Standing at the Crossroads, He Took Fatherland Over Mother Party : Gorbachev: If his vision proves correct, the world will long honor his name. And Lenin will be little more than a footnote.

We would search American history in vain for an analogous circumstance to that of Mikhail Gorbachev. George Washington rejected, after about five minutes’ thought, the offer of a monarchy. Thomas Jefferson was turbulently tested (as he was by much of political life) by the adoption of political parties, the feared “factions.” Abraham Lincoln comes closest--choosing between peaceful disintegration and bloody union. But none faced a choice between mother party and fatherland.

Lenin set the stage for what will surely now enter the glossary of political science as Gorbachev’s Dilemma. Lenin insisted on Bolshevism uber alles . He didn’t identify communism with Russia; he identified Russia with communism. That was because his interests were not simply in Russian revolution but world revolution. He was so convinced the revolution would come in Germany that he was totally taken off guard by the Russian Revolution of 1917. Recovering, he scurried from Zurich to the Finland Station to convert a temperate revolution to a radical ideological one, more by force of will than power of idea.

Thereafter, a maniacal Josef Stalin, World War II, the Cold War and the repression of political alternatives kept the Communists in power. But the golden promise of the revolution never materialized. It required then only a clear-eyed, practical, modern leader to say so and the party was--literally--over. Which left only one question, and that was the crucial one. Which is more important, preservation of Communist Party ideology or survival of the Russian nation? And at that crossroads stood Gorbachev.

He did not hesitate long in choosing. Mark Feb. 5, 1990, as one of the most important dates in 20th- Century history. For on that date, the leader of the Soviet Union chose Russia over communism, nation over party. It remains for historians to sort through the political rubble to determine how and why this could happen, most of all with no bloodshed.

Gorbachev may have chosen wisely for his country, but poorly for himself. Every revolutionary, however brilliant, has only limited political capital to spend. Gorbachev has spent his several times over. And yet, he seems to have a hidden mint for political capital. The more he spends, the more he seems to have. Few question if the revolution called glasnost (openness) is here to stay. Few dispute that some form of perestroika (restructuring) will predominate and that the old centralized “administrative and command” economic system will be replaced. In a very short period of time, fewer still will expect to see the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ever recapture its exclusive control over Russian political life. But surely the time will come when Gorbachev must pay the price for all this.

His attitude, publicly stated, has clearly been: “I’ll do what has to be done to save this country, and if any of you (critics) has a better idea, you step forward and take this job!” So far, no takers (except perhaps the bumptious Boris Yeltsin). On the right, the old guard can only argue that things are happening too fast. But tens of thousands in the street put the lie to that. And no one, not even the most dedicated Communist, wants openly to argue for preservation of the preferred party lifestyle. On the left, the only argument is, let’s go faster. But no vision as to where to go has been portrayed.

Which leaves only Gorbachev’s vision. If he is more patriot than partisan, what kind of country does he wish to save? The outlines are emerging. By the end of the 20th Century, the Soviet Union will be an uneven federation of republics, with varying degrees of commitment to socialism. The economy will be mixed, following the Scandinavian model, with entrepreneurship and market forces increasing daily. Property, including land, will be privately owned. There will be a hodgepodge of quarreling political parties and coalition governments mirroring the post-World War II Italian model. Trade between United Europe (including most of Central Europe) and the Socialist Confederation will have replaced most security concerns.

And the author of this historic upheaval--how will history treat him? Who is to know? If his vision of replacing a worn-out party ideology with a modern nation succeeds, long after Lenin becomes a footnote all Russia and the world will honor Gorbachev.