A Moscow Debate Over ‘Exorbitant’ Military Costs : Glasnost: A Soviet expert on America accuses his country’s military leaders of distorting U.S. defense spending to maintain a ‘huge war machine.’

At the Second Congress of People’s Deputies in December, I criticized the Soviet Union’s exorbitant military expenditures for the following reasons:

New political thinking, a major element of perestroika and a new concept of foreign policy. It also implies a new attitude to military force, its role and the possibility of using it.

I am not saying that previously we advocated the use of force in politics or war. Socialism is against war and it is no accident that the first Soviet decree was the decree on peace. But, as was often the case in many other spheres, we did not always live up to our lofty principles and ideals in this area.

While generally rejecting the “export of revolution,” we nevertheless not infrequently resorted to bellicose revolutionary rhetoric. Too often we pursued a policy that was prompted by our imperial ambitions. There is no need to prove this now that we have condemned Stalin’s secret agreements with Hitler in 1939, the use of the armed forces by the Soviet Union and its allies in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the decision to bring in troops to Afghanistan in 1979.

But a review of political attitudes and concepts leads (and has already led) to a reduction of the risk of war and a rethinking of military doctrines and strategy. The new policy does not require such large armed forces and, consequently, such large military expenditures.

Surplus military might is no “safety factor.” It is bad for the new policy, because the other side judges your intentions not so much by what you say as by your military capabilities. Military capabilities should be “reasonably sufficient,” no more and no less. This means that one should have just enough to defend oneself and not to provoke the other side (especially considering that the United States has not abandoned its old political thinking and “gunboat diplomacy.”)

Yet one should have not enough to attack and defeat the other side, not enough to make the other side afraid or tempt one’s own politicians into reckless action. We have proclaimed such a political and military concept and must now change our armed forces and defense spending accordingly.

Our difficult economic state. When you are in debt and have no money to buy the most essential things, you should do what every housewife would do: live within your means, save on everything and give up all unnecessary expenses.

I think a state should behave in the same manner. It must, first of all, give up all luxuries and extravagances, such as big capital investments that do not pay off quickly, the maintenance of an enormous bureaucratic apparatus, the production of shoddy goods which no one wants to buy and excessive military expenditures. I am convinced that our military spending today exceeds the requirements of security and reasonable sufficiency.

Overmilitarization. Many aspects of our life--the economy, science and even education--are too militarized for a socialist society. It is, to a great extent, a natural consequence of Stalinism, of which militarism was always a part (in fact, the entire administrative-command system is a vestige of military communism). At the same time, it is the result of policy pursued in the post-Stalinist period when marshals, generals and arms manufacturers received so much freedom they became practically uncontrollable.

Under the leadership of “great commanders” such as Leonid I. Brezhnev, (former Defense Minister) Dimitri F. Ustinov and (former Defense Minister) Andrei Grechko, who shamelessly received top military honors and ranks in peacetime, they created a huge and fabulously expensive war machine (which has repetedly surprised us by its ineffectiveness in recent years).

What did we gain from creating that giant? First of all, in the ‘70s, in spite of the policy of detente, we succeeded in scaring the entire world and forging against us a coalition of all leading powers, the most powerful since Napoleon. (The amazing fact we have just learned from our official press is that the Soviet Union has almost 64,000 tanks--more than all the other countries of the world put together).

Furthermore, we bled white and destabilized our economy and finances, which inevitably led to social tension and a lowering of living standards. The gap between the Soviet Union and the industrialized Western nations began to widen. Lastly, while condemning American imperialism, we helped the U.S. military-industrial complex to prolong the Cold War for 15 years or more and suspend the budding process of disarmament and demilitarization of international relations.

All these facts show that we should begin an open and honest discussion of the problems of the armed forces, military policy and defense spending as soon as possible. A radical reform in this sphere should become a key element of the policy of perestroika.

The problem is that some Soviet army commanders are doing everything to avert such a discussion. They resort to dishonest methods, such as concealing or distorting information, discrediting their critics and attaching political labels to them. Unable to deny the existence of problems and shortcomings in the military sphere, they are trying to ward off all criticism.

This campaign, conducted with a lot of clamor, arrogance and even aggressiveness, does not meet the interests of the country and the armed forces. That is why I considered it extremely important that the discussion of military affairs be transferred to Parliament. The more so since the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security is not justifying the hopes pinned on it--it is largely composed of representatives of the leadership of the Defense Ministry and defense industry and has virtually become their lobby rather than a body of parliamentary control.

