Consider the Unexpected : Forecasting: If our experts would think of what is not likely to happen, they might escape the surprises that world events dealt them in 1989.

The remarkable events of 1989 reconfirm the wisdom of Samuel Goldwyn’s maxim: “Never make forecasts--especially about the future!”

No scholar, intelligence specialist, journalist or other type of expert in the United States or abroad envisaged one year ago any appreciable portion of the extraordinary changes that occurred in 1989: election of a non-Communist government in Poland; crumbling of the Berlin Wall; peaceful ousting of entrenched Communist leaders in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary; violent overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in Romania and, in a reverse direction, the brutal reassertion of central control by the Communist Old Guard in China.

This experience forcefully reminds us of the acute limitations of the established experts. It also suggests another valuable lesson: Perhaps thought and attention should be given not just to what seems likely to happen but to what seems less likely, as well.

For the most part, human affairs are fairly continuous; tomorrow’s events are usually shaped substantially by those of today. But often the most significant events are ones that, before the fact, appear less likely to happen. They represent departures from continuity. Last year was dominated by such departures from what had been considered likely.

In this light, and because the inclination to forecast is such a deeply ingrained human foible (Sam Goldwyn notwithstanding), it may be worthwhile to redirect it from a preoccupation with what is expected toward consideration of what is unexpected.

Suppose we ask what specific events might occur in 1990 that would be as far removed from what is presently considered likely to occur, as the events of 1989 were from what was considered likely a year ago. Here are some candidates:

--A violent suppression in the Soviet Union of ethnic dissidence and separatism in the Baltic states, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Armenia or Azerbaijan.

--Mass demonstrations in East Germany, demanding removal of Soviet forces, followed by their peaceful withdrawal.

--Same as the preceding scenario, except that in this variant, the Soviet forces remain and are used to suppress the demonstrations.

--Successful democratization efforts in China (along lines of the 1989 changes in Eastern Europe), reversing the Tian An Men Square crackdown of June, 1989, and ousting the present Old Guard rulers.

--Invasion of Taiwan by forces from the mainland.

--A nuclear conflict in the Middle East or South Asia.

--A stock market crash in either New York or Tokyo exceeding that of October, 1987, and leading to or accompanied by negative real economic growth and high unemployment.

Viewed from the perspective of 1990, all of these scenarios are unlikely. (The order in which they are listed reflects my own judgment of their successively decreasing likelihood of occurrence this year.) But none of them is less likely than the actual events that occurred in 1989 appeared to be at this time last year.

In any case, devoting more attention to such unlikely events--both favorable and unfavorable--may serve as a prudent reminder of the limitations of what we know (or think we know), and perhaps as a stimulus to increasing our ability to cope with the unexpected when it occurs.