Pressure Won’t Break This Impasse : China: The relationship must be based on a realistic assessment of parallel interests, not outdated concepts and the Tian An Men Square incident.

Nine months after the tragedy in Tian An Men Square, U.S.-China relations remain at an impasse. The two sides’ recent efforts to improve the relationship have now clearly failed, and may actually have been counterproductive.

In a controversial overture to the Chinese leadership, President Bush sent two high-ranking emissaries to Beijing in December, and subsequently lifted some of the sanctions he had imposed. For its part, Beijing made some adjustments in foreign and domestic policy, including ending martial law, releasing some protesters from prison, clarifying its policy on missile sales to the Middle East and resuming the Fulbright program in China.

But neither country was satisfied with this exchange of gestures. Some Americans have expressed disappointment that Beijing did not repudiate the Tian An Men massacre or relax its internal political controls, without understanding that Beijing’s elderly leaders were never going to determine their domestic policies on the basis of pressure from the United States. Equally unrealistically, the Chinese have complained about recent congressional sanctions and the State Department’s annual human-rights report, as if either action could have been forestalled by the limited concessions Beijing was prepared to make. Each government now insists that it can go no further, and that is up to the other country to take the next step.

There are two ways of dealing with this impasse. One is for each side to increase the pressure, threatening retaliation unless it gains further concessions. The Bush Administration, for example, is hinting that it may not recommend extension of China’s most-favored-nation status when it expires in mid-year. But the Chinese insist that they will never yield to further American pressure. And, even if they wished to be more accommodating, it is difficult to see what they could plausibly do that would immediately satisfy American concerns about the economic and political situation in China. Further confrontation, therefore, is more likely to exacerbate the impasse than to break it.

Such a development would not be in America’s interest. Although it is unlikely that China would again become a security threat to the United States, we would pay a substantial price for a further deterioration in ties. We need a normal working relationship with China, based not on outdated concepts or exaggerated rhetoric but on a hard-headed assessment of parallel interests. Such a relationship is necessary in order to address international issues like Cambodia and the environment, and to ensure that American firms maintain a competitive position in the China market. Equally important, those in China who still support economic and political change are virtually unanimous in warning that a further crisis in Sino-American relations would imperil their own careers and the prospects for renewed reform.

Since further confrontation is undesirable, and more concessions from either side are unlikely, the alternative is to seek a breathing space. During this period the two governments would tacitly agree that there can be little possibility of a rapid improvement in their relationship, but would try to lay the groundwork for restoring ties. We would need to take the following steps:

The Bush Administration must reconstruct a domestic consensus on our China policy. This will require a comprehensive and persuasive statement by the President, outlining his vision of what kind of relationship he seeks and how he plans to attain it. Rebuilding the President’s political base also necessitates a more conciliatory approach toward Congress, acknowledging that the White House has no monopoly of wisdom on dealing with China.

We need to move beyond the Tian An Men incident in defining our China policy. We should neither forget nor forgive what happened in Beijing. Indeed, we can be confident that future generations of Chinese leaders will evaluate the demonstrations and their suppression very differently from those in power now. But it is futile to expect that the current leadership will express any regret or apology. Instead of dwelling on the past, we should look to the future, insisting on evidence that China is again moving, as Chinese leaders claim, in the direction of economic and political reform.

We then need to examine that evidence with a clear eye and an open mind. The situation in China today is extremely complex. Although the party is indeed attempting to reassert its control over society, many localities and institutions are evading its reach. Although some leaders are articulating a much more limited vision of political and economic change than was the case a few years ago, there is enormous pressure from below for further reform. Our understandable sensitivity to the negative trends should not blind us to more positive developments when they occur.

Finally, we need to keep the door to China open, not only to gain a balanced assessment of a complicated and fluid situation but also to maintain contact with those in China who wish to promote change. This implies that, unless the domestic situation in China further deteriorates, or unless Beijing adopts a more hostile policy toward the United States, it would be unwise to enact further sanctions. We should also preserve the institutional infrastructure for dialogue with China, particularly in the academic, commercial and policy communities.

One of the many tragedies of the last nine months has been that the Bush Administration has pursued a sound policy--expressing outrage at the Tian An Men incident while attempting to maintain contact with China--in an inept and counterproductive way. By sending Brent Scowcroft to Beijing to raise effusive toasts to Chinese leaders, the White House generated unrealistic expectations in the United States about reciprocal concessions. In so doing, it lost domestic support for its China policy without improving our relationship with Beijing. It would only compound the tragedy if, frustrated at its own miscalculations, the Administration were now to threaten further sanctions. Instead, it is wiser to step back from the impasse and wait and see whether there are signs of renewed progress toward economic and political reform in China. If so, that will be the true basis for a recovery of U.S.-China relations.