As Gorbachev Matches Pace to Change, Soviet Union Hurries to Open Politics

For seven decades, the Soviet media have habitually described any Communist Party activity as “historic.” Last week, they finally used the word correctly in reporting the abrogation of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. The Central Committee’s action may led to a system in which the Communist Party will be just another political party vying for public favor. That the plenum took that gamble should not be surprising.

During the second Congress of People’s Deputies in December, an attempt was made to put the fate of Article 6--the party’s legal basis for its monopoly on power--on the agenda. In his last impassioned public appearance, Andre D. Sakharov contested Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s view that the article was needed to keep the nation together. In the end, the proposal lost by only a few votes. Had the proposal carried, party power would have come under the control of local soviets--an outcome fervently advocated by reform-minded deputies.

To be fair, it must be noted that Gorbachev, Alexander N. Yakovlev and other reformers in the top leadership were not enthusiastic supporters of Article 6. Their chief objection was that the time was not yet right to consider its fate. In fact, they were almost hinting at the possibility of the article’s abrogation--for even considering a discussion of the party’s monopoly on power broke a number of sacred taboos.

The question was growing ever more urgent, especially since similar constitutional provisions were being abrogated throughout Eastern Europe. Since the beginning of perestroika, in 1987, until last summer, events in the Soviet Union had a positive effect on the process of democratization in Eastern Europe--inspiring the growth of democratic opposition in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria.

Lately, however, the speed of change elsewhere resulted in pressure on the Soviet Union to follow a more radical course. At the plenum, the party--seeking to regain the confidence and authority it had held--tried to make it appear that its decision to relinquish its own monopoly on power was voluntary. Quite a few reformers--in and out of the party--maintain that ending the political monopoly will help restore the people’s confidence in the party and its authority. Yet, the decision made at the plenum signifies only a de jure loss of legitimacy.

For the last two years, Gorbachev has not quite succeeded in keeping up with events--his moves were always too little, too late. The crises of Nagorno-Karabakh, the relationship between the Moscow and the republics, labor strikes--even the question of private property--were not solved by Gorbachev. Quite the contrary: They became more acute and added to the government’s inability to govern.

But last week, it seems Gorbachev attempted to take the initiative. While resisting pressure from conservative forces, he tried to bring about a quick transition of power from the party to the government. It is possible that he hopes to distance himself from the ultimately discredited party-government apparatus--just as Poland’s president, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski did--and be directly legitimized by the people. This would enable him to strengthen his own authority and proceed with radical perestroika . Whatever the cause, if the plenum’s decision is confirmed at the coming party congress, it will mean the end of the Communist Party as has it existed, with minor modifications, from its inception.

The next step in the transfer of power from the party to the government could be the internal factionalizing of the party. That could come before, or during, the congress. The rise of factions would further weaken the organizational and political role of the middle-level of party nomenklatura and severely limit its ability to resist the transfer of power to the newly created governmental structures. It would also hinder the realization of the more radical measures advocated by the reform-minded wing of the party.

If I am correct in my judgments of Gorbachev’s motives in advocating reforms, the relatively moderate reaction to the defection of the Lithuanian Communist Party can be better understood. If, in the near future, there is a splintering of the Communist Party along dogmatic and ideological rather than national lines, the symbolism and meaning of the split between the Lithuanian and Soviet Parties will be less significant, since the the party will have lost its importance in the political life of the country.

The plenum’s decisions further suggest that Gorbachev and his supporters have finally realized that perestroika ‘s success depends on a systematic self-liquidation of a Communist Party constituted in accordance with the principles of Vladimir I. Lenin. Only such a liquidation can result in the creation of a normal state, with several political parties replacing the existing “monster-party.”

It is important to note that the plenum decided to propose a presidential governmental structure for consideration by the People’s Congress. This change would revolutionize the Soviet political system. For the first time, the Soviet system of government would become personalized. It would not be personal rule based on force--as it was under Josef Stalin--but rather, as it is in the American system: personal authority would be legitimized by the people and their participation in open, free elections.

This would signal the destruction of the oligarchical system that halted development and ruled, unopposed, after Nikita S. Khrushchev was deposed at the October, 1964, plenum. It would mean the end of totalitarian rule by the Politburo and the Central Committee. It would mean the return of sovereignty to the people.

The crucial step in the destruction of the current nomenklatura -dominated political system would be allowing the president to select his own “team” without consulting the Politburo or the Central Committee; and, after confirmation of his “team” by the Supreme Soviet, to take steps toward the realization of programs approved by voters in elections.

This, however, would saddle the president with real responsibility. Lack of accountability now forces us to guess at the reasons for the lack of more radical steps taken by the architects of perestroika. We have no way of knowing whether Gorbachev chose not to do certain things, or whether he was unable to act because of Politburo and Central Committee opposition. In a normal presidential system, he would be responsible for both successes and failures. He would no longer be able to hide behind the Politburo, the Central Committee or the Supreme Soviet. This will finally afford us the opportunity to end the system of collective irresponsibility that has brought our society to its current hopeless state.

To evaluate decisions that have been made, we must realize that even though much valuable time has been invested to achieve relatively painless results, the decisions reached are appropriate; they were the only way to prevent the consolidation of conservative forces and the attempts to reverse the process of change. Events of the past two years have revealed that the longer radical decisions are postponed, the greater is the strength of opponents. At the same time, we must beware of euphoria over the decisions taken, because the absence of much of the needed societal and governmental structure makes further development unpredictable. To successfully accomplish the transition described, it is essential to find answers to a number of questions that are already posed.

To begin with, it is understood that the coming elections will have a deciding effect on the future of the transitional process. We may well ask, therefore, what will be the roles of the local party bodies--from the republican to the regional levels?

What will be the new relationship between party hierarchies and the newly created governmental bodies? Will it be possible to nominate and elect independent candidates for the new power structures if registration and nominations had taken place at a time when party supremacy was unquestioned and accepted, and when the party controlled the pre-election process in many areas? This could result in controversy and friction between the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party on one hand, and the Congress of Peoples Deputies and the Supreme Soviet on the other.

There are many other important and vital questions: Will we be successful in removing party organs from their activities in the administrative-economic sphere, and will we be able to replace them with new administrative bodies while taking into account that the positions of a number of ministries have not been adversely affected, and that the connections between the center and outlying areas, as well as the activities and scope of organizations, enterprises and communal and state farms are not well defined?

If we recognize that all these reforms are taking place at a time when the financial system is out of kilter, there is a chronic shortage of consumer goods and an overall deterioration of the economy--in a country facing a crisis of all social-economic processes as well as a delegitimization of governmental structures--we must recognize that perestroika , after these decisions, will have to face its most difficult trial.

Will we be successful in creating new structures, in accomplishing the transition of power from the party to the government, reverse governmental impotence, restore the legitimacy of governmental bodies, end the economic crisis, restore peace--or at least bring and end to violence--to the national and social conflicts? These are questions whose answers will become clear in the next few months. They will be fateful ones for Gorbachev, and for perestroika and the country as a whole.

The die has been cast. The time of walking a tightrope, of half measures, is over. It ended with the vote by the plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.