Sandinistas’ Defeat in Nicaragua Divides, Confuses Both Sides in El Salvador’s War : Central America: Rebels lose a source of arms, and the army’s opposition to peace talks hardens. Result may prolong the conflict.

El Salvador’s guerrilla movement and its right-wing government have both been left confused and divided by the stunning Sandinista election defeat of Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, according to government, rebel and diplomatic sources.

With neither side able to marshal a rational, unified policy to deal with the after-effects of the Feb. 25 vote, the resulting uncertainty calls into doubt the prospects that negotiations to end El Salvador’s long-running civil war can succeed. Some sources say it may lead to increased fighting.

For the leftist guerrillas, an immediate result of the defeat of their closest international ally--and, the U.S. government alleges, their main source of weapons--coupled with the fall of Communist governments in Eastern Europe, has been serious demoralization. Many rebels are now uncertain about the point of continuing their armed struggle.

“The events in Eastern Europe created doubts among mid-level guerrillas who ask, ‘What are we doing if socialism is failing?’ ” said a source close to the rebels. When the Sandinistas lost, he added, “doubts resurfaced because the defeat ran against the excuses that the situation was different in Central America from Eastern Europe.

“We haven’t seen a lot of (rebel) desertions, but the people arguing for a major armed struggle are being questioned,” this source said.

While some sources say that the rebels’ uncertainty has increased the likelihood they will negotiate seriously with the government, important Salvadoran military leaders and hard-line rightist political officials say they have been encouraged by the Sandinista defeat to oppose meaningful talks with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the guerrilla umbrella group.

“Why should we negotiate?” asked one colonel. “Time is running out on the terrorists, and we are on top.”

That is not the official line of President Alfredo Cristiani nor of Col. Rene Emilio Ponce, the army chief of staff, so the officer asked not to be identified by name. But he claimed that many other senior officers share his view that “the only thing you negotiate when you are winning are the terms of surrender for the other side.”

A foreign diplomat with close ties to Cristiani said in an interview that “it is not accurate” to say that the army is resisting negotiations, but he acknowledged “that the pressures (against talks) are there. We are trying to overcome that.”

Ruben Zamora, a Social Democrat with political ties to the FMLN, said that Cristiani has given in, at least somewhat, to the hard-liners’ pressure by insisting on conditions to the negotiations that the rebels cannot accept.

“Four or five months ago, Cristiani said there were no preconditions for negotiations,” Zamora said, “but now he insists that the FMLN stop any military activity affecting civilians, and the way he interprets that is that all military activity affects civilians.”

Zamora and a European diplomat with close contacts with the guerrillas as well as the military say that Cristiani’s tough position is part of the trade-off he had to make with the army when his government decided to prosecute officers on charges of murdering six Jesuit priests last November.

“Cristiani has exhausted his working room,” said the diplomat. “He traded off his ability to shape the army attitude regarding negotiations and to appoint sympathetic officers to key positions in order to get agreement to prosecute” in the Jesuit case.

U.S. officials deny any such deal regarding talks with the rebels, although they acknowledge military personnel assignments have been affected by the Jesuit case.

“I am convinced Cristiani wants talks,” said one American official, adding that he thinks the guerrillas ultimately will negotiate because in “the medium and long run,” the Nicaraguan elections show they have no choice.”

“In reality,” he said, “talks have already begun; they are just not face to face. Time is against the guerrillas and they know it. Too many things are coming together to stop negotiations.”

Zamora’s view, he says, is that the American’s conclusion is correct, although the reasoning is partly flawed. While the guerrillas are willing to talk because their massive offensive in November failed to set off the popular insurrection they expected, “from the FMLN point of view, this is the best time for negotiations for two other reasons,” Zamora said.

“First is that the United States accepts the need for negotiations” and failure of real talks could endanger American aid to the government.

“Second,” he said, “the guerrillas showed they were strong” in November and have to be dealt with. “That hasn’t changed.”

Nearly all sources agree that means there will be no major FMLN military action for now, or at least until one side or the other decides the negotiation process has fallen short.

“The situation will remain like it is now for the next four or five months as negotiations play out,” Zamora said. “But if nothing happens, then the guerrillas will have to have an offensive to show they are still viable.”

The source close to the FMLN, who favors talks, says that if negotiations do not produce a democratic system that accepts the guerrillas as full participants, there could be a full-scale war. And he warned that fighting could be renewed sooner if progress isn’t made very soon.

“The militants don’t really want talks--at least talks that won’t give them power,” this source said. “For now they are giving in, but when they get the chance, they will resume the attacks.”

Some military experts question whether that can happen.

“It’s going to be difficult to get arms,” said one foreign military man, “and they won’t be able to rebuild a logistic network after their defeat” in November.

“There is no indication of interest in any large-scale military operation even in four or five months,” he said.

Still, this officer, along with nearly all other military and diplomatic experts, failed to foresee the fall offensive. Nor did anyone predict the rebels’ ability to hold off the army for several weeks.

The rebels launched a new wave of small attacks in eastern El Salvador and in the capital Thursday night and early Friday, killing three soldiers and a policeman.

“The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, on a new military campaign, (is) again showing the armed forces (and) the government . . . that it is ready to solve the conflict through talks, but it is the fascists who still cling to the idea that the FMLN is weak . . . they are completely wrong,” the clandestine Radio Venceremos said.

The attacks followed Thursday’s announcement by President Cristiani’s government that it would extend a four-month-old state of siege by another 30 days.

In the meantime, the guerrilla leaders face a more immediate, if not ultimately serious result from the Sandinistas’ loss: Where to live and work.

Under the Sandinistas, the FMLN high command has its headquarters in Managua. They run Radio Venceremos from Nicaragua and they infiltrate into Salvador from Nicaragua.

President-elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro has said the FMLN will lose its base when she takes over. The guerrillas are taking her at her word and looking elsewhere.

“They have decided to leave Managua,” said Zamora, “and that is a logistic and political problem. They don’t want to go to Cuba”--because they would be isolated--”but they may have to.”

The other option is Mexico, where the FMLN already has an office. But the Mexican government has said that while a political operation will be acceptable, it will not allow a military or propaganda headquarters.

“It’s a problem, but we can overcome it,” said another source. “Far more serious is the question of negotiations. If they fail, then we are back to endless war.”