Harder to Get Out Than Get In

George Bush made the tough presidential decision in sending U.S. forces after Manuel Noriega, and it’s easier (in the utterly fearless tradition of mornings after) to find fault with this application of military power--and the execution of a complex mission-- than it is to help the President find a way out now that he’s so deeply in. But if the primary goal was to remove this odious dictator, then logically the U.S. should not tarry long, but instead hasten to declare its victory--Noriega is, after all, out of power--and begin devising a responsible plan for returning Panama to its citizens and bringing American soldiers home.

Already, during this pre-Christmas week, roughly two dozen U.S. soldiers have died in Panama, more than 208 have been wounded, and uncounted numbers of families back in the United States have near-worried themselves to death. So it’s no sense pushing our luck too much: We’ve won, Noriega’s done and the next step is to get the legitimate government of Guillermo Endara on its feet and get our troops out.

This is easier said than accomplished, of course. The President admitted Thursday that he wants the U.S. invasion force out of Panama “as soon as possible.” But he also said that during the preplanning phase of the invasion, he was not given any estimates as to how long U.S. forces might have to stay in Panama. After the 1983 invasion of Grenada, a much smaller country with a far friendlier population, the last U.S. military police did not leave the island for 18 months!

Newly installed President Endara says that his government is in control, but the facts suggest otherwise. Endara has no power to back up his authority except the U.S. Army and Marines Corps. Noriega’s Panama Defense Forces have been broken, but the PDF included all of Panama’s police. Finding scarcely a single traffic cop in Panama now, U.S. military commanders say many MPs will be needed to relieve the original invasion force and maintain order.

The prospect of the U.S. occupying Panama for long is very worrisome. It could delay Panama’s political development by keeping real authority out of Endara’s hands. And it will not ease U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. So how can the Administration extricate itself from this potential morass? Though the President did not consult with our Latin American allies before invading Panama, he should not hesitate to ask the Organization of American States to put together a peacekeeping force to move in as our troops leave. This was done after U.S. forces invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965. It worked so well that experts often cite the Dominican invasion as one case where U.S. intervention in Latin America made things better instead of worse.

Another option might be the United Nations. The U.N. is already setting up a military command structure in Honduras to oversee peacekeeping forces that will monitor a proposed peace plan for Central America. This U.N. command could also oversee international troops if they are sent into Panama. That would require the United States to surrender some of the authority it wields in Panama due to our military bases there. But that’s better than prolonging Panama’s nascent status as a virtual U.S. protectorate.

Let’s all agree that it’s important not to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The decision to do for the Panamanians what they were unable to do for themselves--remove Noriega--must not be vitiated by a prolonged stay in a foreign country that needs to be helped back onto its feet, given all reasonable aid and assistance and, as soon as feasible, allowed to resume self-government. By getting Noriega out, President Bush seized the moment. But the next, harder task is to get the U.S. military out of Panama.