When I took the floor at the Congress, I certainly realized that my proposals for a more drastic reduction in defense spending would be violently attacked by representatives of the military leadership. That is why the statements made by Adm. Vladimir N. Chernavin (commander in chief of the Soviet Navy) and Lt. Gen. Alexander I. Ovchinnikov (a member of the Military Council) did not surprise me. Yet enthusiastic support for my statement and proposals by officers and several generals at the Congress and elsewhere came as a pleasant surprise.

I would like to answer briefly one of my critics, Gen. Ovchinnikov. I cannot ignore the attempts to controvert my assertion that in recent years the United States has been reducing its military allocations, and that the Soviet armed forces exceed by far those of America in troop strength. It is not that my “oratorical vanity” was hurt--the aims of Gen. Ovchinnikov were so transparent. Taking issue with me, he claimed that the United States continued to increase its military expenditures, and that its troops (he included troops of U.S. allies in his count) outnumbered Soviet troops. His message was clear, questioning the Soviet policy of reducing troops and defense expenditures. That is why I have a duty to cite some facts.

Is it true, as Gen. Ovchinnikov claims, that in recent years American military allocations have been growing? No, not true.

What I know and want to repeat here is that since 1985, U.S. military allocations have been steadily declining (though I think the United States, just as the Soviet Union, should have reduced its military allocations faster). Here are official U.S. figures, making adjustments for inflation by using 1989 constant prices: $325.5 billion in 1985, $311.9 billion in 1986, $301.8 billion in 1987, $292.8 billion in 1988 and $290.8 billion in 1989--that is $35 billion, or more than 10%, less than five years ago. It is too early to speak about 1990, because there is no accurate figure for inflation yet.

The same is true of my statement that even when we reduce our armed forces by 500,000 men, our forces will still outnumber U.S. forces by 1.5 million. Gen. Ovchinnikov said that they would outnumber the American forces by a “mere” 460,000.

The readers of Ogonyok already know about the origin of this discrepancy from an “open letter” to the magazine’s editor from Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, and the editor’s commentary to that letter. Marshal Akhromeyev added to the 2.1 million American servicemen the National Guard and reservists, although he excluded from his count of the Soviet armed forces not only reservists, but also the border and interior forces.

The Ogonyok commentary pointed to the tactlessness of this discrepancy, so I have only one thing to add to it: If Marshal Akhromeyev considers it right to equate the American reservists and National Guard, which is a territorial militia, with our regular army, what prevents us from adopting the same system? It would be cheaper for the country and more useful for the economy. The population would welcome such a system, especially people of call-up age (it’s nice to stay at home and spend one to 40 days a year in encampments, which will count as your military service).

This is how the matters really stand. Besides, it is not the United States but the Soviet Union that has adopted the doctrine of “reasonable sufficiency,” which makes us think seriously about many things, especially in our difficult economic situation. Specifically, we should think about what threatens us more--foreign intervention or our growing economic difficulties? If this trend continues, it can eventually make us a developing country.

We should also think more about such specific things as why we still have the largest army in the world and spend on military purposes a bigger share of our gross national product than any other major power (even if we assume that our official military budget figures are 100% correct). We should also think why we produce more weapons of almost all types than any other country and are the world’s largest arms-trader.

The most important thing we should think about is who should govern the armed forces in this country and, on the basis of what laws, who should decide how our armed forces should be organized, who should allocate funds to them and who should oversee the spending of these funds. I think all these questions, as well as the question of the composition and functions of the appropriate Supreme Soviet committee, should be put on the agenda of our Parliament as soon as possible.

The Second Congress of People’s Deputies began the discussion of military affairs, but I believe that this discussion should be continued in the Supreme Soviet and eventually lead to the adoption of laws and political and budget decisions. This would meet the interests of the armed forces, the interests of the nation and its economy and defense capability.

Policy is formulated by political leadership in accordance with the constitution and law. Military strategy and doctrine should serve the aims of policy. And the quantity, quality and structure of the armed forces, defense expenditures and armaments programs should serve the aims of policy, strategy and doctrine--not vice versa.

A group of army officers, members of Parliament, distributed a very interesting document at the Congress. Entitled “Military Reform Concept,” it showed that a consensus on such crucial issues is possible between the military and civilians. So the discussion has begun and has already produced some results.