NICARAGUA WITH A WHOLE WORLD WATCHING : The People Won, Not U.S. Policy, Not the Contras, but Citizen-Voters

Now that Violeta Barrios de Chamorro has achieved a Buster Douglas-type victory over Daniel Ortega, what should U.S. policy be toward Nicaragua? Ironically, the Bush Administration’s much-desired victory by the United Nicaraguan Opposition could present as many problems and challenges to America as a Sandinista victory. Nonetheless, Congress and the executive branch could achieve a rare bipartisan partnership in Nicaraguan policy by moving decisively, while cautiously, to assure an effective transition.

Any doubts about the relative fairness of the vote have been put to rest by the outcome. As a member of former President Jimmy Carter’s official observer delegation, however, it became clear to me that, despite the Sandinistas exerting incumbent advantages, the campaign was conducted honorably. Election-day procedures were remarkably well run. In the northern province of Esteli, where I was assigned to monitor several voting precincts, I saw large, orderly turnouts while election officials and opposition poll watchers worked in close coordination. All were obviously aware that they were taking part in a historic event--Nicaragua’s first truly open free election.

Unfortunately, rather than examining what role the United States should now play in relation to Nicaragua, Washington policy-makers are busy fighting for credit--rehashing arguments about whether past U.S. Contra policy is responsible for the results. In fact, this is moot: Last week’s election rendered past military adventures irrelevant. Former President Ronald Reagan’s Contra policy served to frustrate peace efforts and heighten regional tensions. The Contras remain unpopular throughout Nicaragua and UNO officials actually took pains to dissociate themselves from the group whenever possible. In reality, credit lies not with those who sought to impose a military solution but rather those committed to diplomacy--Carter, President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica and the other Central American presidents.

Every step toward free elections followed efforts by the Central American presidents and their peace proposals. Once the electoral process was under way, the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Carter delegation proved invaluable mediators.

Ultimately, though, credit lies with the Nicaraguan people. The election was well-mannered and enthusiastic--with an astounding 90% of eligible voters participating. Nicaraguans said they voted less for a particular party than for change. It was their strong desire for change, peace and an improved economy--not the Contras or U.S. support of UNO--that accounted for last Sunday’s upset.

The wrong lesson must not be drawn. Crediting U.S. Contra policy for the election result would undoubtedly derail future U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. What worked in Nicaragua were good-faith negotiations facilitated by individuals--Arias and Carter--who had established ties and credibility with both sides. The White House could learn from this measured diplomatic approach.

First, to position itself effectively, Washington should not gloat over the Sandinista defeat nor take credit for UNO’s victory. UNO overcame initial organizational problems and peaked at the right time. The Administration should be more gracious than it has been in acknowledging the positive roles played by the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council in this clean election. Before election day, the Sandinistas, albeit grudgingly, addressed all discrepancies and grievances.

In defeat, the Sandinistas could have pulled a Don King routine--cried foul and tried to abort the results. Instead, they seem to be respecting the outcome. In days ahead, cooperative Sandinista behavior is vital for a successful transfer of power and much-needed reconciliation. It is also important that the Sandinistas turn over the levers of power--especially in the interior and army ministries. Any kind of U.S. breast-beating, criticism of the Sandinistas or pressure would be counterproductive. With over 40% of the popular vote, a sizable representation in the National Assembly and a loyal military, the Sandinistas are a formidable opposition that cannot be dismissed.

The Administration would be best advised not to inject itself in attempting to influence the transition. The OAS, the United Nations and Carter have been asked by UNO and the Sandinistas to assist in the transition. The White House should support these mediating efforts and take a back seat. Its influence would be best-used to discourage any potential UNO retaliation against Sandinista lame duck officials or sympathizers.

Second, the Bush Administration and Congress must commit to dismantling the Contras. The Contras should not be encouraged to remain armed during the transition process until the Sandinista army is dismantled, as some Contra leaders have suggested. A workable relocation program is needed that includes Contra admission to the United States or a third country.

There will be many Contras who will not want to return to Nicaragua--partly because they feel unwelcome there. For those who do return, however, safety should be guaranteed, perhaps using the good offices of Arias. Instead of trying to run a relocation program with existing U.S. agencies, the United States could encourage the OAS and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to administer the operation by pledging financial support.

Third, after U.S. involvement helped launch a proxy war, killing thousands of Nicaraguans and devastating the country economically, the United States has a moral obligation to help rebuild a devastated Nicaraguan economy. Those who say Nicaragua should get in line for U.S. aid renege on a responsibility. The need to help Nicaragua is even more pressing than U.S. efforts to aid East European reform governments.

In addition to lifting the trade embargo, and possibly granting most-favored-nation trade status, the United States should quickly renew a coffee agreement. Both support for the new government and support for social programs are required. A U.S. aid package, however, cannot be rushed. It should be implemented carefully, to be properly absorbed and not wasted like so many other “emergency” aid efforts.

Fourth, the United States must now act in concert with the Central American presidents to guarantee enforcement of previous Central American accords, such as the barring of illegal Sandinista arms shipments to the Salvadoran rebels. The United States and its Latin neighbors should hold the Sandinistas to their pledge not to send arms to El Salvador’s guerrillas in the remaining two months of the Ortega presidency and beyond--especially if Chamorro has difficulty controlling Sandinista army activities.

The Nicargua surprise will have serious implications for U.S. policy in the region’s other hot spot, El Salvador. Having “won” in Panama and Nicaragua, the Bush Administration, along with the Alfredo Cristiani government in El Salvador, have no reason to become cocky and pursue an all-out military solution to the Salvadoran conflict.

Even without new arms shipments through Nicaragua, the Salvadoran rebels are still well-supplied. The Administration should not adopt an aggressive Central American policy to placate right-wing supporters. Rather, the United States should actively support efforts to broker a negotiated settlement through the United Nations, also linking continued military aid to Cristiani with the successful prosecution of those involved in the brutal murder of six Jesuit priests last November.

The United States and Nicaragua are on the verge of a new relationship. Transitional periods can be the most sensitive times. The Bush Administration has to remember that past U.S. action in Central America can render suspect any future action, however well-motivated. The United States should work through individuals, including Carter and Arias, who have established ties and credibility with both sides. Most important, the Nicaraguans must allowed to solve transition and reconciliation problems for themselves.