An Electoral Recipe for Political Madness and Mayhem : Israel: Its politics don’t work, its citizens are angry, its governments keep collapsing. It’s time to reform the way the country elects its leaders.

Israel is in the midst of its most serious domestic crisis ever: It is unable to form a stable government. Not coincidently, this political stalemate comes at a time when the country faces excruciatingly difficult foreign-policy decisions. Israel’s entire governing class could be discredited--or worse.

The tempers of Israeli citizens shorten daily. Some watchers of public opinion fear that the mood may soon turn anti-democratic.

No less a trusted Israeli institution than the country’s Supreme Court has joined the angry chorus. A few days ago, it ruled that recent coalition agreements are unlawful. In condemning how the two major parties negotiate, the court laid down a precedent that may protect the norms of democratic conduct: No more secret agreements.

The source of the paralysis is how Israel elects members of the Knesset and forms its government. The electoral system is hyper-democratic: Once a party attracts 1% of the popular vote (fewer than 20,000 votes in 1988), it secures a seat in the Knesset.

Today, 15 parties sit in the Knesset. To form a government, seven to nine of them must agree on a set of principles. Governing can be very difficult, indeed.

At the height of the recent coalition negotiations, the nation anxiously waited for the 92-year-old spiritual leader of a tiny, non-Zionist, religious faction to indicate which of the two major parties, Labor and Likud, he preferred. His words could make or break a future government. They broke it. In such circumstances, the entire political leadership, including the prime minister and the Cabinet, is forced to devote substantial time and energy to interparty intrigues.

No member of the Knesset, moreover, is personally accountable to the electorate. Israelis cast their votes for a party list of candidates put together by the party’s Central Committee. Members of the Knesset thus owe their seats--and loyalty--to the local party bosses and interest groups who rule the Central committees. The result is a political bazaar in which the bidding for the support of the small parties or for individuals in the rival camp is unfettered by rules. Political decency is not rewarded--or rewarding.

Spontaneous street protests, mass demonstrations, a plethora of petitions--even hunger strikes--have called for changes in the electoral system. The public’s desire for a less complicated and more productive politics is sincere. But political reform born of public protest risks a paradox: The pressure that may force the politicians to change the system may also sabotage the goals of reform.

Israelis unwisely want a solution to the system’s ills--now. They want to directly elect the prime minister, without realizing such a system would require extensive constitutional remodeling. It would also miss the target. Political reform cannot change Israeli political culture, at least not in the near future. At best, it could offer a more efficient way of doing politics. But this, too, would not happen overnight. Reform cannot erase the fact that Israelis are deeply divided over fundamental issues of national destiny, which, by their nature, are difficult to decide.

Fortunately, many of the technical solutions to Israel’s political woes have already been formulated. In January, 1989, after a second “national unity” government--which no one wanted--was formed, Labor and Likud jointly established a bipartisan committee on electoral reform. The government’s fall ended the committee’s work, but the principles of reform it developed, with the help of the Israel-Diaspora Institute’s international advisory body, are ready for action.

The reforms spell out a “mixed system” of electing Israeli politicians. Half the Knesset would still be elected through national party lists; the other half through 20 three-member districts. A political party would have to win 3.3% of the popular vote to gain a seat. This would cut the number of parties in the Knesset and introduce an unprecedented degree of political accountability.

A “prime-ministerial government” is proposed. It would foster governmental efficiency by strengthening the prime minster’s hand without sacrificing the checks and balances of Israel’s parliamentarian system. The leader of the party who won the most seats in the Knesset would automatically become the prime minister. Coalition negotiations would be carried out before the election, giving voters an opportunity to express views on the deals made. The prime minister would not have to count on the unswerving goodwill of his coalition partners to govern.

The current political paralysis is added proof that reform is overdue. In reforming its politics, Israel could rightly claim that it, too, was joining the age of change.