An Infant Democracy Needs Time : Eastern Europe: After the euphoria subsides, the West can expect to see periods of growing pains not entirely to its liking.

There is a sense of something closing in the Warsaw Pact’s condemnation of the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Twenty-one years after the Prague Spring attempt to remold a Stalinist system to the needs of the 1960s was crushed, events have come full circle.

In retrospect, the Warsaw Pact troops were not so much burying reform in 1968 as sowing dragon’s teeth. The disaster was not only Czechoslovakia’s, but the invading countries’ as well, because it placed the entire region in a deep freeze. There would be no evolutionary transformation to keep pace with the material and political changes in the world outside. None of the nations of the Soviet Bloc would deliver on their promise to provide a better life for their people. Ultimately, legitimacy was reduced to a single factor: the ability and willingness to maintain power by inflicting violence. When this was no longer an option, one after another regime snapped because of a self-imposed inability to bend.

The temptation to view these events as an ending is great, but this does a disservice to Eastern Europe. We have been witness to a birth as well as a burial.

The burial seems to be that of political monopolies wielded by totalitarian parties. The birth is less certain. New systems blending economic liberalism, democratic socialism, populist nationalism and old-fashioned bureaucratism in unpredictable proportions will arise. Events are moving too quickly for local politicians to comprehend, much less control. Matters are being directed by new parties with new faces and a dearth of experience for confronting a daunting array of issues.

In Hungary, for example, the former united opposition has fragmented. The beneficiaries appear not to be the West-leaning liberal democrats, but populists who appeal to the Hungarian national character and who, as much as most of them sincerely would wish to, cannot expunge a faint whiff of anti-Westernism and anti-Semitism. In an unintentional process of natural selection, the Communists destroyed the leadership of the liberal and social democratic traditions politically, morally and physically, while at the same time actively promoting nationalist and populist images in a bid for greater acceptance. It would be surprising if Western ideals of political maturity were immediately achieved and demonstrated by the newly enfranchised Hungarian electorate.

Although some of the new politicians of Eastern Europe are among the most admirable figures the region has produced in 50 years, the new governments--if events in Hungary are a guide--may be uncomfortable coalitions, possibly including reform Communists, confronted with sharply deteriorating economies at a time when the institutions of the new democracy are still unformed. They may employ ill-advised policies that actually worsen the situation over the short term, and their rhetoric might be of a sort not entirely to our liking.

What should our response be? The West has a vital interest in Eastern Europe. This is what the Cold War was about: halting further Soviet intrusion in the West while working toward the day when the bloc nations would freely choose their own course. Obviously, prudent material assistance will be required. But we also need to provide something more, and to do so we need to view ourselves as being present at the beginning of a process rather than an end. After the dancing on the Wall is done, after the candlelight vigils disperse and the chanting crowds have brought a tyranny down, after the network crews fold their cables and jet back to new York--that is when the real work begins.

What we see in Eastern Europe are fledgling democracies. Each stands a chance of achieving stable, legitimate government. But the process will not be short and there will be missteps and disappointments. After the euphoria subsides and the entertainment value recedes, we may see phenomena not much to our liking. We should not be hasty in turning away.

Democracies, like children, pass through infantile disorders and adolescent traumas. These are the hours when the West will most be needed--and perhaps we most of all because of the images connected with “America” in the East European consciousness.

The period of transition to mature democracy may prove similar. The people of Eastern Europe have a great hunger to rejoin Western civilization, to live in “normal” countries with “normal” economies. Above all, there is a yearning to be accepted by a West that cares about their troubles and shares their aspirations. We can best help the peoples of this region by resolving to take the long view, to shrug off the inevitable irritations and be realistic in our expectations. We should commit ourselves to the process over its full course.