COMBAT IN PANAMA : U.S. May Come to Regret Its Panama Invasion : Outlook: Experts fear protracted guerrilla war, a costly occupation and a loss of credibility.

The United States eventually may come to regret President Bush’s decision to invade Panama, several specialists on American foreign policy predicted Thursday.

For all the benefits of ousting strongman Manuel A. Noriega, these experts argue, the long-term consequences could also include more casualties from a protracted guerrilla war; expenses running into millions of dollars for a U.S. occupation force; loss of credibility in Latin America, and growing mistrust of how U.S. troops might be used in other countries that have American military bases.

“In the long run, we’re going to be sorry we did this,” said Viron P. Vaky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “We occupied Nicaragua in the 1920s with good intentions, and we laid the groundwork for the Somoza dynasty.”

Other scholars, who support Bush’s intervention in Panama, contend that the ramifications will not be so serious. “I would predict that by New Year’s Day, we will be ready to get out and leave behind the 12,000 troops that were there to begin with,” Michael Wilson of the Heritage Foundation said.

Most of the specialists--both those who support the U.S. intervention and those who criticize it--agree that the historical judgment on Bush’s action will depend in large part on what happens over the next few weeks.

If the United States can capture Noriega, restore order to Panama and withdraw quickly with relatively few casualties, these experts say, then Bush’s decision may be judged a success. But many specialists question whether the United States will be able to achieve these goals.

“Something like this is much easier to get into than to get out of,” observed Kenneth Maxwell, senior fellow for Latin America at the Council on Foreign Relations. “It’s important to have narrow, clearly defined objectives. And one of these, getting Noriega, we haven’t achieved. I hope they (Bush Administration officials) have thought through not only the first action in Panama, but what happens afterward.”

“The result of all this depends on what happens,” said Lincoln Gordon of the Brookings Institution, who is a former assistant secretary of state and U.S. ambassador to Brazil. “A lot depends on whether Noriega is captured or not, on whether guerrilla skirmishes keep marring the scene.

“The other question is whether (Guillermo) Endara will be able to establish his authority (as the new Panamanian president), whether he will be able to build an effective security force. Right now, we have the unfortunate case of the new Panamanian president operating under American protection on an American base. That is not an auspicious beginning.”

Other scholars said that no matter what happens in Panama now, Bush’s intervention will damage American foreign policy by undermining the U.S. government’s credibility and leadership in the world.

“What this means is that every Latin American leader will now feel compelled to take an anti-American stance,” said Philip Brenner, a professor of international relations at American University in Washington. “And all the countries in which we have bases now are going to think about how we are going to use the troops on those bases.”

Some critics also challenged the justifications Bush has given for the U.S. invasion.

“The argument that we acted in self-defense is a difficult one to make,” Vaky said. “This was an invasion. It was in open contradiction to the charter of the Organization of American States and the charter of the United Nations.”

“It seemed to me that U.S. interests were not imminently in danger, not enough to justify this enormous response,” Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue said. “Noriega has never really threatened the Panama Canal. I’ve been arguing for at least the past year against military action, and nothing I’ve seen this week has convinced me to change that view.”

However, Wilson of the Heritage Foundation argued that the United States had no choice but military action.

“We had been trying for 2 1/2 years to oust Noriega from power peacefully,” he explained. “Nothing had worked. Going to the Organization of American States didn’t work. Even bilateral negotiations with the dictator didn’t work.”