Just Cause Kept the Canal From Noriega’s Grasp : Panama: Military force had only recently become a politically viable option, indeed probably the only viable strategy that might be effective.

Scholars commenting upon the American national character long have highlighted the recurring “legalistic/moralistic” elements of U.S. foreign policy. The very name selected for the ongoing military action in Panama--Operation Just Cause--testifies to our continued strain for moral and legal justification, whatever the national interests involved.

It is perhaps typical that the immediate cause for the action was the murder of an unarmed Marine and the beating and intimidation of another officer and his wife. They were tangible incidents around which the U.S. population could rally in righteous indignation. However, there have been scores, even hundreds, of incidents of abuse of U.S. military and dependents in Panama for nearly two years now. We have long had justification for punishing and deterring such abuse.

While many other fledgling democracies have been allowed to die as the United States gazed on in anguish, American policy-makers have felt a deeper debt in the case of Panama. We had an exceptionally close relationship with this country and with thousands of Americans have lived there for most of their lives. But also, the American policy of sanctions against the regime of Manuel A. Noriega have decimated the economy and the livelihoods of innocent Panamanians. It had become clear that Noriega cared little or nothing about the well-being of the country and its citizens. Certainly he did not care enough to relinquish the personal power and fortune he had amassed. Therefore, there was little hope that these measures would have their intended effect, and the United States would have its conscience burdened by the enduring economic crippling of the Panamanian populace.

Moreover, although the civic opposition sometimes has stood up courageously to Noriega in recent months, the abortive October coup against Noriega showed how ruthless he could be.

Although it has not been widely publicized, the escalating schedule for gradual turnover of the Panama Canal was forcing us to confront the reality and the consequences, for both the United States and Panama, of giving the canal to a hostile and corrupt dictator. Although there are Panamanians well-trained to manage the canal efficiently, it has been apparent for some time that this primary material asset and basis for financial stability would become yet another of Noriega’s personal political and economic assets.

Noriega’s appointment of a political underling rather than a technician to direct the Panama Canal Co. was not unexpected, but the need for U.S. Senate confirmation raised the specter of yet another divisive contest over the wisdom of the treaties negotiated by President Jimmy Carter. Had trends continued as they were, it is hard to imagine Washington swallowing hard and handing over the canal to the despicable Noriega. Not only did it represent Panama’s wealth, but it also remained a strategic asset--a sizable portion of shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific continues to traverse it, and U.S. bases in the zone are perhaps even more strategically significant.

Finally, military force had just recently become a politically viable option, indeed probably the only viable strategy that might be effective.

Despite the flood of often unfair criticism that it endured for sitting out the fatally flawed October coup attempt, the Administration thereby had garnered the congressional consensus it needed to risk military action and casualties. Hypocrisy notwithstanding, the Monday-morning quarterbacks who in early October sometimes reversed themselves, if only to have another basis for criticizing the Administration, now publicly supported aggressive action. Politically and even legally, the road was paved for clandestine or overt removal of Noriega.

There were subsequent “leaks” of alleged covert actions and of beefed-up plans to overthrow Noriega by exploiting discontent within the Panama Defense Forces to foment another coup. Whether or not they were true, these tales heightened Noriega’s protective countermeasures, making the clandestine option even less attractive than it had been before.

This left overt military action as the only pragmatic course for achieving our objectives. Indeed, the attempt to conduct foreign policy by consensus of 535 members of Congress or by media leak has so circumscribed Administration options that the near-absolute, although temporary, control afforded by a military action renders this in some ways the least complicated and most calculable of alternatives, risky though it may be in other ways.