We Swatted a Gnat and Stirred a Hornet’s Nest : Latin America: The next generation of U.S. policy problems will arise in this hemisphere. We’ve needlessly complicated them by using a military invasion to settle a score.

Whatever happens next in Panama, last week’s U.S. invasion surely marks the end of an era in hemisphere relations. The Latin American future for the United States holds only challenges for which this nation and its leaders are unprepared--economically, politically or morally.

U.S. military action to depose Gen. Manuel A. Noriega and to break the power of his Panamanian Defense Forces is understandably popular with the American people. Beyond Noriega’s perversion of his country’s political process, he had become a symbol of U.S. impotence in dealing with the drug problem. His status as a drug trafficker was deliberately inflated by the Reagan Administration, which was eager to gain a victory in the drug war it was losing at home. Instead, what ensued was national frustration when Noriega refused to play his role of vanquished villain.

Noriega’s significance as a symbol could be seen in Americans’ escalating anxiety over his evading capture by U.S. forces last week, even though his reign and his role in the U.S. drug scene, never more than minor, had ended.

At the level of symbol, Noriega’s departure should finish illusions that the key to dealing with our drug problem lies abroad rather than at home. At the level of substance, this is likely the last time that U.S. military intervention will be efficacious in resolving even a temporary problem in this hemisphere.

Now the hard part begins, even assuming both a rapid end to Panama’s domestic chaos and unprecedented success in nurturing democracy from feeble roots.

Panama is unique. It has no left-wing “liberation” movement or right-wing “death squads”; neither Fidel Castro nor Daniel Ortega has a foothold there; and the United States has had presence aplenty, providing both intelligence before invasion and the logistics for carrying it out. Nowhere else in the hemisphere--barring a Grenada-like crisis in another tiny island-state--will these conditions exist. Nowhere else, including El Salvador and Nicaragua, can the United States expect to use military force in a short, sharp shock to topple a regime and immobilize local military resistance. The actions dictated by the Bush Administration last week definitely will exact a price.

Ronald Reagan had fallen into the trap of having his confrontations portrayed by Noriega as “gringos vs. Latinos.” George Bush avoided that manipulation when he responded to Noriega’s outrages after Panama’s presidential election last May. By pressing the issue upon the Organization of American States, Bush changed the theme to “democrats vs. dictators.” Soon, however, White House frustration overwhelmed the effort to teach a valuable lesson to Latin American states: that they must help police the region against undesirables.

Today, many Latin Americans are having it both ways: They are rid of Noriega, but they have had to take no responsibility for acting. In fact, they have the added luxury of criticizing the United States--although, in some fledgling democracies, vulnerable leaders must do this to lessen the taint of ties to Washington.

Satisfaction here over last week’s bold action poses a further risk: that we will put off, once again, coming to terms with Latin America’s future. Yet it has already become clear that “solving” the Panama problem will require a continuing U.S. engagement and a good deal of cold cash. And the size of the broader regional challenge is daily demonstrated by the pressure of people trying to cross the U.S. border. This time Latin America will not be pushed aside.

Like it or not, the United States must secure a broad range of support from the Latin countries in an age when the demand for economic progress and political growth will far outstrip the supply. And that will begin to happen only when the U.S. government learns three things: patience, forbearance and greater respect for the forms of hemispheric relations. This means perseverance in keeping regional states on the hook (Panama), supporting rather than stifling efforts like the so-called Contadora process concerning Nicaragua, and seeking the moral high ground whenever possible, even at the price of delay.

It is ironic that the end of the Cold War is not providing respite but revealing a potentially deeper struggle on our own doorstep. Dealing with it will demand a commitment of time, attention and resources that most Americans will find odious. It will demand massive investment--first in U.S. society and then in neighboring states--which is mocked by the pledge of “no new taxes.” These facts may be incompatible with current celebration; but they set immutable requirements for the future.