Drug War: Wrong Forces, Wrong Front

In a matter of weeks, the United States switched from fighting the Cold War to fighting the drug war. The invasion of Panama ushered in the new era; we will pay any price, bear any burden, to combat the drug menace. A Marine patrol has already fired on suspected traffickers crossing the Mexican border and the Pentagon drafted plans (now on hold) to mount a naval blockade off the coast of Colombia. President Bush, who will attend a summit with Andean leaders next month in Cartegena, plans to spend $2 billion over the next five years to fight drugs in the region.

None of this is likely to make much difference. Overseas, the war on drugs, despite last week’s reported surrender by a Colombian cartel, is shaping up as a loser. To understand why, we must examine the nature of the U.S. buildup in Latin America.

The war is led by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. The bureau controls an interregional air wing of more than 50 aircraft, including fixed-wing, C-123 cargo transports and Vietnam-era helicopters. The aircraft are used to ferry troops, move supplies and, most important, spray crops. Today, the State Department unit is dousing coca, marijuana and poppy fields in Colombia, Guatemala, Belize, Jamaica and Mexico.

While the bureau controls the skies, the Drug Enforcement Administration runs the ground show. Traditionally assigned to the domestic drug trade, DEA is strengthening its presence in Latin America. Today, more than 150 agents work in 17 countries. Agency personnel are also more and more involved in paramilitary actions in the coca-rich regions of South America, where, armed with machine guns and jungle knives, they stage helicopter raids on processing labs and clandestine airstrips.

The Central Intelligence Agency also expands its presence in Latin America, with new agents assigned to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and elsewhere. At CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., a Counter-Narcotics Center collates the steady stream of data coming in from agents, informants, wiretaps, radar and satellites.

Next, the Pentagon. Even as Defense Secretary Dick Cheney announces major cuts in defense spending, the U.S. Southern Command in Panama is preparing to step up activities throughout Latin America. Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the commander, has already made several trips to Andean nations, canvassing the needs of local military and police chiefs. Arms shipments grow. In 1988, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia received a total of $3 million in military aid; this year the total will be $170 million.

Even agencies with little history of involvement in Latin America are enlisting. The U.S. Customs Service has dispatched agents across the continent to assist local forces in sealing borders, controlling highways and training dogs to sniff parcels at airports. The Coast Guard has sent mobile training teams to instruct local policemen in river interdiction.

Washington is on full drug-war footing. But its warriors are likely to slip when engaging the enemy, their generals committing the same errors as predecessors who fought the war against communism in Latin America.

First, there’s the friendly dictator syndrome. Just as Washington frequently cozied up to despots like Anastasio Somoza and Francois Duvalier because of their opposition to communism, it now embraces similar characters whose only redeeming quality is strong opposition to drugs.

Take Haiti. Gen. Prosper Avril became president in a 1988 military coup; he has repeatedly reneged on promises to hold free elections and respect human rights. But he has moved aggressively against cocaine traffickers. “The (Avril) government . . . has expressed a firm commitment to cutting the flow of illegal drugs through Haiti,” the State Department said in its 1989 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. “Despite political turmoil, the Haitians have maintained drug interdiction efforts and cooperated closely with U.S. authorities.” “Political turmoil” included disappearances, killings and popular clamorings for democracy.

After Panama, such chumminess is dismaying. For years, Washington overlooked Manuel A. Noriega’s involvement in drugs because of his usefulness in fighting communism. The lesson seems lost; the United States woos other Noriega-like figures.

Washington’s emerging weakness for anti-drug strongmen highlights a broader flaw in drug policy--a predilection for military solutions to problems that are primarily social and economic in origin. With unemployment soaring, prices skyrocketing and governments paralyzed by external debt and corruption, destitute peasants have turned to coca as a dependable means of income. Only economic development and crop-substitution programs offer a realistic chance of getting these farmers off coca.

So far, the United States has displayed little interest in the economic roots of the cocaine problem. U.S. agents spend far more time with generals and police chiefs than with agrarian planners and peasant representatives. Just as 10 years of military intervention in Central America failed to bring peace to the region, current reliance on interdiction and law enforcement is unlikely to stem the flow of cocaine into the United States.

Last week’s reputed offer by the “Extraditables,” a group believed to speak for the Medellin cartel--to end the violence and get out of the narcotics trade in exchange for amnesty--doesn’t mean Colombia has won its war against the drug lords. President Bush and Colombian President Virgilio Barco are rightly skeptical of the feeler. But as recent polls in Colombia show, the people would favor exploring such a deal. Any arrangement that might end the bloodshed should not be ignored.

But an agreement between the Colombian government and the cartel does not guarantee diminished exports of cocaine to the United States. For every Medellin drug lord thinking about retirement, there are dozens of traffickers waiting to take his place. The Cali drug cartel also does business in Colombia; it may expand, having been spared by the government offensive. As long as Americans demand cocaine, South Americans will supply it.

Latin America’s cocaine industry now extends over an area nearly as large as the continental United States. It employs millions of people, generates tens of billions of dollars. The narcos have huge stockpiles of sophisticated arms and maintain private armies that, in some cases, dwarf those of the established security forces. Add weak governments that barely control their national territories and it’s enough to make one nostalgic for the Cold War.