more successful in its policy reforms, bringing about major changes in the rules governing industry, taxation and agriculture, aided in part by revulsion over the excesses of the Marcos years. And the new Philippine government has been justly rewarded with three years of solid economic growth and renewed confidence among domestic and foreign investors.

In matters involving administration and the operation of government, however--where planning, attention to detail, overcoming obstacles and follow-through are important--the Aquino government has been far less effective. Lack of forceful leadership has been the most insistent criticism of the new government. Aquino’s failure to secure the reins, and the centrifugal nature of Philippine politics, has led to the re-emergence of regional kingpins and bosses, further sapping the center.

Whether or not Aquino had the skills and inclination for the rough-and-tumble of politics, the fact that she had to follow Marcos, and had to re-establish a fragile democracy, made her effective use of power more difficult, even when she could rule by decree.

Many of the tasks the Philippines now confronts--land reform, population growth, investment planning and execution--require more than policy changes. The ability to implement--to mobilize and direct the ground-level operations of government so that programs are successfully carried out--is crucial. This was a skill that Marcos had in greater degree than other Filipino politicians, a skill he abused.

The broad economic problems of the Philippines are the same in 1989 as they were in 1972. But with 20 million more Filipinos and $25 billion more in foreign debt, addressing these problems now is much more difficult. It was a tragedy for both the Philippines and Marcos that he chose personal fortune over the commonweal.