Others Await the Arias Cure : Nicaragua: While the peace plan had plenty of shortcomings, it has demonstrated that there is a vehicle for ending Central American insurgencies and nurturing democracy.

Ever since Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez unveiled his Central American peace plan in 1987, it has been all things to all people. The Reagan Administration, while giving the plan rhetorical support, did its best to undermine it. Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, skeptical at first, soon embraced it as the best way to rid themselves of the Contras and come to terms with Washington.

Now three years later--and after the Sandinistas’ defeat at the polls--we can begin to assess the real impact of the Arias plan.

For Americans, it provided an alternative to the Reagan Administration’s campaign to militarily overthrow the Sandinistas. It offered an alternative to members of Congress who previously had been forced to choose between Reagan and the Contras on one hand and Daniel Ortega on the other. Absent a diplomatic option, the war likely would have continued.

For the five Central American presidents who signed on, the Arias plan provided a framework to resolve regional insurgencies by moving . By simultaneously cutting off external aid to guerrillas while guaranteeing their personal safety, access to media and right to participate in free and fair elections, the plan aimed to move the conflicts from the battlefield to the ballot box.

But as logical as the plan looked on paper, it had major shortcomings. The first was its focus on Nicaragua to the exclusion of El Salvador and Guatemala. The Nicaraguans felt it was unfair that they had to fully implement the plan while far greater abuses of human and political rights were ignored in neighboring countries.

The second and even more serious shortcoming was the inability of the Central American presidents to get outside powers, in particular the United States, to comply with the plan by cutting off aid to guerrillas. Every time the presidents met, they pleaded for an end of aid to the Contras. Although Congress did end military aid two years ago, so-called humanitarian assistance continued to keep the Contras armed, intact and killing Nicaraguan civilians, albeit at a much-reduced rate.

The Sandinistas were bitterly disappointed that after signing the Arias plan and then taking dramatic steps to implement it, including opening their political system and releasing political prisoners, the anticipated aid bonanza never materialized. Moreover, the U.S. trade embargo and the U.S.-orchestrated credit blockade remained. The Democratic leadership in Congress, so instrumental in convincing the Nicaraguans to go the extra mile, never made a serious effort to end the financial war.

Indeed, it was the Democrats who persuaded Daniel Ortega to move up the election in order to hasten the day when the blockade would be lifted and aid would resume. Standing for election before economic recovery turned out to be Ortega’s biggest miscalculation.

The magnitude of that miscalculation was revealed by the Sandinistas’ resounding defeat by the coalition headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. A majority of the Nicaraguan voters believed that a vote for the Sandinistas would doom them to six more years of misery. Never mind that it might not be the Sandinistas’ fault.

Where does all this now leave the Bush Administration, the people of Nicaragua and the hapless Sandinistas?

The Bush Administration, committed like its predecessor to destroying Nicaragua, now finds itself stuck with the tab for rebuilding that country. The cost is certain to run into the billions. An uncertain future faces the Nicaraguan people. An unstable coalition headed by a political novice will try to rebuild the country’s economy and mend its social compact.

For a peek at the likely payoff of close ties with the United States, the Nicaraguans need only look next door at Honduras, our closest ally in the region, which now finds itself vying with Haiti for the dubious distinction of having the lowest per capita income in the hemisphere.

And what of the Sandinistas? After they get over the shock of defeat, they may realize that they are in the catbird’s seat, relieved of responsibility for rebuilding the country and well positioned as Nicaragua’s biggest opposition party. They have enough seats in the National Assembly to block any changes in the constitution, they control the biggest labor unions and they are certain to have influence in the army. While Chamorro is buffeted about by one crisis after another, the Sandinistas can methodically plan for the next round of elections in 1996. Like Michael Manley in Jamaica, the odds are that they will be back. That is the beauty of elections--even if you can’t win them all, you rarely lose them all either.

Imperfect as the Arias plan was, multilateral negotiations remain the best vehicle for ending the region’s insurgencies and nurturing democracy in countries now democratic in name only. Daniel Ortega took the bitter medicine. Now the Bush Administration must apply the same cure to El Salvador and Guatemala if it ever wishes to attain the goal of regional peace.