U.S. Rejects Soviet Plan for Germany

The Bush Administration, showing increasing confidence that it can prevail without having to compromise, Wednesday rejected a Soviet plan that would require a reunified Germany to align itself with both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater called the plan “another formula for neutrality.”

The compromise was outlined by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze in an article published under his name in an independent magazine that focuses on international security issues.

“We have a very full and direct policy, which is that a unified Germany should be a part of NATO,” Fitzwater said. “You can’t get any clearer than that.”

Moscow’s policy toward German reunification has been marked by a sometimes disorderly retreat since late last summer, when the Cold War barriers between West Germany and East Germany began to tumble.

At first, the Soviets opposed any suggestion of reunification. When that policy appeared untenable, they said they could support unification if Germany became neutral and was demilitarized. Later, they dropped the insistence on neutrality but said Germany must not remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 16-nation alliance created more than 40 years ago to defend the West against aggression from Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union and its satellite states.

In the latest variant, Shevardnadze suggested that Germany maintain membership in both NATO and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact until a new security organization embracing the United States, Canada and all the countries of Europe could be created to replace both alliances. At present, West Germany is a member of NATO and East Germany is a member of the Warsaw Pact.

“Many of our experts . . . believe that the idea of ‘dual membership’ for Germany could provide a pragmatic way out of the difficulties emerging now,” Shevardnadze wrote in his article for the May issue of the magazine “NATO’s Sixteen Nations.”

Despite the twists and turns of policy, however, Moscow has never yielded on its rejection of full and unfettered NATO membership for Germany. Shevardnadze told reporters in Washington last week that such an outcome would be “one-sided.” He left little doubt that, regardless of the substantive merits of the issue, Moscow could not accept such a humiliating rebuff.

But U.S. officials have said that the Soviets really have no other choice. The seven-nation Warsaw Pact has almost disintegrated, with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia now governed by non-Communist regimes. And the West German government, which is sure to be the dominant force in the reunification process, has made clear its preference to remain in NATO.

The details of German reunification are due to be discussed by the foreign ministers of the two German states and the four World War II victors--the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. This meeting, dubbed the “two-plus-four” talks, is expected to be held late this month or early May.

State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said that no decision has been made on the procedure for resolving conflicts if the six nations do not agree. Other officials have said that while every effort will be made to reach unanimity, disputes will have to be settled by majority vote. On German membership in NATO, these officials expect Moscow to be a minority of one.

In Brussels, a NATO spokesman joined Fitzwater in rejecting the Shevardnadze proposal.

“All Western nations and some of the Eastern Bloc nations have told us that they believe a unified Germany should be part of NATO and that it would be a stabilizing factor for Germany and the region,” Fitzwater said. “Full participation of Germany with the alliance is the best guarantee for long-term peace and stability in Europe.”

In effect, Fitzwater was saying that a unified Germany, unfettered by membership in NATO, could be a danger to its neighbors, just as Germany was in 1914 and in the 1930s. It has long been acknowledged that NATO serves two purposes: It deters the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe and provides a larger international context for the German army.